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In the opening chapter

I

offer an interpretation of

Frege's philosophy of mathematics, one which is in keeping

with his claim to have argued for the epistemological
thesis that arithmetic is comprised of analytic judgments.

Central to this interpretation is the suggestion that
Frege took a notion of analysis which Kant had directed

upon concepts and redirected it upon whole propositional
contents.

By this means Frege attempts to justify his

use, in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik , of "definitions"

which are ontologically augmentative.

In particular, Frege

holds that the pair
The number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs
There are just as many Fs and Gs

have the same content, though the former makes reference
to numbers whereas the latter does not, while the latter
is epistemologically prior to the former.

In this way

Frege gains numbers without needing to call upon non-

empirical intuition to account for our arithmetic knowledge.

I

further argue that G rundp;c3etze der Arithmetik

does not bring any basic change on these matters, that it

V

could not» if Frege is

"to

continue to hold that arithmetic

judgments are analytic and not synthetic a priori.

Chapter II represents an attempt at clarification of
Frege's conception of logic.

I

develop his idea of logic

as lingua characterica . where such a lingua would be a

canonical notation whose grammar is that of logic and which
(potentially) is a universal language, a language in which

what can be said can be said.

Frege’s thinking about logic

deepened with his conception of the laws of logic as laws
of truth.

Frege’s thoughts on truth, developed in pro-

viding a semantics for his canonical notation, place him
squarely in the "correspondence theory of truth" tradition.
I

—

suggest that we may look upon Frege’s theory of reference
his semantics of Begriffsschrift

—

as an attempt at an

exhaustive answer to such a question as how language is
"about the world" so that what we say can be true (or
false.

In Chapter III, having expounded Frege's semantics,
I

examine the origins of this semantics through attempting

to display a path which is inviting at its beginnings, and

which follows individually appealing steps right up to
such "paradoxical" conclusions as that the concept horse
is not a concept.

And

I

argue that the unsaturation of

concepts which gives rise to such "paradoxes" is more

deep-seated in Frege’s thought than has been generally
acknowledged.

Tinkering will not eliminate the

problem

Vi

since unsaturation is an essential element of Frege's

semantics of predication

—

to reject it is to reject his

account of predication, if not his conception of logic.
The "problem”, most generally stated, is the inef lability
of Frege's semantics; the semantics of the lingua cannot

be stated within the lingua itself.

Chapter IV opens with a defense, of sorts, of Frege's
largely ignored horizontal-stroke.

In particular,

I

argue that Frege was not inconsistent, as is sometimes
alleged, in holding both that the denotations of predicates
are incomplete and that the denotations of sentences are
not.

I

then turn to inquiring into whether the ineffability

which attends f’rege's semantics is avoidable through some
alternative account of predication.

An examination of a

representative selection of commonly held views leads me
to conclude that Frege is correct in his judgment that a

"necessity of language" precludes the statement of an
otherwise adequate account of predication in a manner

which is consistent with the import of that account.

At

least this cannot be done while remaining true to Frege's

philosophy of logic.

vii
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distinctions between a priori and a posteriori,
•
•
•
synthetic and analytic, concern, as I see it, not the
content of the judgment but the justification for
making the judgment • . •
if the truth concerned is
[t]he problem becomes • • •
a mathematical one , «
that of finding the proof of the proposition, and of
following it up right back to the primitive truths*
If in carrying out the process, we come only on general
logical laws and on definitions, then the truth is
an analytic one, • « •
GOTTLOB FRIGE
.

r

Frege’s definition of ’analytic* explicates well what
is meant by saying that the logicist (Russell's)
philosophy of miat hematics has refuted Kant and established the analytic nature of arithemetic truths. There
is, however, a subtle difficulty here . . . which is
genei'a.llv overlooked,
ARTHUR PAP

CHAPTER

I

LOGIC ISM

$1.

Frege’s Program and a Problem of Definition
The central concern of this essay is, as the title

g\jjggf>sxs,

with Frege’s account of predication.

On chxS

concepts.
view, predicative expressions are said to denote

Such denotata are said to be unsaturated

j

they effec-

to
tively deflect all attempts at singular reference

themselves,

I

shall, in Chapter III, be extensively

apparently
concerned with the whys end therefores of this

bizarre doctrine,
this view of
"Why bother?" it might be asked, since
A desire
Frege's would seem to be universally rejected,

perhaps provides
to straighten the historical record

2

sufficient justification*

Beyond this, however,

I

have

come to believe that many, perhaps most, of those who

have dismissed this curious feature of Frege's philosophy
have done so too quickly*

While some of the consequences

of holding that concepts are unsaturated are notorious,

others have not been terribly well appreciated.

Thus

they are not investigated, or not in the light of Frege's

general philosophical outlook.

Yet upon investigation

it will be seen, I believe, that some of these conse-

quences, ones which strike us initially as most distasteful, are nonetheless unavoidable.
I

I

wish to argue.

have in mind in particular the ineffability bred of

unsaturat ion.
I

Or so

In Chapter XV, which concludes this essay,

shall argue for this, arguing that it is not possible

to provide an account of predication the statement

which is consistent with the account provided.
this cannot be done, so

I

02'

At least

shall argue, while being true

to a certain conception of logic, one on v/hich the laws
of logic arc laws of truth.

This picture of logic, leaned upon in xhe later

argument, is developed and attributed to itege in

Chapter II.

There

I

explore Frege's idea of a

laws
char acterica , relate this to his thesis that the

squarely
of logic are laws of truth, and locate Frege
as
in the Aristotelian tradition of viewing truth

correspondence of language with reality.

3

I

begin this essay with some remarks on Frege’s

philosophy of mathematics.

And let us recall that it

was Frege’s investigations into the foundations of mathematics that moved him to develop his logical theory.
Here too my purpose, partially, is to clarify an important episode of our history through procuring a better

appreciation of a central aspect of Frege’s logicism,
one which at first comes into focus over the justification
of certain definitions.

Additionally, the perspective

provided on Frege’s logicism should put us in a receptive
state of mind to take up next Frege’s conception of logic.
In 1879 Frege published a booklet of some 88 pages
beari.ng the title Begriff sschrift , eine der arithmetische n

nac hg e b i 1 d e t e Forme Isprache des reinen Denken s

.~

In

this he set down modern first-order predicate logic in
a complete and consistent form, though he did not attempt

to prove either of these results.

He used negation and

conditionality to give truth-functional logics universal
quantification, for predicate logic.

Also included were

identity theory, and an essential, though inexplicit,
second-order logic.

In the "Preface" Frege announced

that

1.

Begriff s schrift , a Formula Language Mode_lg d upor} That
Pure Thought . Translated in From
of ^AT itlirnet ic , f
Fre7’:e~ to Godel , van Heijenoert.
Hereafter, Begrif f sschrift .
,

4

«
•
•
arithmetic was the point of departure
for the train of thought that led me to my
Begriffsschrift . And • • • I intend to apply
it first of all to that science, attempting
to provide a more detailed analysis of the
concepts of arithmetic and a deeper foundation
for its theorems."^

Towards this end he included in Begriffsschrift a defini-

tion of the notion of the ancestral of a relation in
terms of the logic of his system? this was to figure

essentially in the definition of number Frege would later
give
Die G rundlagen der Arithmetic follov^ed five years

hence

This v/ork divides rather evenly into two parts*

It begins Y/ith a brilliantly critical discussion of a

wide array of views on topics in the philosophy of mathematics, focusing especially upon opinions as to the

nature of arithmetic truths and on the concept of number*
The latter half of the book is an extended argument for
the viev/, which Frege claims only to have made probable,

that
the laws of arithmetic are analytic .judgments and consequently a priori. Arithmetic
thus becomes simply a development of logic,
and every proposition of arithmetic a law
of logic, albeit a derivative one.

2,

Begriffsschrift, p. 8.

3*

The Foundations of Arithmetic «

Xustin*
Hereafter, Grundlagen .
4

,

Grundl agen , p. 99*

Translated by J.L.

5

This is the thesis of logicism.

Frege had informed his readers at the outset of

Grundlagen that, with regard to the distinctions between
the a priori and a posteriori, and the analytic and the

synthetic
.
•
•
I do not • • • mean to assign a new
sense to these terms, but only to state accurately what earlier writers, Kant in particular, have meant by them*^

Thus it was Frege's aim in Grundlagen to make probable
the idea that arithmetic was analytic in Kant's sense*

And so to make probable the conclusion that Kant had

been mistaken in holding that arithmetic truths were
synthetic a priori.

We would then be freed from having

to evoke and make sense of such ideas as that of Kant's

pure intuition, at least as regards our philosophy of

That Grundlagen has a general epistemological

number.^

character was emphasized by Frege in his "Introduction”
while "reception by philosophers v/ill be varied, depending
on each philosopher's own position", he hopes that "£s]ome
one or another perhaps will take this opportunity to
7
examine afresh the principles of his theory of knowledge."

5*

Ibid

6.

Cf. Parsons, "Mathematics, Foundations of" in Edwards'
Encyclopedia , p. 193»

7*

Grundla.^en , pp. x-xi.

,

p* 3>

6

How then did Frege intend to establish his view that

arithmetic truths were analytic in nature?

Roughly

speaking, by convincing us that arithmetic

from logic by purely logical means.

v/as

derivable

Somewhat more ex-

actly, if we suppose we possess an axiomatization of

arithmetic, say with Feano's axioms, then, if within
an axiomatized system of logic we could derive each of

those arithmetic axioms, Frege would regard his thesis
as established.

sible.
v/ith

Of course such a derivation is impos-

For arithmetic has its distinctive vocabulary

which we speak of numbers and operations upon num-

bers, and in logic no mention is made of numbers and

arithmetic operations, at least not in so many v;ords.
Definitions must supplement derivations if the latter
are to make the intended point.

But then, as Arthur Pap

reminds us, "any statement could be made to express an

analytic truth in [the] sense [of being derivable from
logic alone] if any definition whatever wore admissable."

Q

This focuses our attention upon the question of justifying such definitions as we employ in shifting from a

purely logical to an arithmetical vocabulary, justifying
them in such a way as to sustain the claim that arithmetic
is analytic in a non-Pickwickian sense.

are severa]. problems in this area.

6.

Actually there

One very general one

Se manti cs and Necessary Tr uth , p.

•

7

we might, put this way*

logic?

How are we to get numbers out of

Additionally there may arise specific questions

over particular definitions, over Frege's definition of
the one tone relationship, for instance*^

Somewhere in

between the very general and the quite specific the

question may arise as to the justification, if numbers
are to be identified with certain logical

objects (sets,

perhaps), of identifying the progression of numbers with
one rather tlian another progression of these logical

objects.

Paul Benacerraf, for one, has argued that since

there is no principled way of picking one sequence of sets

with which to identify the numbers over other equally
suitable candidates, we should reject the claim that

individual numbers are particular sets*^^
not be concerned with this issue.

But

I

shall

More generally, it

be no part of my aim to resuscitate logicism.

v/ill

My concern

will be to shew how Frege was attuned to the general
problem, which

I

shall refer to as Pap's problem, of gain-

ing numerical discourse adequate to the workings of

arithmetic out of non-numerical discourse, and this in
a fashion which opens the way to arguing for the view

9.

10

See Duinmett, "Frege, Gottlob" in Edwards’ Encyclopedia,
p. 23^*

"What Numbers Could Not Be", P hilosop
LXXIV (1965) ^ 47”73*

hic

Review,

8

that arithinetic is analytic in Kant's sense*

(The actual

argument will proceed over a pavement of major technical
accomplishn’.ents

sion.

,

but these will not come in for discus-

)

In Grundlagen Frege gains numbers by definition, or

what he calls definition.

We may distinguish between

definitions v/hich allow the eliraination af the defined

expression and those which do not.

Eliminative defini-

tion may be accomplished either directly, by providing
an alternative expression with which to replace that
defined, or paraphrastically, through showing how to

avoid use of the defined expression by paraphrasing
sentences in which it occurs into others without it.

Russell's theory of descriptions popularized this procedure, known as contextual definition, in at least

certain segments of the philosophical community.
Michael Dummett believes that contextual definition
plays a significant role in the program of Grundlagen .

When G rundlagen is read in its natural sense,
v/ithout the importation of views stated only
in Frege's subsequent v;ritings, it is plain
that he regards his principle that words have
meaning only in the context of sentences as
justifying contextual definitions and took
this to be one of its most important consequences
And that the use of this type of definition is justified, in Frege's eyes, by what

11

"Frege", p. 228

I

shall call Frege

s

10

is better attuned to the function which the Dictum does

play for Frege in Grundlagen »

Indeed my major aim in

this chapter is to bring out how it does performi, which
I

think has not been well appreciated.
A non-eliminative definition* while not providing

means for dispensing with the defined expressions* settles
the use of that expression* at least for certain key

contexts.

Prominent here are recursive, or inductive,

definitions.

We shall encounter one such, Tarski's for

truth- in-L* at the tail end of this essay.

For now

I

simply pass this by? noting only that the "definitions”
Orundlagen which will hold cur attention are not of
this sort.
The Grundlagen type of definition whereby numbers

are gained is non-eliminative however.

We may initiate

discussion of this by quoting at length a passage of

Grundlagen where Frege is discussing Kant on definition.
He seems to think of concepts as defined by
giving a simple list of characteristics in
no special order; but of all ways of forming
concepts, that is one of the least fruitful.
/a geometrical illustraticn will make
.
,
If we represent
the distinction clear
the concepts . . . by figures or areas^ina
plane, then the concept defined by a simple
list of characteristics corresponds to the
area cominon to all the areas representing
the defining characteristics; it is enclosed
by segments of other boundary lines. With a
definition like this, therefore, what v/e do
-- in terms of our illustration -- Is to use
the lines already given in a new way for
the purpose of demarcating an area. Nothing

...

11

essentially new, however, emerges in the
process. But the more fruitful type of
definition is a matter of drav/ing boundary
lines that v/ere not previously given at all.
What we shall be able to infer from it, cannot
be inspected in advance; here, we are not
simply taking out of the box again what we
have just put into it,i^
In part Frege is recommending that definitions need not
be limited to the conjunctive; other logical operations

may just as 3.egitimately be called upon in providing
definitions.
passage.

But this is not the whole force of the

Other logical operations will also simply trace

old lines in different patterns, whereas,

’’the

more fruit-

ful type of definition is a matter of drawing boundary
lines that were not previously given at all,"

postpone discussion of just

look like.

wha.t

We must

these "definitions" will

But Frege implies that they may yield up

something "essentially new", and we may anticipate that,
in the case of our concern, what is "new" will be numbers.
It is through the "more fruitful type of definition" that
P’rege

attempts to solve Pap's problem in a fashion

compatible with his program of establishing that the
truths of arithmetic are analytic in the sense of Kant,

Preparatory to taking this up, let us reminisce a little
on the sense of 'analytic* for Kant,

14,

Grundlagen , pp. 100-101

12

$2,

Analytic ity and Analysis

In his Prolegomena Kant states that
•
•
<
there is a distinction in judgments • • •
according to which they are merely explicativ e »
adding nothing to the content of knowledge,
or exp a nsive , increasing the given knowledge.
The former may be called analytical the latter
svnthat leal judgments .15
,

He goes on immediately to say.

Analytical judgments express nothing in the
predicate but what has been already thought
in the concept of the subject, though not so
distinctly or with the same (full) consciousness* When I say:
"All bodies are extended,"
I have not amplified in the least my concept
of body, but have only analyzed it, as extension
was really thought to belong to that concept
before the judgment was made, though it was
not expressed* This judgment is therefore
analytical
Analytical judgments add "nothing to the content of
The point is put in the Critique this

knov/ledge."

v/ay:

"through analytic judgments our knowledge is not in any

way extended,

17
•

Companion to this view is the idea that analytic
judgments are arrived at through conceptual analysis,
"by dissecting given concepts"

1

as Kant says in

In the Critique he speaks of arriving at

Prolegomtena *

15*

Proleg omena to Any Future Metaphysics, p. l4.

16.

Ibid*

17*

Immanu el Kant

18*

Prolegomena , p* 24*

,

p*

14*
'

s

Critique of Pure

p* 49*

13

analytical judgments by "merely breaking [a concept] up
into those constituent concepts that have all along been

thought in it

^

In a similar vein his Logic

notes say

Analytic propositions one calls those propositions whose certainty rests on identity of
concepts (of the predicate with the notion of
the subject.)
Propositions whose truth is not
grounded on identity of concepts must be
called s\Tithetic
Here Kant runs together the idea of something being true
in virtue of its constituent concepts

»

and its being

known to be true through attention to these concepts.
And he seems to assume, here and elsewhere, that some-

thing which can be thus known to be true cannot be otherwise known.

This is probably false.

do not concern us.
v/hat is

But these matters

The point is the priority of concepts;

analytic can be known through conceptual analysis.

A third point is that Kant*s remarks upon analytic

judgments tend to presuppose that all judgments, or

propositions, are of what he calls subject-predicate
form, where 'All bodies are extended' provides an example.
I

shall assume, however, that

tlie

analytic-synthetic

distinction is intended to be both exclusive and exhaustive.

(In these respects this distinction would be like

i9*

Critique , p. 48.

20.

Log ic , p. 117*

14

the a priori-a posteriori distinction,)

Exclusive, in

that nothing is both analytic and synthetic; nor,

I

shall

assume, analytic at one time (or for one person) and

synthetic at another (or for another).

This condition

requires that what we speak of as analytic, or, alternatively, synthetic, must be thought of as having, or

bearing, fixed truth-values.
vfhat

such must, or may, be.

Let us not here worry about
The distinction is exhaus-

tive over the domain of truths, or bearers of truth, in
that each truth is either an analytic truth or a synthetic
truth,

(We may conveniently ignore falsehoods.)

The

analytic-synthetic distinction will thus cover more
ground than has been thus far suggested.

One trivial

addition will be those truths, such as ’Bodies are bodies',
where the "predicate" does not explicate (even partially)
the "subject", but simply is the "subject".

In his

Logic Kant says that such truths as these are tauto -

logical ,

^^

More importantly, the distinction must have appli-

cation to propositions of any form.

As was implicit in

the statement of the second point above,

I

would suggest

that there is nothing inherent in Kant's idea of truths

knowable t/irough conceptual analysis which restricts its
applj cation to propositions of any particular form,

21,

See L ogic , p, 118,

'All

15

brothers of sisters are siblings of sisters* would seem
to count as analytic as readily as 'Brothers are siblings*,
or 'Bodies are extended*.

What then of (e.g.)

*If John is a brother of Mary,

then John is a sibling of Mary'?

Whether this counts as

analytic will turn on whether sentences of the form
If S

.

then

1

are analytic.

1

And generally, whether the truths of logic

are analytic truths.

I

assume that Kant v/ould (or did)

classify logical truths as analytic.

22

Certainly this is

how Frege took him, for the Grundlagen program presupposes
it.

And surely if Kant treated the analytic-synthetic

distinction as exhaustive he must have considered logic
to be analytic.

He could hardly have failed to mention

that the truths of logic were synthetic a priori if that

was his viev/.

But the intuitive justification for classing

the truths of logic as analytic seems to be missing.

Before continuing with this, we may summarize the

foregoing v/ith the following scheinatizationi

22.

"The judgments in the science of logic itseli are...
entirely a priori. I have not found any statement
in Kant that they are analytic and not syiithetic,
but... I am prepared to assume that they are all
Paton, K ant s
properly regarded as analytic
Metaohys ic of Experience , vol. 1, p. 2l4.
*

16

Truth

Tautologies

Explicatives

Let us now consider the question: What» according
to Kant* do explicatives and logical truths have in common

which warrants according them the same epistemological
status?

Kant in several places writes as if there was

a single source of analytic ity and that this was the law
of contradiction.

Thus in the Prolegomena he states

that *'[t]he common principle of all analytical judgments
is the law of contradiction’*. ^

The implied claim, that

a proposition is analytic if and only if its denial is

self-contradictory* may be true* but it hardly seems
explanatory.

On the one hand, how would we determine

that 'Some vixen is not female* is self-contradictory?

Presumably we would reason that since a vixen is a female
fox the claim in question in effect amounts to stating
that something both is and is not female* which is self-

contradictory.

But clearly the law of contradiction

plays a subsidiary role in our being certain that all

vixens are female, one subsidiary to the idea of conceptual analysis.

23*

P rolegomena * p . 14.

17

On the other hand# how would we determine that the

following is self-contradictory*

Though all men are

mortal and Socrates is a man# nonetheless Socrates is
not mortal*
from this*

We can derive an explicit self-contradiction

But in so doing we will employ various

principles of inference*

So we shall be justified in

calling the claim denied by our initial statement analytic
only if

v/e

have independent justification for supposing

that the principles of inference used in deriving the

contradiction take one only from the denial of analytic
truths to self-contradictions*

(And that the denial of

the denial of an analytic truth is itself an analytic

truth*)

And no such justification is forthcoming.

Thus

neither the explicatives, nor the logical truths, have
their epistemological status explained# at least in any
direct way# in terms of the law of contradiction.
1

shall not pursue further this matter of a common

ground for logical truths and explicatives.

It would

not seem that a unified account of Kant's analytic judgments would be required for the purpose of assessing
Frege's claim to show that arithmetic is analytic in

Kant's sense.

To this end we need only ask whether Frege's

initial resources are analytic in Kant’s sense# and
v/hether each step he takes therefrom results, one way or

another, in a proposition v/hich should be considered

analytic in Kant's sense, and whether in this way we

18

arrive at arithmetic.

Though if we thought that no

general account of analyticity could be given, this might

diminish in our eyes the epistemological importance of
such success as Frege may have achieved with his program.
Before leaving Kant for Frege let us look a bit

more closely at those analytic propositions which are,
intuitively, most deserving of the label, the explicatives.

Let us first note, in passing, what

Kant's conceptual atomism.

I

shall call

This is the thought, at least

implied in Kant's discussions of analytic judgments, that

any given concept of any given proposition has a unique
(though perhaps null) analysis into component concepts.
Or at least that it is not possible to have differing

complete analyses of a given concept, v/here a complete

analysis issues in ultimate constituent concepts, and an
ultimate concept is one itself without constituents
(i,e,, susceptible only of the null analysis,)

To provide

an analysis of a concept is the same as to define that
concept.

And we might call a complete analysis a complete
"?Ll

definition,''

Kant seems to have this latter in mind when

he speaks of "analytic definitions" in L ogic as follows,

24,

Kant was not as clear as Frege would be that a list
Failure
of concepts does not constitute a def inition ,
of
use
the
forecloses
point
this
on
appreciation
of
one's
in
conjunction
than
other
operations
logical
definitions, which was a complaint Frege lodged
against Kant.
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All F.iven concepts, be they given a priori
or a posteriori, can only be defined through
lysis . For given concepts can only be made
distinct by making their characteristics successively clear. If all characteristics of a
given concept are made clear, the concept
becomes completely distinct} and if it does
not contain too many characteristics, it is
at the same time precise, and fi‘cm this springs
a definition of the concept. ^3

For he notes.
Since one cannot become certain by any proof
whether all characteristics of a given concept
have been exhausted by complete analysis,
all analytic definitions must be held to be
uncertain. 26

Analytic truths, at least of the explicative variety,
are, we might say, true by definition.

But to so remark

is in no way to hint of conventionalism.

Explicatives are truths which we may come to know
are true through appropriately attending to their com-

ponent concepts.

We can learn, for instance, that vixens

are female foxes through learning that the concept of

vixen contains both the concept of female and the concept
of fox.

This is the view.

Yet a difficulty lurks.

For

the description of the case presupposes the learner to

possess the concept of vixen, and so, presumably, to

already know such trivialities as that vixens are vixens.
But if this is so, how would one learn that vixens are

25*

Logic , p. 143

26.

Ibid., p. 143
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female foxes, given that the concept of female fox is
the concept of vixen?

this can be done*

Yet it seems indisputable that

A person can be in a position of com-

prehending

v/hat

analysis*

Still we may be puzzled by this combination

to analyze, and yet not possess the

of knowledge and ignorance*

Concepts, for Kant, have fixed constituents*

When

we learn that, for instance, vixens are female foxes it

seems that, for Kant, what we do is scrutinize the concept

vixen so as to somehow apprehend its parts.

Yet it is

puzzling how we can comprehend the concept and yet fail
to apprehend its parts, as if comprehension were like

stuffing something in one's pocket paying it no heed*
Complementariiy, it is unclear on what model
imagine the process of attempted analysis*

v/e

are to

That Kant was

alive to such difficulties seems evident from the second

passage quoted in this section.

Similar puzzles turn up, though somewhat altered
in form, at a crucial juncture of Frege's philosophy
of mathematics.

In Grundlagen they will arise in

connection with definitions of the more fruitful type*
Later much the same issues are focused upon a crucial
axiom of his system of logic, or so

further on*

I

shall argue

The Kantian puzzles of analysis are

relocated as a result of Frege's shift from concepts to

21

propositions as the target of analysis.

His success in

resolving them will determine, in part, the adequacy of
his solution of Pap's problem.
$3*

Frege's Solution

Let us begin by recounting and recasting the earlier

observation on what Frege need do to establish that arithmetic is analytic in Kant's sense.

It is enough if he

were to (1) begin with resources v/hich Kant might well

accept as purely logical resources, and so also as ones

which issue in analytic propositions, and (2) while

making no move not analytically implied by propositions
already certified as analytic, arrive at arithmetic, by
deriving Peano's axioms for instance.

To accomplish (1)

about all Frege would need to do would be to defend his

analysis of statements of generality, such as 'All bodies
are extended', in terms of predication, truth-functional

conditionality, and universal quantif icaxion

—

the

analysis which is called to mind by the notationi
(x) (Bx:-’Ex)

.

To these ideas we need add only those of

negation, identity and second-order generality to have
the basic ideas of the system of logic presented in
B egriffsschri ft

.

It seems unlikely that Kant would

dispute that any of these was purely logical.
the logic of Begrif

s schrif t,

And so

which Frege would later

call the fundamental part of logic, would seem to count

22

as analytic for a Kantian#

Anyway

I

shall assume that

this is so*
Grundge^set ze der Arithmetik #^^ the first volume of

which was published in 1893 » shows some important changes
in Frege's logical system.

For the time being we may

think of this system as the fundamental logic of

Begrif fsschrift enriched by set theory.

The enrichment

occurs via the ill-fated Basic Law V (BLV), the axiom

alluded to earlier.

Granting that arithmetic can be

couched in the notation of set theory and that its axioms
so expressed are provable in that theory# to argue that

we thereby show arithmetic to be analytic would require
a defense of a claim that BLV itself is# in some appro-

priate sense, analytically true.

turn ($4).

To this we shall re-

First wo shall take a closer look at what

goes on in Grundlagen .

But let us observe that to show that Frege's logic
is essentially Kantian would not itself be to show that

Frege and Kant were in agreement on all matters re3.ating
to the nature or epistemology of logic.

It is possible

for two people to agree on the logical truths and yet

disagree on

27*

hovr

we know them.

V/e

shall take up this

The Basic Laws of Ar ithmetic . Translated (in part)#
v/ith an introductory essay, by Montgomery Furth.
Hereafter, Grundgesets e
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topic in Chapter II*

Here* in passing* we may acknowledge

the presumption that Frege saw himself in substantial

agreement with Kant over the epistemology of logic.

For

he tells us that he is using what he takes to be Kant*s

notion of analyticity* and he never -- at least during
the period of our concern in this essay* roughly up

through the early years of this century

—

suggests that

he thinks of logic* at least in its fundamental part, as

other than analytic*
We now turn to the issue of how Frege* in Grundlaficen *

sought to show that arithmetic was analytic*

Philosoph-

ically (as opposed to technically) the central passage
starts at section 62, which begins with the questions
”Hov/

*

•

•

are numbers given to us

*

*

2
*?" 0

It may not

be immediately clear just what Frege is asking.

approach

v/ill be to let his

his intent.

Our

response instruct us as to

But at the outset we can at least confirm

the importance of this question for Frege.

In the second

volume of Grundgeset^e * published in 1902, Frege wrote that
"if there are logical objects at all
of arithmetic are such objects

28

G rundlagen *

p* 73*

—

—

and the objects

then there must also be

Conversations with Philip Hugly impressed upon me
the importance of this section*

24

a means of apprehending them, of recognizing them*"^^

Then, while this volume was awaiting publication, Frege

learned from Russell of the inconsistency in the
GrjmdKQset ze system of logic.

He responded with an

appendix to that volume which concludes with this remark*
The prime problem of arithmetic is the
question, In what way are we to conceive logical
objects, in particular, numbers? By what means
are we justified in recognizing numbers as
objects? liven if this problem is not solved
to the degree I thought it v/as when I wrote
this volume, still I do not doubt that the
way to the solution has been found *3^

Though the form of words changes, the question of how we
are to apprehend numbers, how they are to be given to us,

remains in the forefront of Frege’s thinking*
Before moving directly to Frege's Grundlagen attempt
to answer his question, let us briefly recap certain

"results” established by this juncture of the essay*
Here we may lean on a summary Frege himself provides*
Let us cast a final brief glance back
over the course of our enquiry* After
establishing that number is neither a collection of things nor a property of such?
yet at the same time is not a subjective
product of mental processes either, we

29*

Ph ilosophical Wr itings of Go ttlob Frege * Fdited and
translated by Peter Geach and ifax Black, p* I8l*
The assumption that numbers must be logical objects
marks something of a shift in view fronj that to be^
found 5n Gruji^ii^e n , and also a hardening of position*

30 *

Grundg es etze , p. 143*
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concluded that a statement of number asserts
something objective of a concept*^!
By **statement of number” Frege intends such statements
as

*

Jupiter has four moons* and 'Venus has zero moons'#

He regarded such use of number words as their "basic uset”

or their basic use "in the context of a judgment.
And, whereas he does not say so explicitly, his thought

would seem to be this.
words to count.

In the first place we use number

In counting things we are always counting

things of some sort.

And so when we come to express the

result of our countings we offer a statement of how many
things there are of the given sort.

The statement 'Jupiter

has four moons' is such a statement.
does Jupiter have?"

moons.)

—

1

,

2,

3»

^

•

("How many moons
•

•

Jupiter has four

Such a statement of number "asserts something

objective of a concept" since, in our example,

wh^it is

being said is that exactly four objects, no more no less,
fall under the concept of moon of Jupiter, or more simply
that four are the moons of Jupiter*

Continuing with Frege's recapitulation.
We attempted next to define the individual
numbers 0, 1, etc*, and the step from one
number to the next in the number series.
Our first attempt broke down, because we
had defined only the predicate v/hich we

31

.

32.

Grundla^^en , p. 115*
I bid.

,

p. 59

.
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said was asserted of the concept, but had
not given separate definitions of 0 or 1
which are only elements in such predicates.
This resulted in our being unable to prove
the identity of numbers,
it became clear
that the number studied by arithmetic must
be conceived not as a dependent attribute,
but substantivally. Number thus emerged
as an object that can be recognized again,
although not as a physical or even merely
spatial object, nor yet as one of which we
can form a picture by means of our imagination.33

Although the basic use of number words is in attributive
constructions such use is not adequate to arithmetic.
Briefly, we may think of number words as employed in the

attributive construction of “statements of number*' as

functioning as indices upon numerical quantifiers.

Thus,

•Jupiter has four moons* might be symbolized in standard
(Ex 4 )(x is a moon of Jupiter).

notation asi
point can,

I

believe, be put as follows.

V/e

Then Frege's
cannot express

such essential facts of arithmetic as that every number
has a successor if number words are limited to indexical

position of numerical quantifiers.

For what would be

needed would be to somehow treat the position of
(e.g.)

in the above as itself open to quantification.

*4*

But this would be to no longer regard '4' as an indissol-

uble part of 'kx^'.

33 •

ibid

,

p.

59

When we come to state arithmetic

2?

laws we need numbers

quate*

numerical quantifiers are inade-

Thus » though in their basic use number words do

not refer to objects, since they function not as singular
terms, but rather as attributives modifying sortal terms,
or as we have just put it, as indices on numerical

quantifiers, numbers nonetheless are objects, Frege
concludes*

But then how, and with what justification,

do we make our acquaintance with numbers, the objects of

arithmetic?

How, and with what justification, do we make

the change from using number words to count with, to

using them tc refer to numbers?

Continuing once more with Frege's summary remarks.
We next laid down the fundamental principle
that we must never try to define the meaning
of a word in isolation, but only as it is
used in the context of a preposition* only
by adhering to this can we, as I believe,
avoid a physical view of number v/ithout -jslipping into a psychological view of it*-^^

This brings us back up to section 62, whose first two

sentences run in full.
How, then, are numbers to be given to
us, if v/e cannot have any ideas or intuitions
of them? Since it is only in the context of

34*

Cf* Frege, "Function and Concept" in P hilosophical
"The first
Writin gs ? for example such remarks as*
place where a scientific expression appears with a
clear' cut reference is where it is required for the
statement of a law*" (p* 21) Also, the closing
remarks of this address*

35 •

G rundlage n, p.

Il6.
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proposition that words have any meaning*
our problem becomes this*
To define the sense
of a proposition in which a number word occurs

s.

Here* as in the summary, we find Frege referring to what
we have called his Dictum.

The next stretch of text

indicates in an initial way, the role Frege's Dictum is
to play in his philosophy of arithmetic, at least in
Gruxidlagen .

Frege takes the task at hand to be

to define the sense of the proposition
"the number which belongs to the
concept F is the same as that which
belongs to the concept G"j
that is to say, we must reproduce the content
of this proposition in other terms, avoiding
the use of the expression
"the Number which belongs to
the concept F".
In doing this, v/e shall be given a general
criterion for the identity of numbers. When
we have thus acquired a means of arriving at
a determinate number and of recognizing it
again as the same, we can assign it a number
word as its proper name. 3?

Abbreviating the sentence 'the Number which belongs to
the concept F is the same as

•

.

.

'

to,

NxFx = NxGx,
Frege says, in effect, that "we must reproduce the content
of this" in non-numerical terms; to accomplish this would
be to provide a means of recognizing numbers.

How is this to be done?

Frege, citing Hume, puts

forv/ard the idea of defining numerical

36.

Ibid.

,

p.

73*

37*

I

bid

:

p.

73*

identity in terms
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of ones one correlation, the just-as-many-as relationship.

This is an idea he will endorse.

But, having cautioned

that ”it raises certain logical doubts and difficulties,

which ought not to be passed over without examination",^^
he here emphasizes that he is not proposing "to define

identity specially for this case."^^

Rather the "aim is

to construct the content of a judgment which can be taken
as an identity such that each side of it is a number",^®

and so "to use the concept of identity, taken as already
knovm, as a means for arriving at that which is to be

regarded as being identical."

"Admittedly", he adds,

"this seems to be a very odd kind of definition to which

logicians have not yet paid enough attention

Interrupting Frege,
he has in mind?

hov./

..."

ho

might we state the definition

The thought is that we are to use the

idea of one »one correlation to express the content of the

previously set-off sentence.

When there are just as many

Fs as there are Gs, so that the Fs are correlated one tone

with the Gs, let us say, simply, that the Fs equal the Gs,
underlining

*

equal' to signal its somewhat special use.

38.

Ibid.

p. ?4

39.

Ibid.

p. 74

40.

Ibid., P. 74

4l

Ibid., p. 74

42.

Ibid.

p. 74
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Then Frege’s definition can be stated this way.
(A)

NxFx = NxGx

iff the Fs equal the Gs.

It is worth emphasizing that Frege has, in effect, told

us that the loft and right side of this bi-conditional

are the same in content.
the left side, (e.g.)

Otherwise put, an instance of

'The number of cows is identical

with the number of horses',

v/ill

express the same sense

as a "like'* instance of the right side,

‘The cows e qual

the horses', which is to say that there are just as many
of one as the other.

Continuing with Frege, he says that this "very odd
kind of definition", which in fact is one of the "more

fruitful type" earlier mentioned, "is not altogether

unheard of", as "may be shown by a few examples."

4?

At

this point he launches into a discussion of an example

involving parallel lines, which discussion is critical
for our understanding of what Frege is trying to show.

However

I

v/j.sh

to interru.pt Frege once more, this time to

take cognizance of a remark by Peter Geach.

With our (a) in mind Geach has written that

Given this sharp criterion for identi.fying
numbers Frege thought that only prejudice
stood in the way of our regarding numbers

-O*

Ibid.

,

p. 74
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as objGctG.
he is right.

With what

I

am strongly inclined to think

^

take to be the thrust of this remark

agreement; on this

I

I

am in

shall be more explicit further down.

But it is deserving of notice that, as it stands, the

remark is both inappropriate and inaccurate.

Inappropriate,

since, as we have observed, Frege claims to have already

established that numbers are "self-subsistent objects'*
before taking up the problem of how numbers are given to
us, which leads him to put forth (A).

Inaccurate as

regards Frege's views, since, as also noted, Frege in

effect tells us that the definition (A) raises "certain
logical doubts and difficulties, which ought not to be

passed over v/ithout examination."

Such examination

eventually leads Frege to revise, or reformulate, the
definition in terms of extensions of concepts.

On this

Geach writes that "the importance of Frege's doctrine

concerning extensions has been grossly exaggerated because
it has been thought an essential part of his doctrine

concerning numbers*'.

Geach says that he is going to

ignore it, and does.

Now, as regards Frege's thinking

at the time cf Grundlagen

sympathy with Geach.

44 ,

am, on this point, in

shall bring this out through

G.E.Me Anscombe and P.T. Geach, Thr^e Philosophers
p.

45.

I

1

l

6 l.

Ibid.

,

p. 158
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examining Frege's examination of one of those "doubts
and difficulties") all in due time.
Let us now get back to Frege's discussion of his

example involving parallel lines, to which

much importance.

attach

I

He writes.

The judgment "line a is parallel to
line b", or, using symbols,

S // b,
can be taken as an identity. If we do this,
we obtain the concept of direction, and sayi
"the direction of line a is identical with
the direction of line b". Thus we replace
the symbol //by the more generic =, through
removing what is specific in the content of
the former and dividing it between a and b.
V/e carve up the content in a way different
from the original way^ and this yields us
a new concept,^^
Frege seems to have just told us that the pair of

sentences
(a)

Line a is parallel to line b,

(b)

The direction of a is identical with the direction of b,

have the same content, but that they "carve up the content"
in somsv/hat different ways.

How do these sentences differ?

They differ, or seem to, in logical structure.
difference

v/e

might show schematically this

This

v/ayi

xRy
Tx(Fx) = Ty(Gy),

They differ, or seem to, in their logical consequences,
(a), but not (b), implies something of the form

46 •

Oru ndla gen, pp,

7 4-75®
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(Ex) (xRy)

.

(b), but not {a)» implies something of the form

(Ex)(x = Ty(Gy))

And they differ in what we might intuitively speak of
as their ontologies* the objects (or entities* in general)

to which reference is made within the sentences.
(b)

For

speaks of directions* no mention of which is found

in (a)

—

or so it seems.

There can be no question xhat

Frege regards our pair of sentences as sharing their
content.

But was he prepared to treat these apparent

differences in structure, consequences, and ontology as
real ones?
In Bepiriffsschrift Frege had written that
the contents of two judgments may differ in
two ways*
either the consequences derivable
from the first ... also follov/ from the
.
second* ... or this is not the case. .
£ln the first case] I call that part of the
content that is the same in both the con ceptual content .^7
.

This passage has its unclarities.

But on a natural

way of taking it Frege would be saying that on his view
tv/o

sentences are the same in conceptual content just

in case they have the same logical consequences.

This

has the consequence that all logical truths come to have
the same conceptual content* and it seems to me doubtful

that Frege ever held to that.

^7

*

Bea:r .lf fGSchrift *

p. 12.

But if Frege did hold a
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view with this as a consequence at one time, it was no
longer his view come Grundlagen .
That we encounter "a new concept" with (b) of the

earlier pair of sentences assures us that the sentences
differ in logical structure and consequences.

can be no doubt that Frege means to

sa.y

And there

that the process

of redistributing the content of (a) to get (b) yields
US something new.

For in his ensuing remarks he tells

us that the basic ideas of geometry "must be given

originally in intuition," and whereas intuition provides
us v/ith an idea of parallel lines no one "has an intuition
of the direction of a straight line."

48

Rather, "the con-

cept of direction is only discovered at all as a result
of a process of intellectual activity which takes its

start from the intuition

.

•

4q^

Thus sentences (a) and

(b), which seem to differ in the ways noted, differ in

epistemological status, according to Frege.

We shall be

in a position to affirm the truth of the second, under-

standing what we affirm, only if we are in a position to

similarly affirm the first.
knov/

But not conversely.

We can

two lines to be parallel and yet not know that their

directions are identical.

48.

Grundlage n, p. 75

49*

Ibid.

p

p.

75*
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It is worth noting a similarity between the pair
(a) and (b),

and the pair

(c)

Vixens are vixens

(d)

Vixens are female foxes

of our earlier discussion ($2).

In each case we have a

pair of sentences which agree in content v/here» so we
assume, it is possible for someone to know that the first
is true and yet not know that the second is.

As important as the similarity is this difference.

In the second case we could argue that the content is the
same on the Kantian grounds that the concept of vixen is

analyzable into the concepts of female and fox.

Whereas

in the first case there is no similar concept, or (proper)

portion of propositional content, the analysis of which
grounds the claim of common content.

Rather the focus of

the "intellectual activity" must be the propositional

content as a whole.

Here

v/e

see the influence of Frege's

Dictum,

Earlier we noted certain puzzles with Kant's idea
of analysis.

How is a coupling of knowledge and ignorance

such as can occur with the pair (c) and (d) possible?
Hew, knowing one, does someone learn the other?

Such

questions apply also to Frege's idea of alternate carvings
of common content.

And he, no more than Kant, directly

ansv/ers our questions.

Such hints as he offers turn on

the idea of symbolism.

Earlier in GrundlaiLe n he suggests

36

that some concepts can only be attained by means of
SiTnbols when,

in discussing Mill, he says we must “dis-

tinguish between the symbols themselves and their content,
even though it may be that the content can only be grasped
by their aid»“^^

And in the essay “On the Justification

of a Scientific Concept-Script [Begrif fsschrift]" of 1882,
he had this to say about symbols and symbolism.

hold the selfsame significance for
thinking as did the discovery of using the
wind to sail cross-wind for navigaxicn* Let
no one be contemptuous of symbols!
A good
deal depends upon a practical selection of
them. Furthermore, their practical value
is not diminished by the fact that after much
practice v;e no longer need to speak out loud
in order to think. The fact remains that we
think in words or, when not in v/ords, then
in mathematical or other symbols.
Without symbols v/e would further hardly
raise ourselves to the level of conceptual
thought. In giving the same symbol to siiiiilar
but different things, we no longer symbolize
the individual thing but rather that which
they have in comjnon -- the concept -- and the
concept itself is first gained by our symbolizing it, for, since the concept is of itself
imperceptible to the sense, it requires a
perceptible representative in order to appear
to us. Thus it is that tne sensuous opens
up for us the world of the non-sensuous
SyD'ibols

Nov/

if we recall a remark of Frege's mentioned prior

to taking up the parallel lines case*

We are therefore proposing not to define
identity specially for this case, but to

22.

50 .

Ibid.

51

English translation*

,

,

p.

M ind , 73 (1964), pp. 155“‘l60.
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use the concept of identity • • • as a means
for arriving at that which is to be regarded
as being identical • • ,32

we might try and capture Frege’s thinking this way.

From the content of ’Line a is parallel to line b* we
are to symbolise out the concept of identity, and (somehow)
use this as the means by which we redistribute the remain-

der of the given content, so that now we can represent
the content in question this wayt

The direction of line

a is identical with the direction of line b.

We do not

thereby alter the propositional content in question;
rather we come to apprehend it differently, from a new
perspective, by means of an alternate symbolism.

This

picture, as difficult as it is to clarify, was of much

importance to Frcjge’s thought.

However

I

attempt to assess its ultimate usefulness.

do not want to

All that is

required for present purposes is that we appreciate that
Frege was committed to the view that the likes of (a)

and (b) are, for all their differences, the same in content, and, given that, that we may speak of them as

analytically equivalent in a natural extension of Kant's
usage of 'analytic*.

Assuming this, what proves crucial

for Frege's purposes is whether by means of the sort of

analytic activity he mentions new objects can come into
viev;.

52,

G rundlagen , p. ?4.
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In the parallel lines case it is not just the con-

cept of a line’s direction which newly appears; we also
come upon directions* or so it seems*

Our conceptual

activity* if all goes well* enriches our ontology*

And

it is by analogous procedures that Frege wishes to argue

that numbers are given to us*

Frege's next step is to put the (tentative) results
of the previous analytic activity into the form of a

definition*

He opens section 65 v;ith the remarks*

Nov/ in order to get * • • from parallelism to the concept of direction* let us try
the following definition:
The proposition
"line a is parallel to line b/’
is to mean the same as
"the direction of line a is
identical with the direction
of line b*"53

This is offered as an instance of the "more fruitful type
of definition"*

And* says Frege, offered in place of the

numerical example* our (A)* "because

I

can express myself

less clumsily and make myself more easily understood*

The argument can readily be transferred in essentials to

apply to the case of numerical identity.

ell

Frege then takes up some of those "doubts and difficulties" to which we have twice earlier referred*

These

lead him to reject the above definition and so also that

53*

i bid *

*

p * 76

3^ •

Ibid^

*

p* 78 * n*

1*
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of (A)*

But

I

believe we can best appreciate the thrust

of Frege’s thought if we temporarily set aside these
**douDts and difficulties*' and* assuming the legitimacy

of our (a)* sketch out how Frege’s reasoning could proceed

from this to his logicist conclusion*

This done we shall

come back and look at the *'doubts and difficulties" and
the move Frege makes in response to them«

that it will then be clear why it

v/as

The thought is

appropriate to

defer that discussion for the moment.
Let us suppose that (A) legitimates the use of

numerical abstraction operators* (e*g.) ’NxFx’* that "we
have thus acquired a means of arriving at a determinate

number and of recognizing it again as the same

,

.

.**

Still* sines the right side of (A) involves* at least

implicitly* the idea of one* one correlation we have not
yet* it may be objected* "defins[d] the sense of" the

left side in non-numerical terms.

Frege removes this

objection by providing* in Grundla.-yen * a definition of
one* one correlation in terms of his Begriffsschrift logic.

Given then that we are authorized to use numerical abstraction operators we can
actual procedure

—

—

though this was not Frege’s

define ’zero’*

’successor’ and

’(natural) number’ using just these operators and

Begrif fsschrift logic* the third of which

v/ill

make use

of the Segriffsschrift definition of the ancestral of

a relation

This done* we shall be in a position to
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derive Peano *3 axio^is for arithmetic with the Begriffschrift
logic and these definitions, for ’zero*, ’successor', and
'(natural) number' are the only primitive, non-logical

terms occurring in these axioms.

The technicalities of

these definitions and derivations are now familiar and

will not here concern us.^^

What

I

wish to emphasize is

their dependence upon (A), and the fact that Frege regards
(A) as a case where a propositional content,

that repre-

sented by the right side, has been carved up in an alter-

native manner so as to give, in this case, the left side

with its apparent reference to numbers.

We shall return

to this, but now let us pick up again with Frege's

discussion.
There is one of the "doubts and difficulties" that

Frege spends the most time on; it leads him to revise
the earlier definitions*

ing upon it.

We limit ourselves to comment-

Frege writes that

...

there is [a] doubt which ma.y make
us suspicious of our proposed definition.
In the proposition
"the direction of a is identical
with the direction of b"
the direction of a plays the part of an
object, and our definition affords us a
means of recognizing this object as the
same again, in case it should happen to

55 .

See the discussions of Charles Parsons in "Mathematics,
Foundations of", and "Frege's Theory of Number" in
Philosophy in America , edited by Max Black,
pp. 160-203*
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crop up in some other guise » say as the
direction of b. But this means does not
provide for all cases. It will not, for
instance, decide for us whether England
is the same as the direction of the
Earth's axis, • , Naturally no one is
going to confuse England with the direction of the Earth's axis; but that is np
thanks to our definition of direction,
It might be thought that

v/e

could simply count as

false such claims as that England is the direction of the

Earth's axis.

But how are we to sort out just such "waste

cases" so as to then rule them false?

Not on the basis

of their form; for we can not assume that a direction of

a line v;ill only be referred to just that way, i,e,, as
a direction of a line.

If we possessed the concept of direction, then# says

Frege, v/ith regard to

The direction of a is identical with q
"we could lay it down that, if q is not a direction, our

proposition will be denied, while if it is a direction,
our original definition will decide whether it is to be

denied or affirmed®
lack

•

Vi'e

•

,

But this idea fails, for "we

the concept of direction,

have said that it was Frege's view that we attain

the concept of direction through redistributing the content

560

Grundlagen

57.

Ibid,, p, ? 8 ,

58.

,

P* 78

pp. 77-78
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of a statement of parallel lines over the symbols of a

certain statement of identity.
**if

And Frege did say that

we do this, we obtain the concept of direction.**

And

yet we have just quoted him as saying that, for all that,
we do not possess the concept of direction.

caught Frege in

a

contradiction?

I

Have we

think not.

But what

is the source of this apparent conflict, and how shall it

be resolved?

There is a sense in which we do possess the concept
and a sense in which we do not.

concept in just this sense*

We do not possess the

we are not able to set out a

procedure to deal with the "waste cases" which does not
beg tha question.

For notice that the last mentioned

suggestion of Frege's requires us to be able to determine
for any object whether or not it is a direction; thus it
tells us no better tha.n the previous attempts that Jingland
is not a direction.
V/e

do possess the concept in the sense that we know

that England is not a direction, know which are "waste
cases", and knov/ that a way has not been provided by v/hich
to deal with them.

This distinction is implicit in

Frege's remark "that we cannot by these methods [i.e»,
those thus far considered] obtain any concept of direction

with sharp limits to its application

59

•

Ibid.

,

p.

79

..."

V/hereas in
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a sense we have a concept of direction, we have not managed

definition of it for aii cases*

On this ground Frege

deems the initially offered definition inadequate.

And so

he shifts his approach.

"Seeing that we cannot by these methods alone obtain

any concept of direction with sharp limits to its application, nor therefore, for the same reasons, any satis-

factory concept of Number either, let us try another way."^^
Here Frege turns to using extensions of concepts.
gives this definition of direction*

He

"the direction of

line a is the extension of the concept "parallel to line

a"."

6l

And then the analogous definition of number*

"the

Number v/hich belongs to the concept F is tne extension of
the concept "equal to the concept F"."

Definitions in this style satisfy Frege on method-

ological scores in Grundlagen .

But the immediate justi-

fication of this latter definition is that (A) follows
It is with (A), the analogue of the extension-

from it.^^

less definition of direction, that the philosophical

interest lies.
To pull these remarks together, let me recast a point

60.

Ibid.

,

p.

79»

61

.

Ibi d.

,

p.

79*

62.

Ibid.

,

p.

79-80*

63.

See Parsons, "Frege

*s

Theory of Number"
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recently made.

We may usefully distinguish between epis-

temologicai concerns and methodological concerns* and
correlatively, between methods of concept attainment and

methods of introduction of concept words into scientifical3.y acceptable discourse.

''£T]]h9

concept of direction

is only discovered at all as a result of a process of

intellectual activity which takes its start from intuition
•

•

•**

This is reflected in the extensionless definition*

since* according to Frege* we proceed from an intuition
of parallel lines to the concept of direction.

But this

definition is not adequate to science; it lacks "sharp
boundaries" and so* from the perspective of an adequate
methodology* is not a concept at all.

Methodological

rigor leads Frege to the definition given in terms of
extensions
Analogously* the concept of number is only gained

by means of countings* the results of which are expressed
in statements of number, wherein number words have their

basic use*

Through counting too we learn how to estab-

lish that there are, or are not, just as many of cue sort
of thing as there are of another.

And then through re-

distributing the content of the general case of just-asmany-as judgments we arrive at the concept of number.
This is reflected in (A).

But this, for reasons given in

discussing the concept of direction, does not provide a

scientifically acceptable concept of number.

And so here

^5

too Frege turns to extensions.
suniTiary #

He adds# in his later

that "this way ^i.e.# the way of extensions]] of

getting over the difficulty [the one we looked at] cannot
be expected to meet with universal approval# and many will

prefer other inethods

...

I

attach no decisive impor-

tance even to bringing in the extensions of concepts at
64
all."
Bringing in extensions was simply a device used

(rather unreflectively) to meet a self-imposed method-

ological requirement.

Still we might wonder how the use of extensions
helps us at all,

Cr.n

we not object that Frege *s final

definition of the concept of direction does not itself
lay down that lingland is or is not an extension and so
no more than previous attempts tells us whether England
is#

or is not# the direction of the Farth's axis?

Frege

simply passes this over with the remark "I assume that
it is known what the extension of a concept is."^^

But

this is an issue that sooner or later must be faced#

especially

v/hen#

come to play

a.

as in Grundgesetze # extensions (or sets)

central role.

Here we might just lodge a

The concept of direction was to be made sharp

question.

through using extensions# or sets.

But if the concept of

set is not reducible to# or explainable in, other terms.

Grundla gen, p, 11?.
65

«>

I bid,

,

p, 80# n»

J.
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how then could we assure ourselves that this concept has
sharp boundaries?

To this we shall return somewhat

later ($ 13 )*
In Grundlagen Frege attached no epistemological

importance to his use of extensions? this

trying to convey.

And this is what

of Geach’s remark, earlier quoted.

be clear that, and why,

I

I

I

have been

take to be the thrust

If so, then it should

concur with it.

Now,

does

hovi?

this bear upon our guiding problem?

Pap’s problem, simply put, is how does one get from

speaking in purely logical terms to talk of numbers, and
arithmetic generally, and what licenses the move?
has an answer.

Frege

It turns on the idea that a given propo-

sitional content can be analyzed in different ways, sometimes with the effect that we come to appreciate the

presence of new objects.

More specifically, with the

statements (or statement forms)
There are just as many Fs as Gs
The number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs
we have such a situation.

The first is epistemologically

prior to the second, but shares with it its content.
Thus, having acquired the ability to make just-as-many-as

judgments we are in a position to rcsymbolize such and

thereby apprehend numbers.

Take this together with the

tecimical accomplishments of the definitions of one one
i

correlation and the ancestral of a relation in (arguably)

4?

puiely -tOgical

"teriTiS

and you have

^undlai^en picture.

"the

importanl; elements

And we can appreciate that it

was by no means implausible that Frege had shown the way

towards demonstrating that arithmetic was analytic in the
sense of Kant.

As we have seen* this involves not just

working with a richer logic, but also extending Kant's
conception of a (narrowly) analytic truth so that (A),
for instance, may be regarded as an analytical equivalence.

When Frege gets down to the task of working out the
details of the Grundlagen picture various alterations
occur.

Notably, come Grundgesetze . extensions (or sets)

no longer have an arguably incidental role.

Frege’s

philosophy of set theory is now pivotal for his philosophy of mathematics.

Still,

I

would, and shall, argue

that, epistemologically speaking, there has been no break

with the Grundlagen outlook.

This will be a subject of

comment in the next section and again in

(iiil3),

where it

can be discussed in terms of the logical theory of
Gr undgesetze

previously set out ($9).
$4.

Logicism and Platonism

Frege never sought to deny nor dispense with the

assumption that number words, in their arithmetic employment, refer to numbers? in this sense he was a

Platoniot in his philosophy of mathematics.

sharpen this notion of Platonism.

Let us

We might- say that
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someone is a Platonist in this sense if that person
holds
that numbers vsxist or assigns being to numbers.

And we

might say that it does not matter whether the person
distinguishes various kinds of being, assigning numbers
a kind of being not possessed by, say, tables and chairs.

To say that numbers are, is enough.

But then the question

v/ould arise as to how seriously the person takes the kind

of being accorded numbers.

If this sort of being is also

granted, say, Pegasus, or Hamlet, or the present king of

France, we may not wish to associate the name of Plato

with the view.

For our purposes

v/e

may cut through such

worries over the v/orthiness of some kind of being by

characterizing a Platonist position as one on which the
following two claims are adhered to.

(1) There are

numbers, ea.ch of which has a unique successor.
(2)

And,

in science, existence claims, including that of (1),

are univocal.

(V/hat is,

is.)

Thus a philosopher who

held that the ’there are* of 'There are tables* and
'There are luimbers* was ambiguous, perhaps through assigning numbers and tables to different ontological categories,

would not be a Platonist in our sense.

Nor v/ould someone

be a Platonist under our characterization if they, like

Carnap, held that the 'there are* of 'There are numbers'

and 'There are prime numbers* was ambiguous.

However

in the sense here given the term Frege clearly was a

49

Pla'tonist*

66

Let us refer to such a Platonism as onto ~

logical Platonism*
It seems to be generally possible for two philoso-

phers to agree upon the existence of entities of some

broad category and yet fail to agree about how it is

know about these things*

v/e

For instance# many who have

agreed that there are physical objects have disagreed
amongst themselves as to whether we perceive them# infer
them# construct them# or v/hat*

There is# however# a

certain kind of epistemological attitude prominently
associated with ontological Platonism.

It is the attitude

William Kiieale is thinking of when he writes

many

accounts of a priori knov/ledge
«
*
*
have been inspired by Plato’s notion of
contemplation . . * as a kind of iioteilectual gasing in which the soul may read off
facts about super-sensible objects.^/^

This picture is especially associated by philosophers

with mathematicians v/axing philosophical*

Here is one

confirming instance from the writings of G.H. Hardy#
I believe that matiiematical reality lies
outside us# that our function is to discover or obs_erve it# and that the theorems

66*

This could be objected to on the grounds that
Frege’s logical theory is essentially a many-sorted
logic* However# there is only one sort of obje cts *
In any case my main concern here is not with ontology#
but epistemology.

67.

William and Martha Kneule# The Development of
Logic # p* 636*
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which we prove and which we describe grandiloquently as our 'creations’ are simply
our notes of our observations*^^
It is this picture from which

Frege { he is not* as

I

I

wish to disassociate

shall put it» an epistemologica l

Platonist *

Thinking still of Grundlagen and

ouj:

(a)

I

would

contrast Frege’s thought with the following sort of
picture*

We can imagine someone viewing (A) as com-

pendiously correlating previously unconnected accomplishments*

On

the one hand we have learned to count* express

our results in "judgments of number", and so come to

comprehend just-as-many-as statements*

Independently

of this we have acquired soma acquaintance with numbers

and their properties*

And now, putting both hands before

us, we realise that an intimate relationship binds the

two together, and so come to appreciate the truth of (A)*

On Frege's picture, having come to comprehend a just-asinany-as statement we are able to recarve the content of

it so as to re-express this content by means of a state-

ment of numerical identity*

Such a transformation is

reflected in (A), and it is by such intellectua]. activity
that we apprehend numbers*

This picture supports the

claim that (A) is an analytical equivalences the other
does not*

68.

G.H. Hardy, A Mathem a tician's Apology

,’

pp. 123-124*
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In Grundla/ren the likes of our (A) are called

definitions! they are those of the "more fruitful type"

by means of which we gain something "essentially new".
In G rundgesetze however only direct eliminative definitions are counted as definitions,^^

Thus while in

Grund3,agen "definitions" were ontologically augraentative,

in Grundgesetze all ontology must come through the axioms.

Still
of

’

I

regard this more as a shift in the application

definition' than an indication of any fundamental

divergence from the Grundlagen picture.
I v/ould

In particular

argue that the same type of justification which

Frege provides in Grundlagen for (A) lies behind the

introduction of Basic Law V of the system of Grundgesetze ,
BLV is the axiom which enriches Frege's fundamental logic

with a theory of the extensions of concepts.

We may

convey the gist of this axiom® while avoiding for the

present Frege's own notation and the intricacies of its
intGrpretation® with the use of contemporary class nota-

tion as follows,
(B)

x(Fx) * x(Gx)

This may be reads
cD.ass

69 ,

iff

(x)(Fx iff Gx)

The class of Fs is the same as the

of Gs just in case all and only Fs are Gs,

"We introduce a new name by means of a def init.1 on by
stipulating that it is to have the same sense and the
same denotation as some name composed of signs that
are familiar," Grundgeset ze, p, B2,
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Duimnett, supposing a shift in Frege's practice
in

the use of contextual definitions from Grundlagen to

and regarding the role of Frege’s Dictum in

Grundlagen as justifying the use of contextual definition,
finds that the Dictum

philosophy

•

*'has
I

•

no place in Frege’s later

disagree.

As has been already

implied, I see Frege’s Dictum supporting (B) of Grundgesetze
in much the fashion as it had (A) of Grundlagen .

However

Dummett has another reason for supposing Frege’s Dictum
to be of diminished importance in the later philosophy.
0 ?his

is that "it accords a distinctive position to sentences

which he was no longer prepared to recognize

This,

believe, expresses a genuine insight; to such matters

I

I

shall return somewhat later ($15)
I

have indicated that with (B), our simplified

version of BLV, we have expressed the result of carving
up the propositional content represented by the right

side so that something "essentially new" comes into view;
this is represented on the left side with the statement
of set identity.

must defer offering such direct

I

textual support as

I

can for this interpretation until

the logical system of Grundgesetze has been presented.

In ($13) ihe matters under discussion will come up again

70

•

Dumnett, "Frege", p. 233.

«

Ibid., p. 233.
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and textual citations made.

But in the meantime I can do

something better than providing direct textual support;

I

that this interpretation must accord with

Frege *3 thinking.
In his ‘‘Introduction'’ to Grundfresetze Frege, having
j.ndicatod

hi.s

coricern with "the epistemological nature"

of the laws of arithmetic, informs us that

with this book I carry out a design announced
in my Grundlai^en der Arithmet ik of 1884,
I
wish here tc substantiate i:a actual practice
the view of Number I expounded in [that] book.'^^
The "design" of Grundlagen was, of course, to at least

make probable that the laws of arithmetic
truths.

v/ere

analytic

This, we may suppose, remains the program, though

Frege has by and large now dropped the Kantian vocabulary.
If we have been on the mark in our portrayal of Frege’s

reasoning in Grundlagen , we would expect to find in
Gr undgesetze some juncture at which a transition is made

from one mode of discourse to another across a bridge of
a common propositional content, a content analyzable first

in terms of one mode, subsequently in terras of the other.
It is in this way I would have us regard BLV,

Let us look

at this again, or rather the approximation (B), and set

aside our knowledge of its paradoxical implications.

How might we picture to ourselves how someone might come

?2,

Gru nd gese t«e , p. 5*

5^

"to

gr3.sp "this

.law"?

It night be held that* on the one

hand, we may acquire a knowledge of the logical properties
of concepts through familiarizing ourselves with funda-

mental logic, and on the other hand, and independently,
w© may gain some appreciation of sets and their relations
one to another, and then at some point we consider the

two together and realize that a systematic connection

holds between the domains of concepts and classes v/hich
we give expression to with (B), cr 3LV.
is a picture from which

I

As before, this

would disassociate Frege, for if

such were his view, the set theory which issues from BLV
could not possibly be called analytic in anything like

Kant's sense, for BLV itself v/ould surely have to count
as synthetic a priori*

Hence arithmetic, which is to be

made to appear within the resultant theory, vvould be
synthetic a priori also*

If arithmetic is to be shown to

be analytic, BLV roust be thought cf in a manner analogous
to that discussed with

(A)«.

It functions as a general

rule for the redistribution of content of certain forms
of sentences so that new entities, new objects of logic,

come into view.

(In this it differs from the other

Gru n dgesetze axioms •)

The ultimate basis or our appre-

hension of numbers is through a generalized analytic
equivalence of statements of concept co-extensiveness
and statements of set identity

*

seta, or numbers, plays no role*

Platonic av;areness of
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is ofisn

s'ts.'tGd

metic is reducible to logic.

as thG thGsis

'thA't

arith**

Then it is observed that

true* or plausible* logic must embrace

set theory.

So the question arises as to the warrant*

or merit, of counting the truths of set theory as truths

of logic.

For an understanding of Frege’s thought this

is not the best way of coming at matters.

An apter

question is whether the truths of sex theory are analytic
truths.

And

I

portray Frege as arguing that they arei

set theory is an analytic extension of logic.

Given

that* it would matter little what we chose to say on

whether set theory is part of logic.
It is also misrepresentative xo speak in a single

breath of Frege-Russell logicism.
argue it here.

I

For* though

I

cannot

believe it to be clear that Russell

never advocated the epistemology of number

buting to Frege.

I

am attri-

Russell from at least the time of his

book on Leibniz (1900) until coming under the influence
of V/ittgenstein around the time of his lectures on

Kno wlcd/^e of the External World

logical Platonist.

(

Oiar

191 ^) v;as an epistemo-

Under Wittgenstein’s influence he

moved towards the idea that the truths of mathematics
were just so many tautologies.

And though he never

succeeded in clarifying to his own satisfaction just
v/hat this

amounted to* it is clear it is a view for which

Frege would have had little sympathy.
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We have been considering the nature of Frege’s

response to Pap’s problem*

We may round off these re-

marks by considering Frege’s position in the light of

another complaint lodged against logicism# one Poincare
put this way in 1894.
If • • • ail the propositions fwhich mathematics J enumerates can be deduced one from
another by xhe rules of formal logic, why is
not mathematics reduced to an immense tautology?
The syllogism can teach us nothing essentially
new, and, if everything is to spring from the
principle of identity, everything should be
capable of being reduced to it. Shall v/e then
admit that the enunciations of all those
theorems which fill so many volumes are nothing
but devious ways to say A is A?73

Frege had himself raised this issue in Grundlagen a
decade earlier,
A very emphatic declaraticn in favor of the
analytic nature of the lav/s of number is that
of W.S* J evens*
"I hold that algebra is a
highly developed logic, and number but
logical discrimination*
But this view, too, has its difficulties*
Can the great tree of the science of number
as v/e know it, towering, spreading, and still
continually grov/ing have its roots in bare
identities? And how do the empty forms of
logic C07ne to disgorge so rich a content

73*

Henri Poincare, "The Nature of Mathematical Reasoning*" Quoted by Tobias Danzig in Nu mber , p. ?2,
The contest of the remark is a discussion of mathematical induction? for a recent discussion of Poincare’s
position see Parsons, "Frege’s Pliilosophy of Number*"

7^*

Grundlagen , p* 22.
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Given our earlier discussion we might phrase Frege’s
reply this way*

Arithmetic is not just logic, but rather

an outgrowth of logic, an analytic extension of logic*
Or, to use Poincare’s terms, whereas arithmetic does

spring from logic, it is not reducible to logic.

How-

ever suggestive we find this way of marking a distinction,

what is at stake is the conception that given just logic
and the idea that a given propositional content may be

symbolically re-expressed so that something “essentially
new” emerges, arithmetic may be shown to be analytic in,
Vvhat is

arguably, Kant’s sense.

Thus arithmetic is not

synthetic a priori, nor logic empty.
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If . • • we set aside all cognitions that we
must borrow
from .obJ^c^;£3 and reflect solely upon the use of
the
understanding in itself, we discover those of its rules
which are necessary throughout, in every respect and
regardless of any special objects, because without them
we would not think at all . • . [it] follows that
the
universal and necessary rules of thought in general can
concern solely its fo;^, and not in any way its matter.
Accordingly, ^ the science containing these universal and
necessary ruies is a science of the mere form of our
incsllectual cognition or of thinking. And
can therefore 1 orm lor ourselves the idea of the possibility of
such a science , just as that of a genera l grammar which
contains nothing beyond the mere form ol a language in
general, without words, which belong to the matter of
language.
Now this science of the necessary lav/s of the understand. s.ng a.nd reason in general, or
which is the same -of the mere form of thinking, we call logic .

—

KANT
The most reliable way of carrying out a proof ... is to
follow pure logic, a way that, disregarding the particular
characteristics of objects, depends solely on those laws
ujjcn which all knowledge rests.
FREGE
I

understand by ’laws of logic*

.

•

.

laws of truth*

FREGE

CHAPTER

II

LOGIC
$5*

Traits of Logic

Frege, who reflected so deeply on the nature of

mathematics p and who so greatly enriched logic, provi.ded
us with scant reflection upon the nature of logic itself.

What is studied under the heading of *logic*?
the logician's i>ubject matter?

What is

Let us try and tease out
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ansv.’ors
I"t

roight weXl

lia.YG

bsen Fr6ge*s*

is possible to get rather good agreement upon the

extension of ’logic*, about what principles are logical
principles*

As stated previously, logic for Frege in I879

included predicate logic with identity plus some unher-

alded second-order logic*

With Qrundgesetze we find this

fundamental logic essentially unchanged (viewed mathematically), except for the addition of notation for defi-

nite description and an axiom to govern it*

But now the

second order logic is explicit, and in its terms is introduced a set theory*

And there is more*

A many-branching

structure of higher-order logic unfolds*
terms of basic ideas
plus set theory

—

—

If we think in

roughly those of first order logic

many logically minded philosophers

would regard all of Frege's logic as logic, and all would
regard much of it as logic*

But even if agreement v/ere

complete on Frege's logic extending to include all, and

nothing but, logic, we would not want to identify the
tv/o

without further ado*

For we want to commend Frege

on extending logic beyond what it was, and to be able to

sensibly inquire into possible additional developments or
alternatives.

Thus even complete

agreeinen'*,

with Frege on

the logical truths would still leave the questioni

V/hat

is logic?

The study of logic we might say is the study of the

logical truths.

Which it is*

But

t)ie

circularity of

6o

"this

reiT-ark is

too bla'tan't

"to

S6rv9 as an answer

"to

our

question*
In logic one studies principles of valid reasoning.

True

>

but here what is intended is not so much pieces of

reasonings which people have actually gone through so

much as reasonings which are such that if anyone went
through them they would be reasoning validly.
simply,

we.

Or, more

may drop this talk of hypothetical reasonings

and speak .instead of arguments in the abstract and, in
particular? of the relationship of premisses to conclusion
in valid arguments, arguments such that were anyone to

rehearse them they would be reasoning validly.

In this

way logic is conceived as a study of the consequence
relation, that is, the relation of logical consequence
vrhich holds between just the premisses and conclusions of

logically valid arguments.

And what then is the force of

•logical* in 'logical consequence*

?

Just this, when a

set of premisses bears this relation to a conclusion,

conjoining the premisses and taking th© result as antecedeiit of a conditional with the conclusion as consequent

yields a truth of a peculiar sort, namely a logical truth.

And so it is that we have moved through a rather tight
circle back to the idea that logic deals with the truths
of logic*

Let us try another tack.

Various remarks of

Gruridlagen suggest that it was Frege's view that the body

6l

of human knowledge divides three ways according
to “the

ultimate ground upon which [rests] the justification”^

for particular knowledge claims.

Physical science requires

the support of sensory evidence, in addition to drawing

upon logic and mathematics, and also geometry*

Euclidean

geometry was for Frege, following Kant, an a priori
science; it makes no justificatory use of the senses, but

rests upon a special sort of intuition.^

—

logic

The truths of

and aritiirastic also, as it was to be shown

rest upon neither experience nor intuition*

what do they rest upon?

But then

What is the ground of logical

truth?
It seems almost to have been Frege *s view that it is

bstter not to ask this question, because one is bound to
go wrong in trying to respond to it*

This sentiment is

closely connected with his disgust with what he termed
psychologism, the attitude, roughly, that we must look
to what goes on in our minds when we speak to understand

and clarify the meanings of our words so as to know of

what we speak* ^

In any case Frege does not directly deal

with the question*

We are left with the negative charac-

terization of whence the laws of logic gain their authorityt

!•

Grimdlagen , p* 3»

2*

See Grimdlagen , p* 75

3*

Cf. Dummett, ”Frege”, p* 225*

PP* 101-102
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neither

froia the

testimony of the senses, nor from

intuiti on*

Asking as to Frege's vievjs on the ground
of logical
truth has not yielded a positive characterization
of
logic. Let us look into a closely related
matter, that
wnich Frege calls the ’'domain*' of various sciences.
He
says we may "compare the various kinds of truth
in respect
of whe domains that they govern,"^ "Empirical
propositions hold good of what is physically or psychologically

actual, the truths of geometry govern all that is spatially
intuitable, whether actual or the product of our fancy*"'^

Whereas "the truths of arithmetic govern all that is
numerable.

This is the widest domain of all; for to it

belongs not only the actual, not only the intuitable, but
ever>-t.hing thinkableo"^

As with arithmetic, so with logic

it too governs "everj-thing thinkable".

Euclidean geometry governs everything that is
spatially intuitable, or imaginable.

It is not possible

to imagine anything noii-Euclideanly, though one can

reason about non-Euciidean space.
governs everything thinkable.

Logic, says Frege,

But he cannot want to

imply that it is not pcss.ible for someone to think illogi-

4.

Grimdlageru p. 20.

5*

Ibid.

,

p. 20

6.

Ibid.

,

p. 21.
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callyj he does not wish to deny that
people reason fallaciously. It laust rather be his view that
one cannot think
correctly on any topic except in conformity
with the laws
of logic. But then one cannot (on Frege’s
view) think

correctly about physical objects, the denizens
of Euclidean space, except in conformity with the laws of
Euclidean geometry. 0ns can however think logically while
denying any of these laws.

Here then is the difference

Frege is after between the domains of geometry and
logic#

Whereas one

c-^ii

reason in such a manner that one would

be reasoning correctly only if some laws of logic were

false, it IS not possible to reason at all in accordance

with a denial of logical or arithmetical laws.

Just "try

denying any one of them", he says, "and complete confusion
sets in.

Even to think at all seems no longer possible,"'^

If it is not possible to reason correctly upon any

topic, including logic, except in conformity with the
laws of logic, then the domain of logic is universal.
For, if one could so reason, logic would not apply to

that reasoned about, and hence the domain of logic would

not be universal.

Universality, then, is one mark of

logic as Frege conceived it.

From this characteristic

we can extract a condition which will allov/ us to compare

Frege’s logic v/ith its predecessors and possible successors

y.

I bid.

,

p. 21

64

or competitors.

If we come upon, in any area of
thought,

principles of inference which are recognizably
logical,
then these principles would have to turn
up in any system
of logic which v.'as a complete logic.
Thus to know
of

logical principles not found in someone’s
logic is to
know that logic to be incomplete. Of course
it is not
always a simple matter either to recognise
logical
principles or to determine that the effect, at least,
of some such principle cannot be gained in a
given system.

Still this idea does provide us with a hold on comparing
one system with another in the absence of anything
like
a definition of logic.
Oi course if there is a principle of inference not

reflected in our logic, then there will also be logical
truths not be iound there either.

For, if wc take an

argument whose conclusion follows validly from its
premisses by such an unrecognized logical principle, we

may form its corresponding co nditional by taking the
conjunction of its premisses as the antecedent of a
conditional whose consequent is the argument’s conclusion.
This statement v/ill be a logical truth, but one not

recognized by our logic.

For if it were, it could be

used to justify a rule of inference, since the correspond~
ing conditional of an argument is logically true just in

case the argument is logically valid.

So our incomplete"

ness criterion, such as it is, can be restated this way.
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A coriplcte logic completely covers
the truths of logic,
A second characteristic of logic may
be mentioned,
one v/hich, though largely unremarked
upon by Frege, seems
clearly to be in keeping with his thinking.
This is that
logic is evident in the following sense.
The fundamental

truths of logic are (to be) self-evident, and
the basic
rules of inference evidently truth-preserving,
so that

any logical truth which is not itself self-evident
can
have its trutn established either from self-evident
truths, or ones which themselves trace back to self-

evident truths,®
How, we may ask, should
this context?

four?

Is

take ’self-evident* in

v/e

Is it self-evident that tv/o plus two equals

the fact that I now have a haiid before my eyes

self-evident to me right now?

I

suppose that for Frege

simple arithmetic truths are self-evident in just the

sense of that

self-evident.

terjTi

he required his logical axioms to be

This would seem to have the consequence

that self-evidentness grades offj some aritnmetical truths
are not quite self-evident, others less so, etc.
knov/ of

at this.

But

I

no reason to expect that Frege would have balked

The same situation holds in logic itself.

What

Frege required in his formal work was that his axioms be
paradigifiatically self-evident, so that all theorems of

8,

Cf* Quine, Philosophy £f Lop:ic , pp, 82-83*
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the system would be evident in
the sense stated, that is »
potentially self-evident. (Setting aside
such facts as
that some theorems will be too long
or too complex to
grasp, and others will have proofs
too long to take in
from beginning to end.)
As to the second case questioned,

I

would expect tnat

Frege would clsxm that this fact, that of
my hand before
eyes, is not (was not) se3.f-evident or
not self,
evident in the same sense of the term as it
applies to
logic. My reason is that I expect that his
insistence
on the epistemological importance of the a
priori a posteriori distinction to figure here, though

J.

am

not sure just how,^
To some extent, these traits of universality and

evidentness pull in opposing directions.

Universality

counsels an expansionist policy; evidentness places

constraints.

Frege in his attempt to show that logic

encompasses arithmetic was forced to strain the evidence
condition? as he later admitted.

In 1902, speaking in

the Appendix to the second volume of Grundgesetze of its

9«

This issue was the subject of a debate running through
several decades between (prominently) Quine and Carnap,
a defender of the Kant-Frege distinction.
Quine's
Philosophy of Log^ic contains his reply to Carnap's
"W.Y. Quine on Logical Truth" in P.A. Schilpp, The
Philos OT)hy o f Rudoloh Carnap (see especially p. 9l4)
see Quine on obviousness, especia.lly pp. 96 - 97 .

6?

Basic Law V* Frege wrote
I have never concealed from myself
its lack
of the self-evidentness which the others
Li.e#, the other axioms] possess* and v/hich
must properly be demanded of a law of logic,
and in fact I pointed out this weakness
in
the Introduction to the first volume

However what he had actually said in this
"Introduction''
was.
^ ^i'SP’dte can arise, so far as I can see,
With regard to my Basic Law concerning
courses-of -values (V)? which logicians
perhaps have not yet expressly enunciated,
and yet is what people have in mind, for
example, where they speak of the extensioras
of concepts c
In any event the place is
pointed out v/here the decision must be made.^^
I

think the tenor of these remarks is the hope, perhaps

expectation, that here familiarity will breed self-evidence*

And Frege had reason for this hope? his axiom represented
a very general example of the sort of case we have dis-

cussed where a given propositional content receives

alternate symbolizations.

What forced the issue was a

letter Frege received from Russell in 1902,*^
v/e

For, as

have said, the axiom in question was that by which

Frege vms to derive set theory from his more fundamental
logic.

It states, in effect, that there is a class

Grundgesetze , p* 127*
Ibid*
12.

,

pp*

This letter and Frege *s reply are included (in translation) in van Heijenoort, From F rege to Godol .
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answering to every predicative expression:
a separate
class for non-co-extensive predicates*
Russell’s letter
indicated to Frege that this axiom
engenders a contradiction* Russell's paradox.
Logicism requires set theory to be logic or
its
analytic extension. But what we seemed to
have learned
since Russell turned up the contradiction
named
for him

is that if a set theory is strong enough
to reach arith-

metic* its axioms do not have the self-evidentness
Frege

required* while if one proceeds from only self-evident

principles, arithmetic lies beyond reach.

Either way

Frege's epistemological program would fail.
$6 .

Logic as Lingu a Characterica

In a brief note* "Logic as calculus and logic as
language"*"^

Jean van Heijenoort suggests that "from

Frege's writings a certain picture of logic emerges, a

conception that is perhaps not discussed explicitly but
nevertheless constantly guides Frege", one that finds

expression in Frege's conception of his Begriffsschrift
as a lingua ch aracterica , and not a mere calculus

13»

This judgment is a familiar one; I came to it, I
believe, through listening to Richard Cartwright
and reading Quine.

14.

Joan van Haijenoort, "Logic as Calculus and Logic as
Language", Synthcse , i? ( 1967 ), pp. 324-330.
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raliP5.iB§tpr.

Van Heijenoort in referring to this
con-

ception speaks of the universality of logic.

We shall

explore this idea and try to clarify the
picture van

Heijenoort attributes to Frege.
Frege typically used the phrase

*

lingua characterica

*

in contexts where he wished to dissociate
himself from
the Algebra of Logic school of, notably, Boole
and

Schroder.

In particular, he used the phrase to stress

what he took to be a difference of purpose between
himself and thCEse other logicians.

Frege begins the paper "On the scientific justifi-

cation of a concept-script [Begriffsschrift]", which we
have quoted from earlier ($3). with this remarki
The need for seme method of avoiding
errors in one's ov/n thought as well as
misunderstanding on the part of others has
titse and again made itself felt in the
more abstract scientific disciplines. Both
these shortcomings are rooted in the impsrfecticn of language, for the fact is
that in ^r^der to thiiik we must use sense
symbols ^

Ho goes on, somewhat further down, to state that ‘'language
is not in such a way dominated by logical laws that com-

pliance with grammar would of itself guarantee the

correctness of thought processes .
“logical rules

...

In addition,

[have] proved little protection

15«

Hriglish translationt

l6.

Ibid.

Mind , 73 (1964), pp« 155"i60.
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[from error] because they have
to content.

.

.

.

remained external

He concludes that "we have need
of a

system of symbols

•

•

,

whose logical form cannot be

escaped by the content."^®

This he says, we do not get

with the logical symbolisms stemming from
Jjeibniz which have recently been revived
by Boole, R, Grassman, St, Jevons, h.
Schroder and others. Here one has the
logical forms, if not entirely complete,
but the content is lacking* Any attempt
to replace the letters in these symbolisms with expressions of content such as
analytic equations would with the resulting complexity and ponderousness ~~ why,
even ambiguity -- of the formulas obtained
point cut how little suited these symbolisms
are for the construction of a true
Bogrif 1 sschrift , For such I would like to
demand tne followings
it must have simple
modes of expression for the logical relations
v/hich, being limited to the very necessary,
can be mastered with ease and surencss.
These forms must suited to combine v/ith a
content most intimately, ^
Meanwhile Schroder had written a review of Beg;riffs 3 chift
in whicii he claimed to find little, other than cumbrous—

ness of notation, not already present in the works of

Boole

20

To this Frege replied that

17.

Ibid^

18.

Ibid .

19.

Ibid.

20.

Zeitschrift fur Mathematik und Ph ysi k, 25, Historische
l it era rise he Abtei .lung, til -94. ‘Referred to by Jean
van Heijenoor't in his introductory to note to
Beg riff.ssc hrif t in From F rege to Gode l, p, 2,
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what IS primarily ovorlookad in this
reproach
•
u'thatj my purpose was other than
ooole s* My intention was not to
represent
an abstract logic in formulas > but to
express
a content through written signs in a
more
precise and clear way than is oossible
through words* In lact I wanted to create
not a mere o^l ci^lus rat iocina tor but a
lincua
C
n3.]r3

C

c

0

-i*

3-C3,

XJi

To these remarks we can add the following of
a somewhat
later vintage*
In comparison with Boole's Symbolic Logic my
Begril f sschrif t appears cumbrous; if one considers it merely as Symbolic Logic
as a
c u 1 us ra i oc ina tor and not as a 1 i ngua
^But this disadvantage~be^mes
an advantage ii one uses it for its proner
purpose*
It is precisely this cumbrousness
that makes it possible for the eye to take in
in one glance — - at least as regards the
principal features
a complex logical structure*^ By means of this cumbrousness the more
complicated formulae gain a perspicuity that
would not be reached without it? and then
often would a chaos present itself to the
eye v/hich could hardly be extricated from
confusion*^*-

—

^

—

Frege's Begriffsschrif
rgJ^lQci natcr *

fc

is intended as a calculus

As Frege puts it, this time in Grundlahen .

21*

"Cn the Scientific Justif ication of a Begriffsschrif t”

22*

Frege's notes (p* 251) to P,E.B. Jourdain's "Development of Theories of Mathematical Logic and the
Principles of Matnematicsi Gottlob Frege", Quarterly
Journa l of Pure and A implied Mathematics > A3 (I 912TT
Jourdain included a note (p. 237)
pp* 23 ?“ 2 b 9 »
saying that "Professor Frege has most kindly read
this paper in manuscript, and added* • .notes" ; they
were apparently written in I910*
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It IS designed to produce
expressions which are short

and easier to take in, and
to be operated like a
calculus
by means of a small number
of standard moves.
^3
well the Begriffsschrift is
to "be suited to combine
with
a content most intimately."
From Grimdlagen again, "it
is designed ... to be
capable of expressing not only
the logical form like Boole's
notation, but also
the

content of a sentence ,

how shall we understand this

idea of Frege's that the forms of
a linaua character^ c.
Shall be suited to the expression
of ccatent?
We get some help through considering
what Frege
found inadequate in, for example,
Boole's symbolism. For
example, this notation provides no way
to sjoubolize such
a Simple sentence as 'If something
is red and round, then
it is red,'
For one thing, there are certain technical
difliculties with Boole's notation for general
ity,^-^
But
more importantly, Boole intended that his
sjrmbolism was to
be adequate to two distinct sorts of
interpretation, a

class interpretation and a propositional
interpretation?
indeed, he argued that it was.

We were free to interpret

the symbols of Boolean formulas as representing
eitiier

23*

Grundlagen

2^*

I bid,

25.

See C*I» Levels * A Survey of Symbolic Logic , pp. 56-57.
and Kneale and hneale, Jevelooment cf Logic
pp, ^11-412,

,

p,

.

p,

103,

103, n, 1.
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classes or propositions

not both.

Either one or the other, but
It is not possible to call
upon the resources

Of each simultaneously.

But this we would need to do
to

sjm,bolize our example, which
is wny we cannot.

With
Boole's symbolism we do not have
a notation in which we
can simultaneously express
compounds of sentences while
articulating the content of the
component sentences

in a

way which reveals logical relationships
among parts of
the sentences. There is no way.
for

instance, to show

with the notation that 'Something
is red' follows logically from 'Something is red and round".
Frege's

Begriffsschrift was intended to allow us
to articulate
the content of complex thoughts so
as to bring out
logical relations between these thoughts
and others
composed in part of their parts., and so forth.
Van Keijencort remarits as

fol.l.ows

on Frege's aim of

having a logical notation “suited to combine
with a
content most intimately*', (He passes over the

“class

interpretaticn" of Boole's

s^Tnbolisir.*

Frege frequently calls Boole's logic an
"abstract logic", and what he means by that

2b.

Actually the “prwcpcsitional interpretation" was itself
a class interpretation of sorts? in it the various
"elective s;,Tnbols" stand for,, not classe.s of objects,
but instead classes ol times (or durations, the two
not being distinguished} , intuitively the times at
which the "symbolized" proposition is true. A
result was that truth tended to slide out of the
focus of concern.
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IS thax in this lof^ic the
proposition
remains unanalyzed* The proposition
reduced to a mere truth-value. With is
the
introduction of predicate letters, variables,
ana quantifiers , the proposition becomes
articuxated and can express a meaning* The
new notation allows the symbolic
rewriting
of whole tracts of scientific knowledge,
perhaps all of it, a task that is altogether
beyond the reach of the propositional calivnaa. not sii^ply a
calouius!^?""”

Adopting van Heijenoorfs idea that Frege’s
notation
is intended to allow the ''rewriting”
of ''whole
tracts of

scientific knowledge” in its terms, and remembering
that,
if this is so, then much non-knowledge would
be similarly
expressible, and, further, keeping in mind that the

purpose of a Bcgriffsschrift is to make logical relations
manifest, we might be led to the following characxerization
of a

1

ingua characterica i

A lingua chaxacterica (1) is (or includes)
a grammar, a language -frame, which provides a
set of linguistic structures adequate to articulate the logical structure of any suitable
scientific propositional content so that, when

supplemented v/ith appropriate ncn-logical
vocabulary (as allowed for by the open categories of the grammar) any suitably scientific
propositional content can be expressed in the
temps provided and in such a way as to make
manifest the logical relations among it and
other similarly expressed propositional
contents *
Further, 2 ) it must always be possible
to (finitely) determine logical relationships
among expressions of the lingua (at least in
principle *
(

27 e "Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language”, p* 325
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So characterized, a lingua charactericn
must be, in
currently accepted usage, a forrrsal system
,
a system
vhereby in its specification we are provided
with an
effective characterization of what is a
sentence (formula)
of the system, and an effective
characterization of what
is a proof in the system.

That is, we must be provided

with a means of determining, for any sequence of
expressions of the system, whether or not it counts as
a

sentence, and for any n-long sequence of sentences of
the system, whether or not the sequence of the first

n— 1 sentences counts as a proof in the system of the

nth member of the original sequence,
(1)

states a strong condition of universality, or

potential universality; (2) enforces maximum logical
rigor.

Did Frege actually regard his Begriffsschrift

as meeting these two conditions?

On (2) first, it seems

clear that he did, and that indeed at least with the

presentation of the system in Grundgesetze Frege doss
attain this level of rigor.

It should be noted that Frege

does not explicitly set out an effective characterization
of what shall count as a Begriffsschrift-sentence , and it
is by no means easy to see just how this is to be done.

Still it would widely agreed that, with Grundgesetze and
perhaps even with Begriffsschrift ,

formal system.

van Heijenoortt

v/e

are offered a

Thus, for ii^stance, the judgment of

“Frege was the first to present, with
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all the necessary accuracy, a cardinal
notion of modern
thought, that of formal system

On the first condition (1), whether or not
Frege
actually regarded his Begriffsschrift as such

a lingua,

would, echoing van Heijenoort*s remark, say
that a
conception of logic as, ideally, providing the
grammar
for such a lingua is a conception which accords
well with
I

much of what Frege says about logic and can plausibly
and instructively be thought of as guiding his work.

Except that there is a difficulty in our statement of
idea, at least as it could be held by Frege j this

requires a major alteration of (1).

Before taking this

up let us expend a few words on the working terminology
of this essay#

Thus far we have spoken rather haphazardly of the

content of sentences, or statements, or judgments, and
so forth#

This practice is not inappropriate in dis-

cussing Frege's works prior to the I890's, but needs
improvement when later writings become the focus of
attention, as shall be increasingly the case.

For about

this time Frege introduced what is most commonly referred
to as his distinction of the sense and reference of

expressions#
In his "Introduction" to Grundgesetze , in the process

23#

Ibid#, p# 324#

7?

or indicating changes

egrtffsschrtft since

«M=n

ne nas introduced
into his

Be^riffssch^.

p^ege tells us
his prevxous conceptual
content -has now split
into What I can *
thought- and .truth-value-,
as a'clnsequence of distinguishing
between sense and
denotation
or a sign.
In this case the sense
of a sentence is a
thought, and its denotation
a truth-value. -29
where I’rege
hero used -thought- (
-Gedanken- ) Church and
others have
used -proposition- to
.uch the sa.e purpose.
And both
intend nuoh the same
in speaking of sentences
expressing
C^dr^en] thoughts or propositions.
Both would agree
that more than one
sentence (expression) may
express the
same thought (sense).
And that it is possible
for there
to be thoughts that no
sentence expresses. I shall
capitalize -thought- henceforth
when used in this way.
Still talking philosophical
lexicon. I shall offer a
row words on sentences.
Natural language sentences,
some
of them, clearly enough
express Thoughts. Equally
clearly
not all of what we would
ordinarily call sentences do,
for
a variety of reasons. Kor
instance some are in the- wrong
mood. It seems to have been
Frege -s view at the time of
Grundgeset^ that only declarative
sentences have (conceptual) content, that is.
express Thoughts, and it will
suit the purposes of this essay
to concur. Among declar-

Grundf^eaetze , pp, 6-7,
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atxvea

n,ost at

best oray incompletely
express Thoughts.
Indextcal elements of
some variety (tense,
demonstratives,
etc.) are present in
most ordinary sentences.
Such
sentences Frege on occasion
speaks of as incomplete
sentences. These are
noted for their systematic
shifting
in truth-value with
the context of their
employment. Fven
among sentences that do
completely express Thoughts

problems arise.

Some fail of truth-value
altogether.
This is the case with
-Pegasus flies', for
instance, others,
through ambiguity of one
sort or another, apparently
express more than one Thought
and so, in particular cases,
may be read with either
truth-value. Perhaps we should
withhold from the latter the
designation -expresses a
Thought', reserving this for
expressions whose content is
uniquely a Thought. Adopting
this suggestion. I propose
for the purpose of this essay
to so restrict our use of
-sentence- that it apply to
only those expressions that
express Thoughts and do not
fail of truth-value,
i.e., to

sentences which are either fixedly
true or fixedly false.
Koro accurately. I shall have
this class in mind in making
various "theoretical" remarks,
while continuing to use as
examples sentences with tensed
verbs and other indexical
elements. Given this restricted
usage of 'sentence' perhaps we may say that all sentences
have a suitably
scientific sense, as we were, on van
lieijenoort's prompting, earlier employing this phrase,
and so it may be
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dispensed with.
Let us now take up
the difficulty alluded
to a bit
baok With condition (l).
fbis oondition was
stated in
ter^s Of the logical
structure of Thoughts,
as we now
say. But such talk
of unique logical
structure of Thoughts
is out Of Place.
This is apparent in
a „ild way fron tne
Kantian ease where the
sentences -Vixens are vixens"
and
•Vixens are female foxeswould be held to be
expressions
of a common Thought.
Since the sentences differ
in
structure, which, if eitner,
eithpr will we say
shows jUre logical
structure of the Thought in
question^ Here one might try
saying that, if either does,
it is the latter, by
holding
that in analyzing the concept
vixen one was also coming
to more finely apprehend
the logical structure of
that
concept and so also of Thoughts
that contain it. I shall
not pursue the plausibility
of this approach to
.

the

particular example, for it will
not work in general.
It
IS not applicable, for
instance, to Frege -s example
where
the sentences -Line a is
parallel to
line b- and -The

direction of line a is the same as
the direction of line
b- would be held to express
the same Thought. Here the
difference in structure is sentence-wide,
and so the
alternative structures are competing
in a way the previous pair were not. And neither
can, consistent with
Frege-s epistemological views, be
taken as showing the
logical structure of the Thought in
question. But the
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atte.pt. to speak
coherently of Thoughts
having deter-nate logical structure
runs afoul of deeper
prohle.s
than this suggests.

Setting aside for the
.oment the idea of Unaua
£Mracte^. „e r.ay think of Frege's
Begriffsschrift as
an attempted axio.atisation
of logic.
Speaking so.ewhat
loosely we .ay suppose
that, in intention,
any logical
truth would find expression
in that system as a
theorem
Of the system. Then
consider such a disjunction
as

la White or snow is
not white'.

'Snow

How will such a logical

truth be expressed in a
system such as Begriffsschrift
Which lacks a symbol for
disjunction? We might suppose
that our logical truth
was inexpressible in
such a system,
that such a sentence form
as
-Sj=, S2

would not be adequate for
the expression of disjunctions.
And this on the ground that
only a disjunctive sentence
adequately expresses a disjunctive
Thought.
To this it might be replied
that we could simply
alter the notation to include
a symbol for disjunction.
This IS so. But if we thought
it necessary, then we
should be thinking that, as it
stands. Begriffsschrift.
for vhe lack 01 a symbol, does
not axiomatize truthfunctional logic. Further, consider
such a sentence as
•Snow is white or snow is white
or snow is white' which
someone might argue has its (sentential)
logical form

81

best portrayed
this way.

.

,«“.rplace

»... .. ....

disjunction.

Decomos clear that
if

Once this
unce
thi*^' is
i '
^
admitted,
it
•

Bep-»'ifir.,

.

^^“’schrift needs a
symbol for
two-place disjunction
if it IS
is to be
ho able to

n

express

cer,
tain logical
truths, then it will
al-o
r-oo,
eloo require
a symbol
for three-place
disjunction. And
^ SO
so on.
on
PFrom
which it
^ould follow that no
system could eve- axiomatize
axiomati
sentential
logic, at least not
if we require
q ire a finite vocabulary
for
our axiomatization*
•

If we shall not
succeed i„ our purpose
through

ending additional
primitive notation, what
about introducing a symbol for
disjunction into the
notation by
definition, perhaps this
way*

But how are we to take
this

4finition-

if it simply
provides us with short-hand
notation, then we shall
not
have gained the means
to express disjunctions,
either we
already had this, or we
still do not. Suppose
the
"definition" is not just an
abbreviation, then what
warrants its introduction?

We might try claiming
that sentences of one form
express Thoughts distinct
from, though logically equivalent to. Thoughts expressed
by sentences of the other
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.... ...

.«

... ........

'vhate,

.,„

^

tnat the sentences.

Snow is white

Snow is whin, or an..
.......

,..„,o,a.

.0,

.ai..,

„,o

„

...„

.

View would also be
committed to claiming
that each of
those sentences expresses
a Thought distinct
from that
expressed by

snow is White or snow
is white or snow
is white.
SO xortn.
Yet it cannot be
the case that we
encounter
a now connective at
each iteration. For
this wouih i.piy
an rnfxnate number of
such connectives and
render our
-story Of truth-functional
logic inexplicable.
So it
seems we must be meeting
with ohe old connectives
& up witn
in
new contexts. Now
consider the Thought
expressed

by the
last set off sentence and
the followi:^g two pictures
of
its logical structure#
v^(Sj^,V2(S2,S^;)

V3(S^.S.,Sj)

With the first we represent
it as built up with two
occurrences of a two-place
connective, with the second
we port.ray the Thought as ronta
i
containing a single
occurrence
of a three-place connective.
What is to be our ground
for preferring the first
portrayal to the second? We
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sa, that only this
preference is consistent
with
our taown mastery of
truth-functional logic.
But this
would he wrong. Our
knowledge requires a
finitely surveyable group of connectives,
so I shall assune.
But this hy
itself does not force
a choice of the
first representation
ovex' the second*
Nor
^
or win
Hill at dictate
the preference of
see combination of one-, two-,
and/or three-place connectives over a single
four-place connective when
we take
up the next meniber of oue-tendable senes of sentences.
Siiow IS white or snow
is white or snow is
white or snow
is White'.
More importantly, the
proffered reason for
preferring the first to the
second portrayal does not
give us grounds for preferring
either to the following.
-S^
(-S^zd S^) ,
•

a.

To agree to consider only
connectives of at most (say)
two places would not be
to agree on what connectives
occur in any given Thought.
Our recent reflections argue,

I

believe, for the

conclusion that we have no
principled way of picking one
logical structure from a number
of possible alternatives
for attribution to a given
Thought, and that, consequently,
we should reject the idea that
we make good
sense in

speaking, as before, of

logical structure of Thoughts.

This conclusion was already
explicit in the Grundlag en
application of Frege’s Dictum which we
have discussed.
However present reflections go beyond
that in the following
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respect,

w.en Fre,e envisage,
carving up tPe content
of
a Thought tn alternative
«ays both logical and
non-logical
content were affected.
What has been argued
Just now is
that even if we hold
non-logical content constant,
we

Tnaks

sense of
01 a
a thought having a
unique
.

logical structure,

otherwise put. we cannot
distinguish
among so-„alled logically
equivalent Thoughts where
we
have agreement in
non-logical content.

Our earlier attempt at
clarifying the idea of a
linSia charac^c^ is in need
of revision, it will
not
do to speak, as we did.
of articulating "the
logical
structure of any Thought.
Nor would it be adequate
to
require that a lingua be able
to express, one way or
another, any Thought. For
it is crucial to Frege’s
enterprise that a given Thought
can be analyzed in terms of
logical structures which are
not logically equivalent.
So we must require that a lingua
have the resources for
representing all such alternative
analyses In suitably
distinct ways. This idea of a
lingua being adequate to
represent all possible analyses
of any Thought is a
somewhat elusive one. We might hope
to pin it down
somewhat by reverting to talk of
language as follows, A
lingua ctara^terica has the
grammatical resources adequate
to express any sentence, that is.
express the Thought
expressed by any sentence, and this by
means of a sentence
alike in logical structure to that
discernible
in,

or
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suggested by, the origina]
iginal. h„
However this will
not do.
for reasons previously
gone
over in response
*
to noting
at Prege.s
Begrillsschrirt. lor
instance, does not
.ahe
« e 01 a symbol lor
disiunction. Ihe .ost we
can require
a ong the lines ol
preservation ol logical
structure is
that a
^
equivalent to
that intuitively
divined in. or attributed
to, a given
natural language sentence
which enables it to
be -rewritten.,
preserving content or
sense. When this
condition is „.et
let us speah ol the
lingua sentence as transl^

li^

natural language sentence .30

.ppi^

^ characterxsation 01 a lingua
characterica. a universal
language.
«.ore in keeping with
Frege-s program and his
practice.
Earlier ($5) in discussing
Frege’s idea

that the

domain ol logic is universal,
we were led to a view
wh^ch
-ay be recast, in light
ol recent remarks, this
way.
a
lingua translates all
logically true sentences
(given
suitable non-logical vocabulary.)
Hence Begrillsschrilt.
for instance, would be
incomplete il some logically
true
sentence could not be translated
into it. Now this
notion 01 logical completeness
might seem weaker than that
inherent in the idea that a
lingua can translate any
sentence. However a simple
argument seems to show that

s?mone-«
s,.mtneos ol
of^l'p
rength, but

I

require a reasonable
shall i(^ore this.
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the two ideas are
equivalent.

Clearly if a logic
is complete in the
sense of providing a gra..ar for
a language into
„hich any sentence
can be translated,
then it is adequate
to all logical
truths# or all which
Which can
can kq
be expressed at
all. So only
the converse can be
doubtful. But suppose
we had so.e
sentence not translatable
into a particular
,,,3
sentence will have
logical consequences.
Picking one we
for. a corresponding
conditional as before;
this will be
a logical truth.
Then if the lingua is
adequate to logic,
this conditional can be
translated into

l^^.

the .lingua.

But

wxth It (we .ay suppose)
will be translated the
antecedent
Of the conditional,
which was tne sentence
-f wnich
supposedly
without translation in the
linp-na
In +terms of an example,
consider
i

(

1

)

Tom is a big butterfly,

which has as a logical
consequence (so it seems)
(2)
Tom is a butterfly.
It seems we cannot maintain
both that (1) has no transition invo, saj, Bogriffssohrift
and that Begriffsschrift
is adequate to logic,
since if the latter were true,
we

could translate
(3)

(1)

only if (2)

into the notation.

But to do so would, it seems,
provide

a translation of (1).

conclude that the two completeness
conditions are equivalent.
i
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$7.

Epistemology of Logic

We have previously
remarked that much as
philosophers
can agree, for instance,
that there is a tree
in the
Quad vhtle disagreeing
over how this Is
knovnt. Kant and
Prege could agree on
logic
in that they
th« agree on
«
what are
the truths of logic
and yet
vet not h»
.
be in
agreement in their
responses to such questions
as.

How do we know logical
truths are such?
principles, termed logical
principw be accepted
princii^les,
by us?
S'-cu"<S.

Of logical

I do

however find it instructive
to view Frege's philosophy of logic in a Kantian
light. And remarks so
made
will serve to complement
earlier urgings against
treating
Frege as an epistemological
Platonist in his philosophy
Of number and set. For
if. when we turn to
Frege's views
on fundamental logic we
were forced to employ the
Platonic
picture of mind coming into
epistemic contact with

something apart from itself, those
earlier remarks would be
diminished in inieresb*

Both Kant and Frege would
agree, I take it. that
there is some sharp and
principled way of demarcating the
logical truths from other truths.
In this sense at least,
for both logic is an autonomous
domain. So our above
questions, which imply this, are
not phrased inappro-

I
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y-

ax leabt not on
this score.

For Kant, logic
abstracts from +h
»atter, of particular
cognitions,

it
^ is the science
of

the mere forms
of thinicinp-

pas^ee th

content, or
•

conceived, logic
encom-

e

thinking.

To think at

provides, to reason
CO rrect y is to
think in confora,ity
with the laws of
the
science of those
forms.

These ideas get
sharpened and made
concrete with
Frege. s conception
of a li^u^

^^a^i,,,.

-ceptive to anything
which can

.

be said,
instead of
speaKing of forms of
thought we sne-k
-,f m
speak of
grammar, cr
syntax, hnd we are
able to so frame
our syntax that the
logical form of sentences
formed from the syntax
is
manifest, and the
logical relationships
among such
sentences are effectively
characterized,
t,

m

this situ-

ation we might find
an intuitive iu^-tifirai-,
,
i^ication for
thinking
of logic as analytic.
The logic
j-ogic 01
of a
s lingua
i
analyzes
thought into an exhaustive
® array
arrav of
nr possibilities
-u--,.
of its
expression*
Indisputably, passages with
a Platonic flavor
crop
op throughout Frege's
writings, perhaps increasingly
so
fn the period under
consideration. In some ways
the most
Platonic passage in Crundlawer,
occurs in the "IntroductionWhere Frege says
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If evervthiner

^

nothing maintained itse??*^e^“^i
there would no ?onge^
bi
possibility
of geftins: to k-r»nw^
about the world
and everything would^he
fusion . . . Wharl- V Plunged into Conor concents i^reanv
history
a “m
history either of
our knowiedfre of e>r,yJ^
of words* Often
J>ieanings
2*
it is^o^i^^ after
immense
intellectual effort
tinued over centuries
^thp+^t^
fPat humanity at
last succeed«=^ in
concept in its pure
^
the irrelevant
LcreLons whicrjeU"ft°“'
from the eyes of the
mind,31
.

Here it can seem as
if Fre^-p
iq --kv
i,g is
thinking
of concepts
much as Plato Old
p«»w™o
did thp
the Forms.
However, in quoting from

S£mi^

v/e

left out the middle
of the passage.

reads

It

concepts
sprour^rihP^i"^^^?
«®"lhfS\,rd‘isoover^thnr
nat^ ^*T’
to define them^csyo^ologi-all
v‘
Of the nature
ollhriS^mi^d.

everything subjective,

and

away with truth!'3^^''°“®“

®"‘*'

‘‘°®®

And replacing it serves to
remind us of the context of
Fi-ege's remarks, his
continuing struggle to free
logic
and mathematics from the
clutches of psychologism.
Remarks such as the following
dot the pages of Grundlerer

31*

^rwdl agen

32*

Ibid *

,

.

p. vii,

p, vii.

.
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""

-^-olutely no concern

can cont^ibute^anythS^
foundation of arSme?fc5‘r'^"®''

ev;r'in*'Lycrc!-v°
- -tter 0?

it

9«®stion whatso-

In the closing
paragraph of his
-Introduction" to
balf Of „hich is
taken up with a diatribe
agaanst the peychologistic
views of Benno Brd.ann,
Brege
gasps.

Ihe distance between
mv vipw
logical logicians*
that there i^^ no

havinranv

psychoenormous
^ook*s

°vir.e^u:rT:.

“

By remembering who is
the enemy we shall be
prepared
for some countering
hyperbole, and better placed
to
maintain perspective*
The earlier quoted
Grundlagen passage may be
counterbalanced somewhat by this
note included in Grundlagen.
An idea in the subjective
sense
governed by the psychological is what
laws of

33 *

Ibid >

a

p, y*

3^*

Ibid «

,

p, vi,

33 -

Ib id.

,

p, 105,

36.

^J^nd gesetze o p, 25,
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charac?er?''\n\dL''L^^
belongs to logic and
is
sensible • ,
Suh
‘

M

Pictorial
sense
non-

Sr -

myseli . . , use
jective
sense,
it
is becrusa^^^t^^^
meanings
w!th
wo'rl
assumed such
a very subjective,
idealist^rn^
co,.y,pXexion, and
his true view wa^ marf<>
<liifidult to
discover
a?
or faKs'witt tha?
psychology and
logif:37
'•idea*'

nrn,/L

4af

The counter-weight
S

lipc?
les

p>,«
in Frege
seeming to portray him-

self as advocating and
developing the "true view"
of
Kant. Since it is unlikely
that anyone would regard
Kant as an epistew:ological
Platonist on any topic, we
my suppose that Frege did not so regard
himself i„ the
sphere of logic.
What is crucial, Frege seems
to be saying in speaking
as he does of the objectivity
of concepts and so of
arithmetic, is a sharp distinction
between psychology
and logic. This Kant also
emphasized.

presuppose psychologi cal
princip_es in logic o But to brineprinciples in logic is as absurfas sucii
to
bring morality from life. 38

Kant’s comparison of logic and
morality is instructive.

It is at least suggestive to
think of Frege on

3?*

^run^ejS^ij p. 37» n. 1.

38*

L ogic , p, l6.
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logic in parallel with
Kant on morality.
And this idea
is suggested, to
some extent, by such
remarks of Frege
^
as these.
'

be called

‘law^ of

asserting what is, can
--iJi be
ue
h-Jr-.o^ one ought to
think in conformitv wTth
coTicPiv^bH
t-onceivea as prescri

than for l^ws 0 .^ 0 ^!^'*
*
ihf
^ne lat/ter nave a
special ti-Mo to 4the
.u"^
name
»’iaws of thcu^hf
o^v If we mean to assert that
o^y
thev
tne most general lawc;®
wnich prescribe univerc^alitr
rsally th^ way
which one cnght tn° thir,kif one IS to think at
all. 39

m

To develop the suggestion
a bit. let us recall
a portion
Of Kanfs discussion
in his Funjament^ Princinles
of the
Metaphvsj^s of Morals. In
the section headed '•Hsteronomy
of the Will as the Source
of All Spurious Principles
of
Morality” Kant writes that
seeks the law which is to
anafisre else than in the fitness^of"?+*^
ness
of its maxims to be universal
laws of
if it goes
oJt 01
out
or‘i?^el-''^d’
Itself and seexs this law
in the
always
resu??fLf
results
iielieronc^
The will in that case
does not give itself the law.
St i1 i^
through its relation

39*

Grundgesetze . p, 12.

^0.

Immanuel Kant. Funda ment al PrincipTes of thP
of Morals, p. y/~7~
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U sec.uently. having
.ivihed the possible
foundations of

-nality into those which
depend upon e.pinical
pnincipies

those Which depend
upon national principles,
he tells
us that ••[e]2£irical
£rinci£l^ are wholly
incapable of
serving as a foundation
for ..oral laws-.'^l
essentially
because this would be
to attempt to found
the necessary
upon the contingent.
Much the same reason
lies behind
the demand of Frege
and Kant to Keep logic
distinct fro.
psychology. Whereas the
empirical could conceivably
suggest principles,
logical or moral, in
neither case
could it authorize our
acceptance of either sort
of
principle.

In discussing rational
principles as a possible
foundation of morality Kant
maintains that if we are not
going to simply build our
conception of morality into
our conception of the source
of morality
"ill remaining
conception made up of the attri-^
bnd dominaiion! comV M
conceptions of might and
ven“4nc^^ "Jlri
Sjstems of morals erected
on t‘ii^
directly opposed
to moraiUy,t!^"“"

Briefly pvt. might does not
make right.
general outlook, there can be no

Summing up the

sort of apprehension

whereby mind supposedly gains
moral principles, or

P*

58.

P» 8o.
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directives fro™ something
independent of it
God, or Nature, or
what ha^,o
--

pe it

"hioh. at the time,
for us the acceptance
i^<.ance of
or the,»
these principles.
„e
™ust ash. Are they
rights Are they
truly moral
principles? And no
source other than
morality itself
can answer these
question<?
questions. ,uch, roughly,
is Kanfs
view.
„
authorizes

It is the rejection
by Frege of a
-rational sourceiust as much as an
-empirical source-, of
logic that I

am tentatively, and
somewhat controversially,
suggesting,
ere is textual support
from Grundgeset...
.

thoughrSatiy’^oontra'dinerours
-- to be laws
of^rutr"anH°"%'^“^*'^
natural laws
Of human beings* taking
p
~~
will ask, who is rie-htf
J^ignt?
Whose laws of
takin-~-A k 1 +
“Ith ;y,e laws
of trSthV^.^
It would not matter.
I submit, whether
the imagined beings
were (held to be) divine.
Nor would it matter
whether we

ourselves were the beings
in question in this
sense.
In
-consulting the Forms-, or
whatever, certain principles
occur to us Which differ
from those with which we
have
previously operated. I„ any
and all such cases we
must
ask.
Which are the laws of truth?
Ultimately there is
no source outside of logic
itself which can authorize

se tze , p. 14.

95

for us a. answer.

This see.s to .e the
spirit of the
remark that -I ta.e it
as a sure sign ei
a .istahe ii
logxc has need of
metaphysics and psychology
sciences
that require their own
logical first principles.-'*'*

-

let even if we work
ourselves around so that
we are
sympathetic to this outlook,
questions remain, even if
they are not Just the
same ones we started
with. Dummett
has instructively observed
that

recen?rrthf f^rst oie?*?of
was wha? we ca^l;^orind-\"Sw":e"
c'anlL^llIv"
oui claim to this
^
knov>fiedre* ana
^
Frobiem was now
Skentic?s^^“^”°‘‘^®'^^
after Descartes total*
spective. and in this''respec^
xajxico*

Phi’osopner
hr'looKed’'®"'

i‘cr Fretre^

get lo-i?^i’^‘®
fi|ht!^:5

as for them* iox^ic
philosophy: if we do not
nothing else

But how will we know when we
"get logic right"?
v/e have to go on
here?
$8*

What do

Truth

In his Grimdgese:^ "Introduction’*
Frege wrote that
Our conception of the law s of
logic is
necessarily decisive for our treatment
of the science of logic. and
that con-

Ibid., 0, 18 .

45 *

Dummett

"Frege

pp. 225-226
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How then did Frege
understand the word -true he have us speak of
truth?

How would

In making that remark
Frege, as so often,
had
psychologism in mind, it
is easy, he held,
to slide from
a recognition that
laws of logic prescribe
patterns of
correct thought, and are.
in this sense, laws
of thought,
"into supposing that these
laws govern thinking
in the
same way as laws of
nature govern events in
the external
world.
In that case they can
be nothing but laws
cf
psychoxogy , . .•‘7
something being true gets
confused with someone-s
supposing something to be
true,
until
in the end truth is reduced
to individii^l

<=:

Alffhf^fto

lly'tf iHis is: being true
is different
C..X
from
being taken to be true,
whethe3 3v one
or many or everybody, and
in no case is to
be reduced to it.
There is no contradiction
true which everybody
I understand by laws
of
he true,

but laws of truth

But this is not the only
route to "psychological
logic",
in his Grun d l agen "Introduction"
Frege had warned
that if his Uictum is not
observed "one is almost forced

P-ru.nci/:

e3etze « p, 12,

^7.

Ibid.

,

p.

12.

46.

Ibid.

,

p.

13 ,
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to taka as the meanings
of words mental
pictures or acts
Of the individual mind-.'*9
principle.
"always . . . separate
sharply the psychological
from the
logical, the subjective
from the objective .
.»50 And
.
in Gr^e^et^.s
•Introduction-, while not
mentioning
the Dictum, he once
again offers a diagnosis
of a major
cause of psychologism.

Because the psychological
loe:icians
recognite the possibility

-S^e^oS^’f
thf sense.,
tenL-O^^.^S
j, ,hey

f

i

i

therfbefni
actuaffi.e.,

airectly or indirectly on
ccncepcs to be ideac;
olS thereoy
and
assign them to psychoiogy.51
The nature of their error
lies in forgeting that
thoughts
are not subjective. So
that, for instance, I may
have a
thought w.iioh I relate to you
so that you understand it,
and convey it. in turn, to
someone else, who voices disagreement with it, and so forth.
And so, in looking for
the meaning of the words used
to convey some thought they
are led "into the mind" of the
one who has the thought;
finding there only various ideas,
they assign such the
task of, individually, being the
meanings of words.
Thoughts then become combinations of
ideas. And,
taics

[t]hus everything drifts into idealism
and
-rom that point with perfect consistency

^9*

G rundlag:en »
Jt>id

•51 •

. ,

p, x.

p. X.

Grundt^esotze , p .

1

6

*
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into solipsism • .
•
if
omnn
anything but what was w-5 we
+ h^
then a conflict of
opinions"rbe^
n.utual understanding’^wouW

4.

grasp
selves.

ri""

arbiter in the t-oniiict
^
fPPointed
conflict of opinions.
Some pages on Frege
continues,
put'^Sli'^the'sentence ”Cha-!f
the Saxons" as neither
false, but
as fiction, iust a<^ Zl Itrue nor®?®i
^^ccustomed to
regard, for -xancto
sentence "Nessus
carried Deianeira
i^'venus-;
for even ti: sen?4cr'L"?f
Deianeira acr^s^
across the
ri
^h^rivertvenu^’^couW^b^
ue on y i., the name
"iMessus" had a bearer, 53
And again.

L

—

with the words "ThifbiaSf
,tdrsL?e'ne1

TrJLl

17

">y,

7oI?U

ideas

fllfeT"

that my“iLa"of''grLn^is"Lferted^cf^^“''’
Of this blade of^assf
grass.
I repeat
in this
sentence there IS no
uo talk
i;aiK v/hatever of mv
ideas*
it IS idealists who foist
that sense upon us. 5^
Here is revealed the style
in which Frege would have
us discourse about truth.
The sentence ’Charlemagne
conquered the Saxons’ is true
just in case the names
'Charlemagne and ’the Saxons’
have (unique) bearers such
that the one stands in the
conquering relation to the
Other. And a familiar style
o
it IS.
is
On*:,
rh-r+rv
IX
une,
often
associated
with Aristotle, which embodies
what A.N. Prior has called
.

52.

Ibid.

^3*

Jbidi.» P* 20.

,

p.

17.

1
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•’the

wrote

nerve of the
correspondence theory"
of truth. 55
In a familiar
passage of the Metaphysics
Aristotle

contradiotions?"but*^of^o '^"^®5''!'®‘*iate between
subject we must
either affi^ Ar a!
?^®dicate. This
is olAar ^'^the
nrs^^'^cT
define
what tr.e true and

Here we have a statement

-

though not the first, for
the
Idea is present in the
Sophist
of wnat, following
Tarski (and the Warsaw
group of Polish philosopherlogicians generally) is
commonly termed the classical
conception of truth. 5 ? its
hallmark is the central
role
of a notion of reference.
In our talk of truth we
aim to
provide a systematic account
of how sentences, or sentences through their parts,
make reference to what there
is, which account enable^?
cfictuxes us ..o explain,
or understand,
how it is that truths are
true.

-

Edwards'

"Correspondence Theory of Truth” in
xn
p. 224 .

Enc^ lopo dia.

56 .

Me

57

Tarski's "The Conoeot of
Truth^?n
Truth
in ioririaiizea Lan.^uages” (o.
I53) in
'
and
(more ri^^iyj
^4~ru
i.xUu/1
th^cinJl
iA iir^OOi p ^ C i C n
in
k*
O0
T
^-^0
a JDilO£xiiU
(June
1 Q 6 q)
r.rt
At
hazinuerz A.jdukiewicz,
iJ}Ji££ios of Philosoph y
pp, 9-18.

vs

,
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A variant idea also
looks back to Aristotle.

=«Parated to be
combined
has the truth, Vhile”'he''^h
in a state contrary
to tharof'i'^^''-^
objects
is in error.
Thi^
when
is
v;hat
is called truth
-p
present, and
when is it not*'»
we
mean by these tenns
think trulylnat^o;
a“ pare, that you
are nnlp Kh+
say this ’have th^^truth^^B^^®
i,

v,...

In this perhaps equally
well-known passage we find
an
idea Which turns up this
way in Kussell-s Lectures
on

^iosl

j^

AtoTnism .

The first truism to
which I wioh^
draw your attention
ara r L;,.
agree with me that these

—

'9,,

‘tht-r^rhs*"

thatiT

I

.j.
xnem,

.,-S7-c..o„

when I speak of a fact
I mean the kind of
thing that makes’a'o^oposition true or false. . ,
Thus,
.

,

,

I

for in
in-

va^iL

versei;^as%-'’'‘'’
bta^em^n? i. rerde^ld ?rue"b./n%'""=“ ’
fact.
If 1 say^r^io'^^rL^arrfZ-^'tt
'

'

menfi
Agctin,

Dammett, in his widely read
article "Truth" tells
us that an "important
feature of the concept of truth"
which the correspcndejice xheory
expresses" is "that a

58.

_MetaDfivcji c3.

59.

Bertrand Russell, "The Philosophy of
Logical Atomism"
^^
^.nd K n m'/l. e p-e (edited bv
Robert C. Marsh),

1051b.
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statement is true onlv
only

i-r

there is something
in the
virtue of which it
is true.-^O

Ihe additional
quasi-causal element which
appears in
«3e sets Of remarks
through the expressions
-because..
->^33 . . . true-, and
-i„ yictue of- i wi,h
to hold
separate from the
-e Classical
clae;c;i«oi
conception of truth as
correspondence with reality.
^^tty. IT find no hint
of it in Frege's®
®
writings.
The classical conceotion
-.wa cx
of ••ru+h
wruth seems *
to carry with
it some rather difficult
problems. For it seems
to presuppose that it is possible
for us to relate to
the world
tn such a fashion that
we can say how it
is.
And this
would seem to require
that our oonceptualisations
carve
reality at its joints, and
that cur referential
apparatus
engage with what there
is.
Onlv 11
ir this were so
uruy
could
our statements be true,
that is. say how reality
really
For some, highlighting
such assumptions nay
induce a
scepticism, one avoidable
only through rejecting
the correspondence theory and holding
that reality is what we
make of it. For others,
the impossibility of
comparing
conceptualisation with reality will
dictate the view that
the scepticism-inducing
problem is a pseudo-problem.
But
this too may lead to a
rejection of the classical concep.

60 '

(eaited by

x’.P'*

—

••Truth" in .Phil osophical Lo^ic
^
Strawson), p, 03,

102

tion on the ground that
it Is censexess
senseless to
tr> speak
^
u of
an

„.u„ „

seneelesd to speak of
correspondence between
words and
world.
While the issues raised
here are important I
wish to
pass the™ by, since Frege
does not see™ to have
worried
the problems, and any
discussion I could offer
would be
too tortuous to be worth
the excursion.
However I would
like just to register
the claim that, whereas
deeming
the question of the
ultimate nature of reality
a senseless one may lead to a
rejection of the classical
conception Of truth, it need
not. And I would mention
J.L. Austin and Quine as
recent examples of
philosophers
who have maintained versions
of a correspondence
theory
while rejecting the question
of reality's ultimate

nature.
One or another reaction
to the mentioned problems
may be a source of adopting
one of a variety of nonolassical conceptions of truth.
Karl Popper has broadly
dravm a contrast between the
"idea of objective or absolute truth
that is truth as correspondence
with the

6l

Cn Austin* compare the section
on "Realitv" in
both
repr^te^in
pinol'
^a^rs. On Quine compare ''The Scope
auQ J.,yigua^Te of Science" in
Wavs of Paradox,^
espeoia-ly p, 126, and Chapter III
^hflC’SOPhy of Logic .

—

^
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and •subjective (or
-episte.ic.) theories
of
'’2
truth".
The latter

S“

K:s(/rr“

-f
Characterized? for example,
by its history
or bv its® reicxtion
^
to other bel^e-^c,
Tw«
1
.
,
LNon-classical theorioc;'] =,11
less, that truth is \hat
with^'ce^^ain rules
?rcritefia?^?''o^r^^^
bility?''^^.

In this grouping belong
the views of Frege -s
"psychological logicians" with
their idealist, coherentist
tendencies which he so stoutly
opposed.
Having located Frege on the
classical side of the
truth divide. I wish to
indicate a bit eiore specifically
what his view involves.
Here, once again, we shall
be
involved in bringing to the
fore a conception which
underlies and guides Frege -s work,
but which receives no explicit discussion on his part.
The theme will be how
discoursing upon truth can provide
what we shall call a
semantics for a logical system
such as Begriffsschrift.
Our approach will be slightly
oblique.

62
'

63,

^^^224-225^''’
Ibid.

.

p, 225.

and Refutations.
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Consider the sentences

W

Jack i3

Ured although

Jill is not tired

Jack is tired because
Jill is
Hach appears to be
composed
(

5)

the same pair in each
case.
(6)

tired.

out oi a pair of
sentences,

Further each implies

Jack is tired.

Tnus both Of the following
would seen to be logical
truths.
( 4)
only if (6)
(S)

(

5)

only if (6),

Now it seen.3 we can say
why (7) is logically
true in a
way in which we are unable
to say why (8) is so.
Of ( 4 )
«e know that if it is
true then both of its
component
sentences must be true
alsoi and conversely,
if the component sentences are both
true, then so too must be
(4).
That is, we can state what
are necessary and sufficient
conditions of the truth of
(4) in t«rnc?
nf its component
Xwims of
sentences. Otherwise put,
•although*, in (4) expresses
truth-functional conjunction. With
regard to (5) we know
that if it is true then both
of its component sentences
must be true also, but the
converse does not hold. It
IS not sufficient that Jack
be tired and Jill not for
(5)
to be true. Since each of the
seemingly component sentences of (5) is implied by
(5), it seems each must, in
some way, be a logical component
of (5).
On the other
hand, they do not compound
truth-funotionally
in

deed wo

c.re

(

5 J.

In-

In the dark as to the logical
structure of (5).
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The noted difference
between (4) and
(5) can be al-

______

ing the

internal structure"
xruoture n-p
of +v>
the component
sentences
Xh unproblematic),
but not how to so
translate (5).
seems appropriate to
register this difference
in our
knowledge of (4) and
(5) bv
*
^ savir,^
y^^fc> what v/e know why
(4)
implies (6), but not
why
(5) does,
dop«5* equivalently,
y o;
that we
know Why (7) is a
logical truth, but not
why (8) is. The
sense Of •explain',
or -knowledge- at
worh here seems to
he this*
We know
^.-.4now how to determine
the truth-value of
the
(8)
complex sentence (4) from
its component sentences,
and
knowing just this enables
us to know that
(7) is true.
We do not know why
(8) is logically true,
since we do not
possess knowledge of
(5) analogous to what we
have of (4)

v.-hioh

would enable us to determine,
using just it, that

is true.

Now consider the following.
(6)

Jack is tired

(9)

Jack is very tired

(10) Something is tired.

(10) would seem to be a
logical cons equence of both
(6)
and (9), thus each of the
following would be a logical

truth.
(11)

(6)

only if (10)

(12)

(9)

only if (10)
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Since (lO)
\
/

J.J5

T>n+
noT

j.Xoelf a lop'io^i
-Logical +rMt+u
truth nor either
(6)

or (9) a logical
falsehood, it see.s
that if either (n)
or (1.) ts logically
troe. its antecedent
„ust in so.e
way guarantee the
truth of its consequent.
For the lihes of
(6) Frege
offers the following
account, an account taken
up in detail in
Chapter
Jack IS a proper na-ne.
and so purports to
refer to something. via., some object,
*is tired- is a
predicate, and
also purports to i-ier
refer to or.mo+i,i
something, viz., a
particular
concept, and so (6) itself
„ui pe true just in case the
referential relations hold,
and the object in question
falls under the concept
in question.
If we accept this
account of (6). then if we
knew that (6) was true we
would be able to determine,
on the basis of that knowledge. that (10) was true.
Or rather we would if we
accept
some account of (10) on which
it gets treated as claiming
in effect that at least one
object falls under the concept
of being tirsa, and let us.
Given this account we know
whj if (6) is true, then so
too must be (10), that is.
we know why (ll) is a logical
truth.

m.

We are not so well off as
regards (12j.

Neither
Frege, nor anyone else to my
knowledge, has an account
to offer ^or (9) such that on
that account we would know
why if (9) were true, so too must
be (10), and so why it
IG that (12) is logically true.
Frege’s accounting of
(6)

does not app.ly in parallel to
(9) since there is no
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concept answering to
the phrase .is very
tired*.
(i
ume this will be
granted and do not
consider how we
know that this is so.)
Once again, the
di«erence in our
knowledge oi (ii)
(,3) is renected in
the iact that
we know how to
translate ( 6 ) into a
notation such as
Begriffsschrift. but we do
not know how to similarly
translate (9), whereas we
can express ( 6 ) and
(10) in
Begriffsschrift so that
(10) is derivable from
( 6 ),
we are
unable to do the same
with (9) and (10).
Again, the
logical structure of 6
(
is
)
as treated here
that of
a simple predication
wherein a proper name and
a predicative expression concatenate
to give a sentence.
Frege-,
account of predication tells
us (if correct) the
conditions
under which predications
are true, and in so doing
instructs us. by implication,
on why the likes of
(11) nust
be true
or rather, accomplishes
this, if at ail.

-

-

-

in

conjunction with his account
of existential statements.
We have considered two
examples of logical truths
With regard to which we are
able to explain why it is
that they are logically true.
I wish to generalize
a
thought implicit in the examples.
In general, we may
say. we know why a sentence
which is a logical truth
is

such When we are able to recognize
parts and modes of
combination of these parts in the
particular case so that,
in tei-ms of a general account
of the referential and
(perhaps) non-referential function
of sentence parts of
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these sorts, an. a
general account of how
such parts forn
« o es, we can show
why
given that the referential
worh is perforce,
according to plan
the sentence „ust
he true. To provide
such an account, in
general, for the
logxcal truths of some
system of logic would be
to give a
semantics for the system.
I believe
intended reOf his in Crundge^
to constitute a semantics
for Eegriffsschrift in
this sense. At the
same time.
Begriffsschrift is conceived,
in the ideal, as a lingua
Oharacterica. a universal
language, indeed I think
we
can capture much of what
Frege had in mind in
speaking,
in his “Introduction" of
Grundgesetz,e of a "thoroughgoing
development of my logical
views"^^ with the idea
that
Frege now thinics of d
a linp-ua as requiring
a semantics as
an integral part.

-

-

Since any sentence figures
in logical truths, not
just as a whole, but through
its various parts, to
possess
a lingua would be to possess
the means for spelling
out.

with regard to any sentence in
the lingim. the conditions
under which it would be true,
its truth-conditions. And
since any sentence translates
into a lingua , in effect a
lingua would provide the means
for stating truth-conditions for any sentence. To possess
a lin^a then, would
be to have an understanding
of an exhaustive set of
ways

64,

Grundg:os c ~t7.e , p, 6,
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».

••

«sh,

„„

to

truth possible?

h„.

„ „„„

,, ,,,

t™.

I,

,„u

...

„„„o„,

For we cohIh
could respond to this
question
ostensivelyi
Tn one
xn
otip or these
j
ways*
ic.
That
k,
y
mat is*
by
sentence
p&rts of such and
.u.h sorts conung
together in one of
tnus and so wa,^s.
(Re,»enber. this question
•How is truth
possible?- IS not to be
confused with the
problems earlier
mentioned and set aside*)
It ia in this light
that I would have us
consider the
theory of reference Frege
provides for his Begriffsschrift

t"

Perhaps the most important
conclusion
that Frege drew from
his attempt to say how
truth is
possible was that, as he
might have put it,
unsaturation
id unavoidable.
Understanding what he meant
by unsaturation and why
^
j he was led +o
to +>1-10
this conclusion
will be major
concerns in the ensuing
chapter*

110

Consider "the sentsne^a m
^ Prime number*.
Linguistically we distine-ijidh +
a predicative part
a subject *two*
*is a nrT°
latter we usually
associate^ assert
assertive force. Y^»-f +k-;
not essential
t-p ^
® statement on
stage, it JanAot be
the
said^that^h®^®
actually asserts anything, nor is he
rIsponsiMe
eliminate
state+?*
the assertive^fn^'’
orprt'
force from the
predicative
part, as
•

^

the sentence'^will
sliH rLai^ar^tsi"
of
-hey are, and it is
'ffstinctly different
as
impor+rpi
this difference cuts
Point that
deep
and
J*'®
first part, 'two*, is a'rrn^fblurred. The
denotes an objects It
certain
number,
itself is'^sn^
does not require a
which
a prime number', on complement^ Thr^^ea?
part,
'is
the other hand
a
comdenote an object'"'
'all"^?h’
^ail
the iirst oart
bhail also
a
second
lira ted.
p.art unsatTo this distlT^TTf^^
symbols there'"
naturally corresponds an^anp ^
distinction in the
realm of denotatLnsi
to
object, ana to the
corresponds an
^ corresponds what
Will call a concept.^rediL^iSrL®^^""-"®
I
*=® ^ sofinition. For the cleco^posuLf
satuiated and unsaturated parts must bp'reca^dph
logical structure, which
feature of
accepted but which cannot must
and
brredu-eri
recused to something more
primitive.
r,

'

FRKGE

CHAPTER

III

THE SEMANTICS OF FUNCTION
AND ARGUMENT
$9.

Exposition of Notation

Wo begin this chapter with
a sketch of the basic

ideas of Frege's systora of
logic, as presented in
Grun^et^, by following Frege through
his exposition
of primitive notation,
supplementing this with occasional
remarks of historical cr
clarificatory nature. In this
e.xpoG.ition
follow Frege *s order of introduction
.T,

of

Ill

pr'iini't xvs
'

w?+-v»

exception.

Discussion of the
notatioTi for definite
description
rxpxion is
IS deferred to
the next
section ($10) where it
serves -^o
-o set th«
+
the stage
for what

co.es next.

This is an atte.pt
to elucidate Frege-s
semantics through seeing
it as flowing naturally
anP
powerfully from certain
r.ain a=-<-mr^-n
„
a„o.mptions about apparently
complex names. After
some further discussion
of certain
aspects Of Frege's
philosophy of set theory,
we take uo
the so-called paradox
that the concept horse
is not a
concept and attempt to
assess the importance
of this claim
Within Frege *s philosophy.

In

Frege builds from eight
primitive
names, bach is a
function-name. There are no
purely
logical singular terms which
are primitive. Singular
terms, or proper names, do
occur in the purely logical
notation; they make their
first appearance in Frege's
exposition when the resources
for constructing sentences
become present. This since
Frege holds that sentences
are proper names, each a
name of one of two objects,
the
True and the False. The
existence of this pair of logical objects is assumed in
the ensuing explanations.
The first introduced name
is the symbol

—

(

).

This little stroke, with its
attendant argument place
shown by the pair of parentheses,
is simply called the
horizontal. The horizontal, it is
explained, is a
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^
a

^-Maco

function-name.

It denote.

one-£l^

and yields objects as
values, in particular,
when the
True is taken as argument
this function yields the
True
as value, and in all other
cases, i.e.. for the False,
or
any other object as argument,
it yields the False

as
The horizontal has the
effect, then, of doublenegation. It might be read
’It is the case that . . .’,
at least when a sentence
fills its blarJ:. Since it
denotes a function from objects
to objects, only names of
objects, £rooer nan^, may fill
its blank.
I shall
generally use open parentheses
as above to indicate
positions for proper names, and
use apostrophes to indicate distinct positions as
required.

value.

In B ^riffsschri ft what was
outward.ly the same sign
had been called the content-stroke.
Its function .bad
been somewhat vaguely characterized
as serving to combine
"the signs that follow it into a
totality" so that they
have a content that can become a
judgment."^ This sort
of talk is absent from ^im^gesetze
.
Semantically speaking, the horizontal is on a par with
the sign for negation,
next introduced. Still the horizontal is
peculiar, and
its peculiarity is reflected in the fact
that it is a

syntactic requirement of Frege's Begriffsschrift
that

1

•

B egriffsschrift

,

p , 12.
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a well formed
formula begin with -*-h^ w
.he horizontal
stroke.
n ($ 5) I shall comment
•

further upon this.

The negation-strohe
is introduced as
a short vertical
fine placed mid—wav alon^r
y along tne uhorizontal
thus
_

“T

(

)

This exoressior'
ic;
n IS
also a one-place
function-name. It
denotes a function which
yields the False when
the True
fs taken as argument,
and yields the True
for any other
Oboect as value. So.
for instance, if Prege
had a proper
name for the Sun, say *©»,
then
“TT

6

would be a name of the
True.
The horizontal and the
negation-stroke are thus, in
effect, the two singulary
truth-functions. However, (i)
tnej are names of
functions, not syncategcremata.
and
(li) these functions are
explained for all objects,
not
just truth-values, as
arguments. Further, each
function
takes only objects as
arguments, they are first -Ievej
functions. As well each
yields, for any object as
argument. a truth-value as value,
Frege terms function-names
Which denote functions with
this property concent -wnr.i,
Both the horizontal and the
negation-stroke are one-place,
first-level concept-words.
Concept-words, as one might
expect, denote cojicents,
concepts are a special case of
functions, viz., those which
yield a truth-value for
every argument. Predicative
expressions are. for Frege.
.
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COnCept-WOr'Hcj
wo.cis,

V.,,4.

Dut no prireitiva
logical
J-o„icai «v^
expressions are
dica^ive expressions,
unless t.e identity-sign
i= so
^
counted.

u
luno^r
.ion-na.es.

.ao. ol tnese denotes
a function v,nion
.ruth-value When both
places have been
0
with arpcents.
Frege calls such
two-place funclons lotions, and
the expressions
which denote thorn,
,

wo allow .concept,
to apply generally
to functions which
yield only truth-values
when fully oo.pleted.
so that we
have one-placo,
two-plaoe. n-place
concepts, and similarly
with concept-v/ords.

The symbol for identity,
> »

place concept-word.
(

-

...
.
lo a
primitive two~
•

>

Frege explains

)-(•)

as denoting a function
which yields the True
just v/hen
the "( }-argumenf is
the same as th G "(
* )“argumen t”j

in

all other cases it yields
the False.
Here we make use
of our apostrophe
convention for holding open
distinct
places in the concept-word,
Note that identity, like
all
other first-level functions.
takes only objects
as
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arguments,^

cai:er.."T'"'“"
X entity of
contentan. oon.ltionaUty

m

.a. .el. i.at «.at
.e t.ere

.iffe„ fro. (e.g.)
negation

t.at -It applies to
na.es an. not
to contents.
There he used a trim»
riple-bar, and regarded
names which flank thi'^
o© 4-v.
sicrri as
Thereby giving up their
ordinary function of
r=ferrir.^ +„
>,
r.ierring
to objects
in favor of
t*®t'erring to the. salve*?
alves in so.e manner,
so that identity
statements spo.e of the
flanking expressions,
saying of
the. that they had
the same content.
Evidently Frege was
>»oved to this view,
which on its face is
puszling and
•Ufficult to integrate
with the other doctrines
of
B^ifl^hrift,'^ through noticing
that different identity
•

^^sis for truthfunctional logioranS ?h!?
conditional when it is fla-ikeri j onctioas as the bi?''-‘®^’
wonder whether Frege Leded ?-'
~
o.s a piece of
tive notation, we yp"!
pri.ition could be define'd in
Oisjuncte-mtionality. So couirwf
nol‘dL-?ne"®®?^^°"
the
l>i-ocnditicnal, as a roiMu-i-tioi nt2 ?.*®
^ conditionals
the standard .anner‘>
in
pj.^
identity
statements (whos'^^tir.fao
no?

LT

3«

identity was an indefinable
'logicfl
Begrif fs s ehi^ift . p, 20,

i^ioticn!

Frege gives for identity
in Begriffssrhri f+
(i) either not (F.x
'
“
Frege's interpretation ’x"'
must hi niw
thing in its first
Sccl-rLoe^tn
s.nd something else in
its -econd
second
occurrence aiid in (ii),

may be expressed,
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statements may .Ufer in
epistemic interest, wpiie
at the
same time holding that
one had exhausted the
meaning of a
name «hen its denotation
had been specified.
The fact
that the morning star is
the evening star
requires the
confirinaxion of astronomy,
iwi.ij,, while
wnij.8 thi*,
eo not
this IS
so with the
that the morning star
is the morning star.
Yet if

reference is all there is
to content (at least
in the'
case of names of objects)
how shall we account for
the
difference in interest that
attaches to these two claims?
In "On Sense and Reference"
Frege rejected the Begriffsohri
reply of ruling names
ambiguous in reference between
their
occurrences on one side of an
identity sign and elsewhere.
Here and henceforth he
distinguishes between the sense
and the denotation of proper
names, and signs generally.
Ihe view which Frege came to
hold would seem to be one on
which the content of no name is
exhausted by its having
denotation; there are (e.g.) no
Russellian proper names.
Any expression of which we could
sensibly inquire into
Its denotation has sense, though
some of these same expressions fail of reference. This allows
the Grundgesetre
explanation of •=•. Our differing interest
in the members
of such pairs of identities as 'The
morning star
is the

morning star* ana ’The morning star is
the evening star*
is seen as arising from difference
in sense
of the names
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Which flapJc the
expression of identity.5
The next sy^hoi. or
rather faniiy of sy^hois,
Prege
introduces is desired
to capture the idea
of ,eneraiity.
or to be quite
explicit,» generalitv wi+h
_

&^“'^ra±ixy-with-respect-to-

objects.

In this

Hare is an example.

is a place-holder
for a first-level
function-

na^e, it functions
analogously to our open
parentheses in
first-level function-names.
And we shall use distinct
Greek capitals to mark
distinct argument positions.
All
bnt
in the example, is the
name of a particular
function. It is a s^cond-l^el
function-name, it denotes
a ^ond-leyel function.
As first-level functions
take
objects as arguments, so
second-level functions take
first-level functions as
arguments. However the value
of this function for
appropriate arguments is an
object,
ana ^his is true for functions
generally.
generality

V,

5•

"ts^y! °S°tiu"l°wiJ'/^o
that Prer --3 tairn-

epist^moioglcS

discussion in this
register the idea

f

Pla^oniJf?n"h?s tneory of meaning,
The thoup-ht
would construe the
q and R are it
S
the same in sense to the sense move from
oFs ^r
Sense of R on the model of the
move
^ -Ls the same as the direction of line b;
.huo^ to avoid epistemological
Platonism, unless"it
simply holding that sameness and
djf^'e-eniTip^^P^
ii^e.ence in meaning are objective
relations itself
epistemological Platonism
in
h^J'^onl^s
one s theory of meaning.
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function takes one-plaoe,
first-level -uncxions
n-notions as arguments and yields the
True
ru. v/nen
v/he-i the o
argument function itself yields the True for
all
all objects as
arguments, and
yields the False in all
other cases. Other

na..es of
this generality function
may be formed by using
other
letters uniformly i„
place of .fl. of our
example. However before this beeomes
necessary we shall have
reverted
to more common orthography.

In this notation we have,
nave, ir
pf-Tof'+
+
in eifect,
tne
univex'sal
quantifier.
But note that (i) like
the previous ••connectives", this symbol has
denotation, and (ii) that
the
generality function is explained
for first-level, onePlace functions generally
as arguments.
Its denotata
val-, hovievsi, in every
case yield a truth-value

as valuej

so this function is itself
a concept, a second-level

sLe^^crLlluon'af

introducing

.enlrt^EKHteT-'

lo

pLeralt^v of
o?\a negation.
o?

?hf n'

M3.thGniQ~t .iCtiX

.^ op'i.c

of a generality from the
These, bv the v/av, are iust
i° suooort hif

will, show#

Introducti on to
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concept, and the
"quantifier**
nxiiier is
iq a
o
4
second-level conceptword,^
>.

Thus the following

Where the initial horizontal
has been absorbed into
the
line setnnent preceding
the concavity.^ is a
„a„e of xhe
False, And so is

Whereas both
TvS-(U)

and
TvSrr(!i.)

modern notation, •(x)Fx»

oust the two significant oarts,
on Frege's analysis. Hence

»(x)

^

^
thero^can'b^
quantification" nor any question'of
quantif iervarf
-bles matoning quantified
variables in i>e-e®s svstL

such a formula as
the aLve it^wnnla
appropriate,
as Furth sugge^ts (haitoi.
ce-’ts
(Fdi+n.”°
s Introduction, Grund^esetr.e. n
v-v-;?i

SnSe^t -""bound"™
I'^iiers. letters of L style
S"Unfrfro’'"?f
distinct
from the apparent abound) variables,
of Lsf^st;;!
x*or
F'L"more"r%f°^
more on this see note 27 ,

8.

= 0 ">P 0 sed of the small vertical
IVn'J-t
'Tstroke, , he ne^ation-strpj^,
and the two portions of
tne horizontal stroke, each of which
may be rfgL'ded
our sense. The transition from
from
.Z^Z/^r..r/'~A7'^r‘
I call amalgamation of horizon'VGrundgesetze*
.
pp, 39 - 40 .

m

•

.
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are names of the True,
since they are negations
of the
preceding pair. The last example
«e might, with caution,
road as

There is something,
since

t5t0(^O
IS, in effect, the existential
quantifier; as Frege says,
"... this is how ‘there is' is to be
rendered in the
Begriffsschrift ."9 This view
is also stated explicitly

by Frege in his essay "Function
and Concept", 1 ° and was
present in Begrifl^schrm.^ and
Grundlae-en .l^ though
without the semantics of Grundgesetse.
Also in "Function
and Concept" Frege echoes his Grundlagen
opinion
that

"the ontological proof of God's existence
suffers from
the fallacy of ti-eating existence as
a first-level concepte“»|13 We learn from Carnap that Frege
continued in
this belief in 1913.^^
It is instructive to contrast Frege's
views on

9*

10,

Grundgesetze . p,
Philos or/hical W ritings » pp* 37-38.
Be griffsschrift . p. 27.

12.

G rundlagen » p. 65.
Vjr

1^'.

tin gs , p, 38.

Cf* Grundlagen . p. 65.

Rudolpn Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography" in
B^P Ll'C’'3cphy of jLudp lph Carna 0 , edited by
~
““
PoA. Schilpp, j)o 6.
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quantification with those of
the Algebra
A-gebra of
U6). Here we may quote van
Heijenoort
,

-

•

i.ogic

school

again.

•
•
a
Boole has his universe
class ana
'i-nn De
nl
class,
Morgan his universe oP
^ discourse, denoted
•!*
bv
p,H
The universe of discourse
What we agree°io"fonsider
arfc^er^aln^SL

be a ques?icn"TcS‘
could^noi even saf
self to onlunive-sr
universe
!!’.•.
there

'

restricts
v?^ universe himis the
consists of all-that

have mentioned that Boole
thought of his symbolism as admitting of
alternative interpretations,
and the
objection of Frege that since
Boole's interpretations are
incompatible they cannot be
called upon simultaneously
so that much we wish to say
cannot be articulated in the
symbolism. However, from Frege's
point of view, there is
a more fundamental difference
between himself and Boole.
Boole regarded his notation
as requiring some interpretation or other, whereas Frege's
Begriffsschrift was intended as a language whose formulas
stood in no more need
of interpretation than the
sentences of natural languages;
indeed less so, since they would
be unambiguous. To
understand '(x)(x=x)'. or '-^,1=^..
ft is no more
V/e

15.

van Heijenoort, "Logic as Calculus and
Logic
as
s
Language”, p. 325 ,
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necessary to specify a
universe of discourse
than it is
to do so for the sentence
•Everything is identical
„ith

Itself.

This point t,ust not be
confused with the fact
that any new notation must
be explained to us so
that we
catch on to hov/ it goes.

This difference in attitude
is still very much
with
us.
Quine, for instance, speaks
for Frege, as well as
himself, in such a passage
as this.
The existential quantifier
... is a lo^i^®f^^®"'^®'^/®ndering of the "there' is"
Idiom.
idiom
The bound variable »x* ranges
over
^

quL?ifer
says tnat at least one of
the objects in +hp
universe satisfies the appended
condition". .
^-^i^tential

On the other hand, when Donald
Kalish, whom we may take
as a representative of the
current model theoretic approach to logic, provides what
he calls a semantics for
a syntactical system, not
in terms of the notion of truth,
but instead in terms of nhe
more general notion of truth
in a model,
he identifies himself with the
Boolean
attitude. For one element of a model
is a specified set
of entities intended to serve
as the values of the variables of the syntactical system.
There is nothing contraPregean about model theory, per se. The
point
is

16.

Quine, ’'Existence and Quantification" in
Ontological
^

Felativitv
17-

just

,

p,

94,

Donald Kalish, "Semantics" in Edwards* EncvcJ ooedia.

p.

351

.
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that If. with Frege,
you regard the laws of
logic as laws
of truth you will
not think of yourself,
while doing
model theory, as studying
a "more general
notion" than
oi truth.
To similar matters we
shall return
in ($17).
To pull together some
of rhe remarks on
Frege's
notation made thus far. let
us introduce into the
notation
the expressions 'the
morning star' and 'the
evening star',
abbreviated •«. and 'FS'
respectively, each with its
customary sense and reference.
Then each of the following
r=
r.is
MS
MS = S3

denotes the True, and so
likewise does
(MiS

= MS) = (MS = ES)

18 .

^"l^t^onsr'oombinaUo^s

metTo fig;r:s:-etc?^"of the

occurring in the exact sciences
was
as oSipuu into el feet (in some form at
least, if not
the one neibniz had in mind) by
Ere^e . , , (Kurt

pf4^25'f)“~'^^
19.

—

edited by P.A.

sThil^,”

Note that these three expressions are not
formulas of
Begriffsschrift since they lack an initial horizontal.
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We may. from this
denotation of the True,
selectively
delete two occurences of
the proper name 'MS*
so as to
obtain the one-place
function-name
((

= MS) = ((

)

)

= £3).

This in turn may be universally
quantified! that is. we
may replace the place-holding
0 - in the second-level
function-name previously discussed
so that we obtain
'

MS) =

(a = Es).

This we know also denotes
the True •
We may express this
knowledge otherwise by saying
that the concept-words.
(

)

= MS

(

)

= ES,

denote concepts which are such
that whenever they take
the same object as argument,
they yield the same object
as value.
Identity, we know, holds only of
objects.

Thus we

are precluded from inquiring into
the "identity-conditions" of concepts. Nevertheless
it is clear that Frege
viewed concepts (and functions generally)
as indistinguishable when, as with the example
pair, for every
argument they yield the sane value
We may al.so note that the above
pair of concept-words

must, by reasoning parallel to that
implicit earlier on,
be distinguishable in sense, since
completing each with

20,

See note 51

,

and the passage it notates.
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m

*MS* gives a pa.r
i r»
j.
of sentences
distinct i„ sense.
Before getting back
to krege's exposition
of bis

Prt»itive fonction-na^es.
here see.s to be a
good pla^e
to „,ention briefly
an expression passed
over. I refer to
the turnstile. • I-*,
which frege
Frege calls the
assertion- si^ii
It is Frege's
contention
^lon that wi+h
with suchu /(complete)
.formulas
as we have exhibited
thus far we have
expressions which
only designate a truth-value,
without its being said
which of the two
••wo it
-j.
«P/w
It is
IS.
To write,
for instance.

--H^n=n

,

is merely to denote a
truth-value, and not. as we
would

wish to assert thereby
that everything is the
sa.e as
itself,
-we therefore require
another special sign to be
able to assert something
as true. -22
this purpose
Frege lets • f-' precede the
name of a truth-value

-

more
strictly, the assertion-sign
prefixes what we have called
well-formed formulas, a requirement
upon which is that
the left-most symbol be
the horizontal
so that, for
examplG, with

-

it is asserted that everything
is the same as itself.

Frege regards the assertion-sign
as composed of a
vertical component, which he calls
the .judgment - stroke .

21*

G rundgesetza

22

Ih i

»

» f

p*

.

37*

p, 37,
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and a horizontal, in
the explained sense,
thereby doubly
guaranteeing that what is
asserted is either true
or false,
or at least denotative
of either the True
of the False.
Frege's remarks on
assertion and its sign,
those
quoted and those companion
to them, are puzzling
and worth
puzzling over. On these
matters 1 shall have something
-ay later ($ 15 ). At
this juncture I shall
simply record two observations.
First, the assertion-sign
is
neither a name, nor a part
of any name, in this
respect
It is like the sign
which Frege uses to introduce
definitions, the double-stroke
of definition, and the
signs
which he uses to mark
inferences, called transitionsigns .23 Secondly. Frege
tells us that he calls "the
pres 6111:3 ion i.n BGsrif'f's'^rhri
o
-p+ of
n-r
IS sennit
a judgment
by use of
the sign •
a oroEosition of BegriffssohrVf-,
or
briefly, a £rooo3r^...2'*
Frege's Basic Laws
(axioms) are propositions, and
the rules of inference are
stated to insure that only
propositions may be inferred
from one or more propositions,
it is propositions, and
not ruunos of truth-values, which
form the substance of
Frege's logical theory, or so we
might wish to say.
"t

r,

;

.

23 *

See Grundp*esetze « pp, 82-83*

24 ,

p, 38.
Frege's term here is 'Satz'j
Furth renders it v/ith 'proposition* for
reasons he
gives on pp, Iv-lvi of his ''Fditor* s
Introduction"
.
Late r , in ($ 15 ), I shall call
these expressions assertions.
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Retumin, to Prege's
exposition, after the
generality

notation which we have
discussed Frege introduces
his
notation for the cmn^^-of.
values of a function.
^0(x).

This, like the generality
notation, is a one-place.
second-level function-name,
V3
-el'
servir...
,
u ^
serving,
as
before,
to
hold open a place to be
filled with a one-place,
firstlevel function-name.
However the function which
it denotes is not a concept;
in this respect it differs
from
functions met with through
primitive notation to this
point. This function takes
its argument, a one-place,
first-level function, into
what Frege calls the courseof-values of the function;
as a special case it takes
or.eplace. first-level concepts
into their extensions. What
then are courses-of-values.
or extensions? Frege
stipulates that whenever two
one-place, first-level functionnames denote functions which
yield, in parallel fashion,
the same values for the same
arguments, the oourse-of-

values-names formed from the two
function-names denote one
and the same course-of-values.
And generally, such indistinguishable functions have identical
courses-ofvalues. Such is the force of Basic
Law V.
It is this

which enriches Frege's fundamental
logic by set theory,
and in such a fashion that the way
is open to Russell's
paradox*
If we inquire via current set-theoretic
notions as
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to What courses-of-values
are the ™oat appropriate
anewer
would be that each is an
infinite set of ordered
pairs
<x,y> each of whose
y-member is the value of
the parti-

cular function in question
for the x-r,eo,ber as
argument.
Extensions are sets of ordered
pairs all of whose
y-.„embers
are truth-values.
If we go through an
extension and gaoher
together all the x-members
whose co-ordinate y-member
is
the True we are left with
the class of objects which
satisfy the concept whose
extension we have gone

through.
In this way we can "recover"
classes from extensions.
Subsequently I shall, on occasion,
speak of such classes
and extensions more or less
interchangeably.

Next Frege uses the course-of-values
notation to
introduce a surrogate definite
article. I hold off on
this notation and its explanation
until the next section.
Frege then introduces the second
primitive, twoplace, first-level function-name,
(•)
-T-r;

L

).

With it the truth-functional and
first-order part of the
notation is complete. This denotes the
conditionalityfunction which is explained as yielding
the False when
the "lower-argument" is the True and
the "upper-argument"
is any object other than the True,
and yielding
the True

for all other combinations.

Thus, the earlier remarks

on “connectives'* being not syncategoremata
and taking
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objects in general as
argument apply here as
well.
for instance, if the Sun
was

So.

the •'lower-argument",
then

the True will be the value
for whatever object is
the
*'upper-argument"

Some pages on Frege completes
the primitive vocabulary he will actually use
in Grundgeset^ derivations
with notation for second-order
generality; more speoifioally, generality-with-respect-to-(
one-place) -firstlevel-functions. Hers is an
example

In this

'y

~S

is a place-holder for a
second-level

•

function-name of one argument

—

the concavity notation

for "universal quantification",
for example
where
stands for what will indicate the
particular secondlevel function, and
marks the "apparent variable"

—

25.

’m.

For notation thus far introduced F
rege provides the
lollowing axioms.

}— -r a

3LI.

^

—
BLIII,

r-~|-

hr- a

BLIIa.

La

b

H

F(a)

Us-

f(a)

a
g —

BLIV .

— —a)

-

(— b)

Lp(—-a)

=

(”rb)

(

)~j

^ g(a=b)
BLV.

(

C

f(C

)

= a g(a))

= (-nSa- f(a)

= g(a))

The remaining axioms are given in notes 26.
and 29.
See notes 7. and 2?. on the use of Roman
letters
(iree variables) in the axioms.
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occur, for example,
within and without a
particular "universal quantifier".
What is naned is a

function Which takes one-place,
second-level functions
as arguments. So it
is a tMrd-1^
function. I„
particular, this function
yields the True as value
when
the second-level function
which is the argument
itself
yields the True as value
for all its arguments,
and yields
the False for second-level
functions which yield the
False
for any argument. Here
again the function in question
is.
as well, a concept. A
simple example of a
Begriffsschrift
formula which uses a name of
this function is
This is a name of the

raj.w.e,

^ince not every object falls
,

.

under every function.

Frege's system allows for an
ascending hierarchy of
levels of functions and function-names.
In a way his
semantics compels such ascent.
Further, functions of
mixed levels are possible, these
ramify the hierarchy.
However Frege makes no use of such
mixed functions, nor
does he go beyond the third-level
of functions
in his

26.

This notation is governed by the
following axiom.
BLIIb.

(f(^))

I—,

~<L'~

(/^ ))
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firuudseset^e derivations .2?

$10.

Definite Description

IT.,..,

».. 1 .«,,
27

,

«...

„„

!^ve observed (note
7.) +ha+ ^
axioms with Roman
letters
eiiect are free
variables. Thus the
axioms a
out truth-value (see rrn^n
stand are withso v/e need to think
i?
^ implicitly
ly quantified. (See oHh'jfff^;
universalthat the intro due
tion'^rt^Br^
would introduce names
.Quantifiers'*
nJ
the axi oms.
I'^'^ictions
into
If inst=ad^orr^^°'‘'^'‘"'
I

funotion~naras!!*“
second-level
would be licensedS^then'^%iv"^°-’'^°'^‘^.^
to rlSlaffth^l^^ l^iHSILUcs, we
an
(appropriate) variable
"existential quantified'
initial
have, in the new
"Quantifier-^ p^fn
on-name, specif.
ically a third-leverfuncnL'
Frege's se,r.anticr!LSses
dzing" upon the position ft
general‘^nd so forth,
At each step we introduce «r.
an expression whicn the
semantics says is a
which occupies
a position accessible
to’ouantff?n^+°'''^
Perhaps
Frege's reason for
axioms with free
variables was. at least
Partially, the potentiality
for such a regress.

incompl ete-

ness of Frege ^s^sv?tem''^ot^?

i

=:”*«sr*5iL-

after we have sp^nt somi'
time wol-k”ing^oul Inf®’’
^ncom^in!i^L"s (which
wltW^^^
incompleteness;
chows that
idea, disoussea earlier
lls? that logic is throughout evident, at -‘-east
llasl If
if wlh
„his is taken to imply that
V
the tru^ ho
-ogle
can be encompassed by a system
with self-evident axioms.
‘
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generality and existence
functions, et al. This
abundance Of entities is
closely bound up with
that ™ost
puezling Of Frege -s views,
that which received
its .ost
well-known expression in
the remark
that the concept

is not a concept.

Our discussion of definite

description, besides being
of some independent
interest,
will serve to set the
stage for an extended look
at the
intertwined origins of Frege's
ontology and his views on
unsaturation.

Frege desired that his
notation have a symbol which
would substitute for the
ordinary definite article,
accordance with what in Grundgesetze
he described as his
••basic principle”, -that
every correctly-formed name
is
to denote something-.^e
required a piece of notation
which would have denotation
whenever completed to a wellformed name. When the definite
article aids in definitively describing an object, our
surrogate notation should
do likewise. But what will be
the denotations for those
visibly similar expressions which
do not manage to single
out just one thing? Frege's
suggestion amounts

m

to treat-

ing expressions of the form 'the

F\

when there are no,

or more xhan one, Fs, as denoting
the class of Fs
more
exactly, they shall denote the
course-of-values of the

—

F-function.

For

O r un d e e t z

t}ie

»

intended surrogate he introduces

p* 9,
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the notationt
\(

).

This is to denote a one-place,
first-level function in
accordance with the following
stipulation. If the argument is such that there is an
object, s, such that the
argument is x(z=x), then a is
the value of this function
for that argument! if there
is no such object, a, then
the value of this function for
that argument is the argument itself. Intuitively, if the
argument of the function
is a class, then if the class
is a unit-class, the value
of the function will be the sole
member of that

class, and
If the class is not a unit-class,
the class itself will be
the value of the function. And
if some object other than
a class is the argument of the
function, then that object
will be the value of the function,
A fev/ examples are helpful#

In each case let *a'

abbreviate the given name of the argument.
(i)

If a is the course-of-values of the
function,

natural satellite of the earth, Na is the moon,
since it
is an object, z, such that a = i(z=x),
i.e., the identity
statement.

29.

This notation is governed by the following axiom.
BLVI.

—a

I

=\r(a=£:

)

Frege collects his axioms together on p. 105 of

Grund/resGtz e

•

13 ^

x(x is a natural satellite
of the earth) =
x(x=the moon)
denotes the True.
(ii)

If a is the course-of
-values of the function,

author of Princrg^ W
athemati r.,

is tne course-ofvalues of this function,
on the grounds that
since the
work was co-authored
there is no object * z,
such that
a = x(z-x)

(iii)

.

If a is x(2=x). sa is
^(2=x)

-

and similarly

for any course-of-values
which is not the extension
of
a concept.
three Cases are the ones
Frege mentions.

He

does not explicitly consider
what happens when, say,
•Everything is self-identical*
or 'Frege* completes the
function-name. But it is easily
seen that, just as with
(xii). so with these cases the
value of the function will
just be the argument. Thus the
following will be true.
VFrege = Frege.

Frege concludes this section of
Grundgesetze by
remarking on a certain "logical
danger". If. from such
an ordinary expression as -author
of Princinia Wathemet^ca
(I change Frege's example) we
were to form the proper

name *the author of Princioia r»!athematica

*

we should commit a logical error,
because
this proper name, in the absence of
further
stipulations would be ambiguous, hence even
devoid of denotation . . . and if we were
to give this proper name a denotation
expressly, the object denoted would have no
connection with the formation of the name.
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entitled to infer it
waf
was [an author of Pri rtf'
r>^
1
u i
yet we
should be onlv
to
conclude
just that
i

,

•

whxILr ?ie^-unoti^^
or nrre"°h^^
falls'

under which falls°no^ob
ject*^^’

exLuy^on; oSoec??3§®°"

Perhaps Frege is here
inveighing against the sort
Of suggestion he once
offered for dealing with
rotten
descriptions, those which fail
to describe uniquely.
.air the rot by means of
a special stipulation,
e.g.,
by the convention that 0
shall count as its reference.
When the concept applies to
no object or to more than
one. "51 still the intent
of the above passage is
not clear,
What advantage does Frege see
gained by the Grundveset.e

technique?

The inference which we are
"only too inclined"
to make is no tetter, since
the conclusion on either of
the two suggestions will be
false. Fer.haps an advantage
is seen in this.
On the Grundgesetse view we shall
be
less inclined to fallaciously
draw the conclusion, hence
the virtue of the apparently
elaborate symbolism of Frege’s
surrogate definite article.
If the goal of weakening an
inclination to draw what
may be an illogical inference is a
worthy one. we might

30 .

^j^undgesetze , pp, 5 O- 51
p.

.

.
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wonder whether it could not
be achieved so.e other
way.
A suggestion to the
point would be to weaken
Frege's
requirement that the surrogate
'the F- itself denote
at
every occurence to the weaker
requirement that all
expressions (not themselves
definite descriptions)

which

contain definite descriptions
denote.
this idea for a paragraph.

Let us hold onto

A puztling feature of
Frege's theory is that the

function-name which goes surrogate
for the ordinary
descriptor is a first-level
function-name. Confronted
with the theory we naturally take '\'
as the canonical
substitute for the ordinary 'the'
(in at least one prominent use of this expression.)
But when thus viewed, the
canonical 'the' seems to perform a
double role; it takes
the function-name which follows
it into its oourse-ofvalues, and then yields the "sole
member" or the courseof-values itself, as the case may be,
as value.
Would
we not gain a closer fit with
intuition, and
at the same

time simplify theory, if we introduced
the descriptor
function as a second-level function understood
as yielding,
for F as its argument, the sole F, if
such there be, and
otherwise yielding, say, the class of Fs. The
effect of
this would be to locate description at the
same level
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wit.h Quan'tif ica'tion

The point of these
reflections is this. If „e
combine the weakened requirement
of a paragraph back with
the suggestion that we treat
definite description and

quantification as both second-level
functions we shall
be led naturally and direcxly
to a version of Russell-s
theory of descriptions. Setting
aside the rotten cases.
•The F is
may be understood by a Fregean

C

as

just one F and it is G'.

'There is

It is then not difficult
to

see how to use quantification
and identity to re-express
•The F is G' in a way that
rules the rotten cases false,
provided we have allowed to lapse
the requirement that
the F must always have denotation*

Why did Irege treat his descriptor
as a first-level

c

Geach makes this point in a reverse
manner when he
observes that

when Russell says that expressions like
the King ol France* are not names
but
incomplete symbols* he is saying what
would be put thus in Frege *s^ terminologvs
In "the King of France is bald", "the
King of i ranee" is not a name of an
object; what it stands for is something
incomp2.ete
, ,
a second-level concept*
within which a concept falls if and
if there falls under it someone
v/ho is a King of France and apart
from
v;hom nobody IS a Xing of France.
Philo Writings * editor’s note, p. 51 •)
,

•

(

33*

The reader unfamiliar with the procedure may consult
Quine s i(ili tbods ol Lo gic * for one work* where will
be lound a clarity of exposition surpassing any
Russell himself provided.
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functior.-na.c7

I

not ..now.

Penhaps it was tProu.P

treating such expressions
as 'the natural
satellite of
the earth- on the model
of -the successor
of zero-, whatever may have suggested
the view to Prege.
we can come to
understand why a Russell-like
treatment would have refined alien to him even were
he to have located description up with the quantifiers.
To see why this is so
is
to be well into an
appreciation of the considerations
moving Prege towards his
ontology of truth-values,
truthfunctions, et al.. with its
attendant unsaturation. To
anticipate, I shall suggest
that Frege would have felt
great resistance to our
suggestion that expressions
which
in many ways behave like
singular terms can be treated
as
contributing to the reference
of sentences which contain
them without themselves being
treated as names, expressions
with a denotation, that is.
he would not like our weakeng f his basic principle". Subsequent
remarks
on the

"origin” of Frege's semantics
will bring out why.
Before weaving definite descriptions
for the present,
a few additional observations
are worth registering.
One
of Russell's motivations in
coming up with his theory of
descriptions stems from problems
incurred in saying what
does not exist.
One type of negative existential
claim
is that there are no things of
a certain kind, that unicorns do not exist, for instance.
This yields unproblematically to F;regean, as to Russellian,
resources, going
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straxghtforwaraiy into a
negated existential.
-(.x)(x is
a unicorn). Another
type of negative
existential involveattachfng a denial of
existence to a (putative)
singular
ar». Thus we have
'The greatest pri.e
number does not
exist*, for instance,
or again,

*Pegasus does not exist*.
The difficulty here
is to see how these
claims could be
true, as we assu„,e they
are. Although Prege
does not
discuss this question,
we can see how with
the first
example, that of *the
greatest prime*, we might
fashion
an answer. Keeping the
explanation of his surrogate
article in mind we give
this case the following
treatment. -(Ex)(x=v^(y
is a prime greater
than all
others) and xfy(y is a
prime greater than all
others)).
Here we incorporate Frege
*s descriptor and
course-ofvalues abstractor into more
common orthography.
What now of the other exam.ple,
that involving
•Pegasus*? It is widely
believed that Frege held what
Geach has called the
'•disguised-description theory of
proper names ,
that is, that such unstructured
expressions as *Frege*, *Aristotle*.
and ’Pegasus* are equivalent in content to some
(possible) definite description.
For example, ’Frege* might have
the sense of ’the greatest
logician of the 19th century* for
some. This is Frege’s
view with regard to numerals.
But it must be said that

3 ^*

T_h_r]^

Philosophers a p, i37.

l4o

textual evidence that
he held it generally
is very sli.
indeed. There is the
footnote in "On Sense
and Reference".
but other than this
the only passages
which bear
directly on the question
(in writings Frege
published)
are in a quite late
paper.36
widesnread
attribution of the
"disguised-description" thesis to
Frege
reflects, in port, a
difficulty in imagining what
would
be the sense of a simple
proper name if ix were not
that

of some possible
description.

Be that as it may. would

this thesis open the way
to a treatment of (e.g.)
-Pegasus
does not exisfT Yes.
at least schematically,
simply
replace, in the earlier
formula, -is a prime greater
than
all others' uniformly with
'Pegasises', which itself may
be regarded as an abbreviation
for (and failing that a
place-holder for) an appropriate
predicative expression.
Let us be clear that our use
of 'Pegasizes' here
does not imply any claim about
the eliminability of proper
names.
(We are not using 'Pegasizes'
as Quine might.)
Nor do we want it to. For we
should not confuse the view
that any name can be replaced with
a definite description,
which there is some reason to
believe Frege held, with
the view that every name can be
replaced by a definite
oescription. which there is no reason
to suppose Frege

-”^5.

36 .

Writin^^s

e

p.

58 .

"The Thought" (1913) in P hilosophical
Logic

I4l

held.

That is. we must not
equate the two claims,
sentence can''be"reDlaced^h"'*^^^
description without change

of°sense^"^^®

sr;S£rOis-"“"
without

sense.

'descriptions

change of

These are not equivalent
since in some cases any
definite
description capable of replacing
a name may itself contain a name replaceable only
by a description itself
containing such a name, and
so forth. So the thesis
that
every simple name has the
sense of some definite description does not imply the
eliminability of names.
It has seemed to Leonard
Linsky that the way was
open for a somewhat different
treatment of negative
existentials than the one just
suggested. He writes that
that existence is a second-level
'the sense
considered
a
prooer
nLl
i.ame is iw
the same as that of some
definite
description. Thus the sense of
’Homer' is
sense of 'the author
of^Th^T]??^
of
The
and The Odyssey , , , 'Homer
exist', correctly understood, must
be
taken"L^
taken
as . . . [assertingj what is
asserted
Dy It IS not the case that
one and
person authored ^he I Iliad and The only one
Odyssey'.
Though this may be true, it does
noF^^T^in
ny referenceless names , so the
problems of
^xistentials cannot arise • . ,
fThisJ solution ... is never explicitly
lormulated by Frege as an answer to the
problem .. . rather [itj is a by-product
of
con-eot'^’''^

*
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Frege *s treatment of exis-tflnr<a -o «
o
®^iS‘*ence .s a secondlevel concept. 37

Linsky see«3 to suggest that
his -solution" simply falls
out of the dual thesis that
existence is a second-level
concept and nan,es have the
sense of

definite descriptions.

But this is not so.

A critical step in Linsky-s
reason-

ing is the move from (e.g.)

The object which Pegasizes
exists,
where 'Pegasizes* is used as
before, to

There is exactly one object which
Pegasizes.
There is no reason for Frege not
to agree that •there is
exactly one object which ...»
denotes a second-level
concept; and he might well agree
that such pairs of sentences as the above express the same
Thought. But this
agreement would not commit Frege, in
his ovm
eyes, to

claiming that the sentences agree in
other important
respects, such as logical structure and
implications
ihis wo know from earlier discussion
($3).

So Linsky*s

elimination requires further argument, at least
if it is
to be offered on Frege's behalf.
We can see in Linsky's idea a suggestion
for the

elimination of complex names.

But to eliminate complex

names would be to eliminate the rationale of Frege's
semantics, as we shall see.

37

•

This is the source of the

Leonard Linsky, R efer ring, p, 29.
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resistance

would imagine Frege to
have to proceeding
along Linsky*s lines.
I

$11.

Complex Names and Predications

In discussing Frege's
Dictum earlier on ($ 1 we
)
mentioned Quine's remark to
the effect that it
signalled
an important reorientation
in semantics away from
name,
or term, semantics." We
also noted Quine's view that
this reorientation underlies
Russell's theory of descriptions with its use of contextual
definitions.
I

do not

wish to take exception to
either point. And yet Russell's
approach is, I have claimed, alien
to Frege. The nub of
the reason concerns the
eliminability of complex names.
For when Frege turned to developing
a semantics for his
Begriffssohrift he took complex singular
terms rather
than sentences as his model of
significant complexity.
In particular, it seems that he was
led po his full-blown
semantics through generalizing certain
impressions gained
through pondering the nature of complex
arithmetical
singular terms.
Central to this semantics is the view that
concepts,
and functions generally, are unsaturated.
If we ask just
what Frege means in calling concepts
unsaturated,
and

correlatively, speaking of objects as not so,
but rather
complete, we get this sort of reply.
*unsaturated

'

"'Complete* and

are of course only figures of speech? but
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all that

wish or am able to do
here is to give
hints.
If we asic for Prege's
reasons for maintaining
this view,
xt must bo admitted
that we find very
little in the way
Of direct argument,
still i believe that a
more sympathetic understanding of
this pivotal idea of
Frege-s is
possible than is commonly
evinced,
this section and
the next we shall attempt
tc trace out a plausible
path,
which Frege may have
followed, which leads
I

m

to the

semantics of unsaturated
functions.
It is hoped that
ensuing remarxs will constitute
something of an explication of such a passage as
this one of Frege’s.
•
•
o
the words ‘the concept
sou?re root of ~
U*
have an essentially
different“Dl^rv\l^^^^
“"^^Sinal sentence
[•there i^ 2*- Lt
square
root of 4’]j
i p
fhp^-p?'"
i.e.
the reference of the xwo
pnrases
phrases
is
essentially different.
'

Frege’s model of signifioant
complexity was that
exemplified by such expressions as!
2+3.
We shall focus
attention on this for awhile.

Frege did not doubt but what there
are numbers, and
iiT^ldlaS.^ he had argued that numbers are
objects.
Let us assume this is correct.
2

,

or

two

,

Then the relation between

as in *Two is a prime number*,
and the

38.

*'On^Concept and Object", in
p. 33.

39*

ALLd_c, p.

50

,
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nun-ber two may well
strike us as transparent
and paradigmatic
or at least as
providing one paradigm
of the

-

-

way words relate to
things.

Accordingly let us say
that
•2' denotes,
or names, the number
two, and speak of the

relation in question is
that of denotation.
paradigmatically do •three*, •3.,
.q.,

Just as

.5.,

.seventeen-,
etc. {at least in certain
uses) denote numbers!
each belongs to a recognizable
class of expressions
exoressionc: whoo
whose members
we shall call number-names

And now consider

'

2 +y.

if „e are holding that

numbers are nameable. it is
not difficult to think of
•
2 + 3 * itself as naming
a number, specifically the
number
five. Let us then count
-J+S* into our class of numbernames, and so also *two plus
three*, *3-1*, *12-5*,
*(2+3)+7», etc.
We are assuming that -a-,
at least on occasion, denotes the number twoi looking
then at •2+3* , and assuming
it to be a name, it would be
difficult to avoid the con-

clusion that
in

•

-a-

denotes the number two in its
occurrence

2 + 3 *.

So we are led to conclude that
some numbernames have parts which name numbers,
that there are
complex number-names.
This conclusion, which

I

have approached as inno-

cently as possible, has an appeal that
is easily felt.
It is one Frege acceded to unhesitatingly.

Still, accept-

ing tno idea that there are names with
constituent parts
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Which are also na.ee
is a crucial step.
SO we shall follow.
we assume that

.

2 .3

Pre,e too. it.

denotes five and shift
our concern to providing
anaccountof ho„ it
acco.plishes this.
That as. taking it to
be a fact that 2 ^
3
denotes five
we seek an explanation
of this fact.
But what is the
nature of the sought-for
explanation? In what ter.s
.ight
we anticipate its
framing? Here we should
recall the sort
Of account envisaged
in ($8) of why particular
logical
truths are Icgically true.
And how this led
'

'

.

us to the

idea that to have a lingua
would be to have an answer
to
the question wldch we
phrased this way.
How is truth
possible? Though in the
case at hand, we are not
(directly) concerned with
truth, but with the
(supposed) fact
that -2t3’ denotes the
number five, we should
nonetheless
expect what we cay here to
tie in at some point to
our
earlier question. Here it
seems we wish to require that
an essential ingredient of
any explanation of the fact
that •2+3’ denotes five be
the fact that •2' is a
part of
•2+3' and in this
occurrence denotes two.
It is to be

further expected that the
explanation will be completed
by further specifying "parts"
of •2+3’ and indicating in
some analogous way "relations"
these hear to other things.
This is rather vague, but that
is as it should be at this
stage of the game. We may expect
that the attempt to
provide the explanations we seek
will make it clearer to

14 ?

us What we are willing to
count as an explanation.

And
this process will undoubtedly
yield some gain in clarity
of the relevant notions of
part and relation as invoked
above.
In the meantime, and again
remembering earlier
remarks, we shall use 'semantical'
to qualify these
terms! '2' is to be a semantical
part of '2+3', and
denotation is a (paradigmatic)
semantical relation.

2

,

Returning to '2+3', we have recorded
the fact that
in 2+3 , denotes two. A parallel
observation

may-

be made regarding '3'.

Each of these facts is necessary,

we assume, to explain that '2+3'
denotes five.

But it is

clear that they are not, individually
or jointly, sufficient. Montgomery Furth has put the
point this way.

... we cannot regard as a final semantical
account of a denotin,G; comnlex name . •
.
a
simple enumeration of the denotations of
all
its component parts.
For while it is true
that a complex complete name is a complete
name containing complete parts, and we are
taking each complete part to .have denotation
on Its own, an account that stopped here
would
leave unexplained the most remarkable fact
of all, that the complete name is itself
a
name, denoting a single determinate object,
.
•
.
So we know that a further semantical
role is being played within the name, over
and above the denoting of their respective
denotations by the respective complete parts
of the namer^^
These remarks occur in the context of an assumption

40,

Furxh, "Two Types of Denotation" , .Studies in Lori cal
American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph
Series, No, 2, (1968} , p, 23.
(
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on Furth's part that
with V(e.g.)
.?+v che only
„ ,
‘tp*;
denoting
component parts are *2*
»?•
^
and 3 . However
u
Furth intends
the conclusion more
.srenerallv
generally. He assumes
that the further
semantical role played in
(e.g.) -2^3. eannot
be played
by a part which itself
denotes an object. Or
rather, he
assumes that the further
semantical role is not
played
by some (perhaps other)
part denoting an object.
Though
I am inclined to
agree
e with
thicwixn xnis,
t do not
6
I
see that Furth
has set out support for
this '-u.ii.j.usion.
conclusion
tor osuppose the
reply is made that# appearancpc+v,a «
appearances to the
conxrary notwithstanding, the expression which
remains when ’a* and 'y
are deleted from '2+'^* Itself
i-t-cioi-r
denotes an object# and that
the account we seek of the
fact that *2+3 • denotes a
number, indeed, the number five,
is to be found upon
examining the nature of this nev;ly
introduced object.
Furth wants to say that no such
reply can be adequate,
but I do not find an argument
for this rejection.
4.

a.

In

what follows

shall offer something like an
argument for
Furth's conclusion, one which
plays an essential role
I

in

the genesis of unsaturation.

Getting back to the fact that *2+3*
denotes five,
let us, for simplicity's sake,
think of

•2-v3-'

as breaking-

up into just *2' and what remains
when *2' is deleted
from this. These parts go together, v/e
are assuming, to
produce a result which denotes the number
five.
Our
question may then be put as how what remains
when *2* is
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deleted contributes to
this. At this point
we .ay at
least infer that the
remainder is not itself
a name of
would be a two-item
fst and not. as it
is. a name of a
number (assuming it
could not be both.)
This I thinh we Know.
And 1 thinK
It faxr to assume
that the difference
between a name and
a list IS reasonably
clear in this case.
Thus with regard to the role of our
-remainder-, we are in a
position
to say this. Either
it bears some semantical
relation
(as we say) other than
(what we are calling)
denotation
to the number two. or
it bears some semantical
relation
(possibly, but not necessarily
that of denotation) to
something other than two. or
any other number. The
alternatives, while perhaps not
exclusive, are exhaustive.
It is Frege's view that
functional expressions, such
as are obtained through
deleting a number-name from
a
number-name, have denotation,
they denote functions.
Thus he takes the second
path. V/hy?

Perhaps he reasoned along these
lines.

Certainly

there are arithmetic functions,
or operations, such as
those Cl addition and subtraction.
For we know, for
instance, that addition is commutative
whereas subtraction
is not.
Since with (e.g.) '2+3’ we
represent the result
of adding together two numbers,
surely addition, that is,
the arithmetic function of addition,
must got mentioned
one way or another with the expression
'2+3' . And, given

1.50

hat.

see.s clear that ....
or .(
mentioning. Or. to revert
to our simplified
case, it
seems that the result
of deleting .3. from
.3.3., viz.
•( )t 3 -. must
mention an arithmetic
function, that
:.t

of”

adding three.

So we conclude, more
generally, that
functional expressions
mention functions. But
why. having
come this far. should
we conclude that they
denote functions? Why. that is.
Should we liken the
semantical
relationship holding between
functional expressions and
functions to that holding
between arithmetic names
and
numbers? A thought here
might run this way. Part
of the
force of saying that
number-words denote numbers is
that,
from their legitimate
arithmetic use we can infer
that
there are numbers. Analogously,
it seems we can infer
from the legitimate arithmetic
use of functional expressions that there are functions
and so find appropriate
speaking of functional expressions
as denoting functions.
I touch this thought
lightly here; I shall look more
closely at a similar idea further
down.
In any case, let
us, for whatever reason, follow
Frege in deeming functional
expressions denotative of functions.

Before continuing with our semantical
journey, let
us pause for a few words on
functions. Compare ' 2 +j- with
the followingi
1+3

each has

(2+3)+3
a

(5-2)+3;

common part which we can indicate with
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(

)+ 3 .

This incomplete expression
(as we may call it.
witn Frege)
along with others which
similarly arise, has
several
notable features. One
is that whenever it
is completed
with a number-name,
however complex, a name
of a number
results. Another is that
when two number-names
which
Share their denotations
complete such incomplete
expressions. the resulting
complete expressions share
their
denotation. So we may think
of these incomplete
expressions as mapping expressions,
they systematically relate
the denotations of the
completing number-names
to the

denotations of the completed
number-names. In other words,
and stated mors generally,
the reference of a complex
number-name is a function of
the denotations of its
number-naming parts. Functions
we m.ay think of as entities through which this
mapping is accomplished, and
which
are such that no two functions
perform exactly the same
mapping service. More precisely,
but less generally, if
two function-names are such
that whenever each is completed with an arithmetic name
(simple or complex, the
same or different) of a particular
number, the resulting
expressions are names of the same
number, then the function-names denote (as we are saying,
with Frege) the same
function. In a word, functions are
extensional. This
was Frege’s view, and it accords
with mathematical
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practice then and now.'^l

what is distinctive
of Frege's
conception of functions is
that they are. as he
puts it.
unsaturated
( ung esattist
) ,
in contrast to object.unctions are not
seif-subsistent. but rather
stanrin
need of completion. We
e are working
worlrinn- towards
an understanding of this claim and
its motivations.
We set ourselves the
problem of accounting for
the
fact that • 2 + 3 denotes
five. Frege's parsing
of this
expression, under our simplifying
assumption, yields as
significant parts just '2' and
'(
,
for each of which
denotation is claimed. Accepting
the claims, do we have
sufficient material with which
to construct an account
as desired? It would go
like this. Since '2'
denotes
two and '( )^ 3 ' denotes a
function which maps a number
into that Which is three
greater. '2+3' denotes a number
that is three greater than two.
Is this explanatory in
the sense we are after?
Let us proceed by granting
an
'

in.

But

Frep
Cii>

did not simply take over current
conceptions
Sharpened them? lef

anlrodiiction . pp* 22 " 23 *

’unsaturated'
to speak of certain expressions
much as Frees used
It. or 'incomplete', to speak of
certain
however he apparently did notp as Frege ??p?e?sions.
did, also
use It in speaking of entities
referred to by such
its use
in chtMibwry, wiiich may well have
been Frege's
source also.
I.M. Bochenski’s A History of Formal
LOjg^, pp, 323-24, is my source on
Peirce.
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context we want to
examine a particular
feature of it.
TO rehearse earlier
observations with a
different
example, consider the
expression •(2.3).7’.
which we will,
or the present, think
of as breaking up
into the two
parts .(2.3)' and .(
).7..
If we replace the
constituent part .(2.3)', which
is evidently a
nu.ber-na.e, with
another arithmetic name of
the same number, say -v.
the
expression that results not
only names a number,
but names
the same number as the
original. Now if •(
denoted
a number, some numeral
would likewise, yet no
numeral may
replace this incomplete
expression with an expression
we
recognize as a number-name as
the result, at best we
come
up with a listing of
numbers. So such incomplete
expressions are not names of numbers.
This was our earlier
conclusion, and not a dramatic
one.
Now, considering the language
of arithmetic i„ a
broader context, we generalize
from our class of numbernames, whose members serve as
guiding paradigms, to a
wider class of expressions all
of whose members shall be

suitably similar to number-names.

Note that here what

we "generalize on" is the
idea of an expression being a
number-name, not on that of an
expression being a name
of something, or having a
denotation. What makes for

suitable similarity, or common linguistic
role, is difficult to specify, though behavior
about signs of
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identity (equality)
figures importantly.

For instance.

9 = (2+3)

planets

'

kind of progression
which suggests that
9 ', *the
third planet from the
sun* and .Venus' may
replace one
another in these contexts
(though in some cases
with a
greater or lesser degree
of incongruity) so
that the other
two Will join .9- in
our expanded class
of expressions.
The guiding idea is (or
vor seems •‘n
^
.o be) that
expressions gain
entry to our class, and
let us call its members
singular
terms, by intelligibly
replacing paradigms (occurring
paradigmatically. we should
perhaps add.)
*

Notice, first, that sentences
(identities) are used
to motivate the expansion,
this may not be incidental.
Secondly, such motivation
as is provided hardly
looks
like a conclusive argument
for placing ‘Venus'
in the

same semantic bag with '9'.

Rather, attention is directed

to certain features of
language which, at least while
attended to, pull us in a
certain direction. Furthermore. there are other examples
which induce an undercurrent.
Wert we to yield to the
initial suggestion, what would
we make of the likes of
'Venus + 3' where 'Venus'
replaces
’2* IS a paradigm
occurrence? We might decide

—
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Wittgenstein apparently

did'^3 ..

our generalization
before it gets going,
that they show
that the Whole endeavor
to provide a semantical
account
of complex names is
misguided,
response to this I
think all we can do is
to (tentatively) treat
these examples as misleading, as
exceptions to be dealt with
later
on, once the ball
eet<^
rniiithro
t
11 gets rolling.
Only by adopting such a
high-handed attitude can we
proceed, and only through
proceeding will we be able to
determine whether we have
been
justified in proceeding, whether
in fact we can treat such
examples as exceptions to a
pattern persuasively portrayed.
We shall, thus, with Frege,
succumb to the set-out temptation. and explore the
consequences.

m

To continue, whereas we
previously thought about
replacing a functional expression
with a number-name, let
us now consider doing likewise
with any member of our
generalized class of singular terms.
The envisioned result is comparable to the earlier
one.
But now there is
a bite. Before we were led only
to reject the obviously
false suggestion that functional
expressions denote numbers. The view we are now led to
reject is that it is
possible to refer to the denotation
of a functional ex-

pression with a singular term.

Otherwise put, we cannot

® message of the Tractates
See
and also Anscombe’s introduction to
wittrons -coin's Tractatus, p. 120.
‘
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generalize the idea of a
nu.ber-na.e to sufficiently
enrtch the class of
singular terms to a
point where it
includes expressions that
may denote the denotations

we

have assumed for such
incomplete expressions as
•( )+3.
More generally, to assume
that every significant
part of
a complex name itself
has denotation seems
to require the
view that at least one
such denotation cannot
be denoted
by a singular term. Frege
assumed that functions were
denoted by functional
expressions and this, given
his
assumptions as to the components
of complex arithmetic
names, seems to require that
functions cannot be referred
to with singular terms.
It is this -result" which
stands
behind Frege -s view that
functions are unsaturated. Rephrasing our conclusion, functions
must lie outside the
scope of singular terms if
the earlier account
of

IS to be explanatory.

'2+3

Frege sought some such account

and 30 was led to conclude that
functions are insusceptible of singular reference.
This. I submit, is just
what the claim of unsaturation
comes to. Ultimately, the
suggestion that we can consider functions
incomplete in a
fashion analogous to the way in which
functional expressions themselves are incomplete is
unhelpful. And the
same is true of other metaphors Frege
hoped would be
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elucidating.^^
I nave state.,

tn erfect. t.at

tt.e semantical
analyses
rege gave to sentences
were derived from
those originally
given to arxthmetical
singular terms. We have
just seen.
through a few exam, pies,
how Frege-s account
goes and why
It brings in its wake
the view that functions
are unsarurated.^ Next we shall
look at some simple
sentences in much
the spirit as we have
examined *2+3*.
j •
Thi'"
i.nio will
will, eventually, serve to motivate
Frege's wider application
and
generalisation of his semantics
of complex arithmetic
names

Sentences are expressions
with truth-value.
(Here
we continue in our earlier
conceit ($ 6 ).) with-or
without
an emphasis on names, ix
mighx well strike
us that the

simplest sort of sentence is
one in which something
is
named which thee remainder
iremaindpp of
r>r the
sentence says something
about, as is apparently the
case with (e.g.)
Jane is an actress.

This sentence, it happens, we
know to be true, at least
If we are together on our
Jane. We say that 'Jane'
names
the actress in question, and
thus speak of the relation
between 'Jane' and Jane in the
same terms as that between
44 e

In "Frege cn Functions" Black
subiects severaJ of

ihfPe"

and'finL

?^e„ting.
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and two.

But for the .noment we
shall set aside
those
earlter reflections, not
drawing upon the^ yet.
As we
here shall use 'na.e-,
the paradigmatic cases
of names
are expressions that
apply to things to which
we might
well be able to point,
perhaps so to name. And
this is
certainly not the case with
number-nam.es.
Previously we
took arithmetic as providing
us with the clear cases
of
What we called names, now
we think in terms of
naming, or
pointing, to gain the clear
cases of what we call
nam.es.
Sentences such as Vane is
an actress'.
-Tom is

tall*.

-Peter is next to Jane*.

*George is between Tom

and Sally*, etc., we may
call simple predications.
With
sentences of this sort, deleting
a (complete) name, as
•Jane* in -Jane is an actress*,
leaves an incomplete expression» e*g.,
(

)

is an actress,

which we will call a predicate,
or predicative expression.
A predication, then, is the
completion of a predicative
expression by a complete name (or
pair of
names if the
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predicate is doubly-incoraplete,
etc.) into a sentence.'*5
I now wish to develop
a line of thought,
rather
parallel to that gone through
with *2+3., which

arises in

response to the question.

How are we to account
for the
fact that *Jane is an
actress- has truth-value,
indeed,

is true, in terms of
what is to be said of its
parts,

•Jane- and

-(

)

is

an actress-?

(Note here the assumption

that such most simple
predications, as that of our
example, shall have such account
as we desire of them framed
in terms of just two (proper)
parts; what we here assume,
with Frege, comes in for
mention in ($li) and extended
discussion in ($16).) That -Janenames, or denotes.
Jane is necessary to the desired
account, but clearly not

f-benxenc^s to gain
slntenc4°?:
^afn predicates is not a wholly
tran^;paren- one. Witness the fact that
name John from 'John loves John* if we delete the
we are left with
the appearance of a one place
predicate *( ) loves
^ binarv
relationship,
Lilhcnlhff for
forT"
we recognize the same predicate
in
John loves Mary*. Even Frege shipped
on thi^*
p. 81.
The mofal he?rwc“d se^

^^cset^,

through uele-cing occurrences of names
from sentences.
fiut not any occurrence of
a name in anv sentencp
Dropping -France- from -The capital of ?ran«
if
iaris does not give us a predicate;
nor
does
deleting -2- irom -2t3=r. Nor is it clear
that tne
result of deleting VPeter’ from^ •Jane
is an actress
blonde snou^a be considered a predicate
Tho moral here is that there
Ihe
is no substitute for
judicious use of examples in introducing the
Idea of a predicate, or the predicative
occurrence
of an expression.
For a related point see note ?2.

l6o

sufficient for it.

T+ IS also
oi
It
Ci.ear that

•(
is an
)
actress* does not (or
not only) function
luncv^ion to name Jane,
or any other person,
since if it hid. Vane
is an actresswould be, in effect, a
two-person list, but it
is not,
-ince it is a sentence.
Here we draw on an
assumed
distinction between a sentence
and a list, in parxicular.
between a ss'n.fcen''p
-nten-e p’hi-sii+
about ^a ^person and a list
of persons.
Which parallels the earli^v,
+
ariie. aistinction
oetween a list of
nu.nbers and a narne of
a number.
We then conclude that
•( ) is an actresseither bears other than
denotation to
Jane, or it bears some
semantical relation, perhaps
that
of denotation, to something:
oth^^r than Jane
t
/
oxner
(or anybody
else .
^

*.

•

Frege held that predicative
expressions denote what
he called concepts.
Why was this? In a sense
the answer
is quite simple.
Frege intends to quantify
(generalise)
at the predicative-position,
and. as Quine would say, he
knew that to quantify at the
place of an expression
(i.e., to replace it by a variable
bound by a quantifier)
was inseparable from the assumption
that the expression
which occupies that position has
denotation.
But this

then raises questions as to why
Frege did so quantify, or
what reason can be offered in
motivation of this move.
A rather common thought on this
topic (similar to

that previously offered regarding
functions) finds expre5.3ion in these words of Furth's.

I6i

ingly
“nhesitat"Napoleon
general and MccIellan'^Sarnot^'to
was something that
McClellan
was

ihat-t^pr^dlcalr""
comparable

to that required
the paraU^ro^eration?®^"""

NOW Of course we do
commonly enough in ordinary
speech
™ove as Furth indicates.
And we may agree, for
the jurs of argument,
P
that to generalize at
the predicateplace is to presuppose
that predicates
denote.

n.ay

But it
he doubted whether,
in the move Furth cites,
a

predicative expression
nww simple
K sbion ourp
pure and
is generalized on.
Consider simply,
-s

Napoleon was a great general.
In this we have the
predicative expression
(

)

was a great general.

But to replace this, in
the above sentence, with
a variable
Which we bind with an
existential quantifier gives
something which might look; this
way
(Ex)

(Napoleon x)

have difficulty in understanding
this. At the very
least it does not admit of a
reading parallel to that
Which we give the result of
existentially generalizing
I

'
See also StrawP*
Terms
and
Predication"
in PhiloK?
pp. eoff., and Dummetfs "Fr'S^
on Funotionsi A Reply" in E ssays
on Frege . p.^Byz.

son°s
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at the position of
'Napoleon'.
(Ex)

That gives us

(x was a great
general),

which unproblematicallv
th«+ something
says that
y savs
was a great
general. The second
nu existential
;
existential invites
the questioni
Who (or What) was a
great general^ Here an
appropriate
answer is. Napoleon.
Now. judging fro^ the
quoted
passage. Kurth would suggest
that we understand the
first
existential as saying that
Napoleon was something.
Then
it invites the question.
What was Napoleon? And
here an
appropriate answer would be.
A great general.
•

Or.

He

«as a great general.

In answer to the first
question we
give (or may give) the
expression on which we had
previously generalised. But
this is not so with our
answer
to the second question.
Might we not suppose that
this
indicates that it was not the
position of the predicate
that was generalized upon?

These reflections cast some
doubt that the move to
Which Furth directs our attention
involves generalisation
on a predicative expression
and hence gives us reason
to suppose that predicates
denote. And Frege never, so
far as I know, offered such an
argument for his view that
predicates denote. I think that we
would do better to
seek Frege's reasons for assuming
concepts
as the de,.o-

tations of predicates in the context
of the demands of
logicism as Frege saw them. Reverting
to the earlier
approximation of Grurid^osetze
Basic Law V,
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(B)

x(Fx)=Ji(Gx)

iff (x)(Fx iff Gx),

if this is going to
serve Frege's program
of providing
ith the means of
apprehending sets, and so
ultimately
numbers, then 'F' and 'G'
must be construed as
genuine
variables, at all occurrences,^'^
'^his
xHis, tno-o+h
together with the
claim thax (e.g,) 'All
and only vixens are
vixens’ has
the logical form of the
right side of (B), yields
the
conclusion that predicative
expressions have denotation.
For the present let us
just accept the idea that
predicates denote.

Predicates denote concepts.

What then are concepts?

hell they are the sorts of
things which, e.g.. •(
is
)
an actress’ denotes, in its
occurrence in ’Jane is an
actress’, and are such that the
fact that ’( ) is an
actress’ denotes the concept
that it does, together with
the fact that ’Jane’ denotes
Jane, is sufficient to
ac-

count for the fact that the
sentence has the truth-value
that it does. We proceed in
analogy with our discussion
of 2 t3 . There we assumed
a distinction between names
and lists: here, between predications
(and sentences
generally) and lists. There we
generalized out from
arithmetic singular terras: here we
envisage a similar
generalisation, but one where the paradigmatic
singular
tenr.s are names of things we could
handle or point at

—

^7.

I

discuss this more explicitly in

(,'P13),
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expressions that Strawson,
for instance, would
incline
to count as singular ter™s
in the first instance.
Thus.
»uch as we know that concepts
are not persons, or anything else to which we might
be able to point,
since if

they were we would be able
to provide the denotation
of
•( ) IS an actress’
with a name, which upon
substitution
would transmute a predication
into a list, so we conclude
more generally that concepts
are entities which cannot
be
denoted by singular terms.
Concepts, like functions,
are

insusceptible of singular reference)
they too are unsaturate d.
We have sketched independent
accounts of complex
singular terms and simple predications.
That they run
as parallel as they do to some
extent reflects shared
assumptions; still the parallel is
striking. The urge

toward integration of theory is
strong.

Do we then have

a choice in the direction of
integration between assimi3-ating complex names to predications
or conversely?

Frege's move was to count predications
(and sentences
genez'axly) as names, therewith absorbing
concepts into

functions, as a special case.
^

Being able to thus treat

concepts as functions was undoubtedly felt
as an evident
gain; functions were a mathematical commonplace,
whereas
concepts were entangled in speculations of uncertain
usefulness and some obscurity.

Also, where in our

development we have made use of two somewhat different
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lnt.er.,i» .. I..,
,

,«.„i.i„,

arithmetical names and "natural"
names
Ar^n we
names.
And
might feel
that the differences
in our regard of names
serve to reinforce one another with
the cumulative effect
of a clearer categorization.
(Though the resultant
inclusion of
sentences into this category
is a doubtful gain
on this

score.)

Of course, this is
dependent upon being able to
make out a view on which
sentences have denotation,
which
we have yet to take up.

Whereas this assimilation of
sentences to complex
names is thus rather straightforward,
there is no equally
simple way of effecting the
reverse assimilation of complex names to sentences.
It is. however, possible
to go
the other way. The possibility
is provided by Russell's
theory of descriptions. The
process proceeds by, first,
finding what looks to be a
predicative expression in a
definite description: thus (e.g.)
locating •( ) is a

father of Jane' in 'the father of
Jane' so that the latter
may be recast as 'that which is a
father of Jane'. Then,
with any sentence in which the complex
phrase occurs,
the sentence as a whole is reworked
in the familiar fashxon with the result that the appearance
of a complex
name is eliminated. It then remains to
show how other

apparently complex names, e.g., '2+3', can bo
treated as
definite descriptions, and so on their way. to
being not
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nances at all.

48
^

,

place

Such transformations
arc todav a ncommon''

•

We can now appreciate
the resistance Frege
might well
ave felt to a Russellian
account of definite
descrip-

tion.

Carried through thoroughly,
this approach threatens to obliterate the
very phenomenon
reflection upon
Which led Frefre
hi ^
ege fo
to his
semantics, the phenomenon
of the
semantically complex name.
And recognising this we.
in
turn, might be led to
wonder to what extent,
and with
what effect, Frege's
semantical assimilation of
sentences
to complex names obliterate-:;
xixerates .he phenomenon
of sentences?
To this we shall return
in (.$15),
$12.

The Semantics Extended:
Problems

If sentences denote, what
do they denote?

In

S£SEiI£§schrift Frege had, at times.
spoRen somewhat
vaguely of sentences and facts,
or circumstances, with
the implication that (i)
sentences stand in some semantical relation to facts, and
(ii) the facts are many
perhaps not a fact for every
sentence, but at least

-

different facts for many different
sentences. On Frege's
later view there are just two
facts, if facts are subject
to a constraint implicit in
Begriffsschri ft
that the

48.

—

In Quine's _Mathemati ca] Logie
this, and more, is
carried out.
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fact

such there be) to which
a sentence is
related
contains, in so^e sense,
the objects denoted by
singular
ter»s occurring in the
sentence. These two facts
Frege
calls the True and the
False. Needless to say.
facts in
such short supply hardly
seem facts at all. Why
does
Frege hold this view?

Suppose that this sentence
is true,
George is a Republican.

Assume that just as -Georgedenotes George, the containing sentence denotes its
associated fact, and that George,
however referred to. is a
constituent
of this fact.

Presumably then any expression
that denotes George may be
exchanged with -George-, in
the example, with the result
that the new sentence refers
to the same fact
as the old.

Thus,

Ton's father is a Republican
is co-denotative with the
example if George is Tom-s

father.

And if this fellow is the oldest
man ever to
five-putt the fourteenth at Pebble
Beach while standing
on his left foot whistling Dixie,
then each of the preceding two must be co-~referential
with

The oldest nan ever to five-putt the
fourteenth at Pebble Beach while standing on his left foot whistling Dixie
IS a Republican,

and if all and only men are featherless
male bipeds,
and if Dixie is the best loved song in
Little Rock, then
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fourteenth at Pebble
standing on his left for^+
whistling the be^t in-TrL^i
Rock is S Republican
u--.^^

•

in turn agrees in
denotation with each of
the other three.
And so forth.

Having encouraged us
in •Sense and Referenceto
reflect on such examples
F^ege queries.
-„hat else but
the truth-value could
be found that belongs
quite generally to every sentence
if the denotation of
its components
IS relevant, and
remains unchanged by
substitutions of
the kind in question?**^^
If sentences denote, and
if the contribution of
a
singular term, occurring as a
part of a sentence, to the
fact that the sentence denotes
what it does lies completely
in the term denoting a
particular object, then we may
be
convinced that we have no choice
but to treat

sentences

alike in truth-value as
co-referential. Then again we
may not. Can we conjure up an
argument that carries us
directly to this conclusion?
We are assuming that predicates
denote, and we may
suppose that just as the contribution
of the subject of
•George is a Republican' to the
fact that the sentence
denotes what it does is exhausted
in its denoting George,
likewise the contribution of the
predicate lies just in

Writin.^s

.

p. 64

,
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Its denoting a
particular concent.

co-denotative with

(

)

Hence any predicate

i^ . Keputlican'

is intercdangewith xt, in our example,
salva irritate . And
if
concepts are construed
as a special case
of functions.
two concept-words
(pr^dicate^ will
vp*-aicdtes;
wsn v.be co-denotative
just
in case whenever
co-denotati
t
s_ngu.».ar terms complete
the™ to for™ sentences
the results have the
same denotation. But clearly this
information is of „o use
to us in
tryrng to argue that
sentences equal in
truth-value are
co-denotative.
e

1

We try another tack.

Sentences denote facts,
so we

are assuming, but not every
sentence denotes a fact
distinct from What any other
sentence denotes. Some
sentence
pairs are co-denotative.
For instance, a pair of
sentences
which ciffer only in that
one arises from the other
through
a substitution of one
singular term for another will
be

co-denota1;iv^ II
if +hp»
«ne crnyio-nio,singular xterms are.

Further, if

S

abbreviates an arbitrary sentence,
then its self-conjunction
S and S

will surely be sufficiently
equivalent to .S to insure
that the pair are alike in
denotation. And similarly
with self-disjunction: surely
S or S

will be co-denotative with the first,
and so also with
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the second of the above
pair.

Since sentences denote we
can make use of other
of
Frege -s logical notions
so as to form such
singular terms
the unique thing that
is the same as S',
briefly,
(Tx) (x=S)
bs ouxe
surG uenowes
dGno+pti what o does
so that
i

(Tx)(x=S) = s

must be true.

As, of course, will be

(Tx)(x-S) = (Tx)(x=S).

Here our interest is less
with this being true than
with
the fact that it is a
sentence of Frege's logical
theory.
Let us look just at the left
term.
It contains as a part
the predicative expression '(
)=s'; we can thus schematise
this term with
(Tx) (Fx)

Recall that on Frege's theory of
descriptions such exprss
sions (or the equivalent ones
in his notation) denote the
sole F, if such there be, otherwise,
(roughly) the class

of Fs.

Now let us consider the slightly
more complex
predicate *S, and ( }=s* with which
we replace *F* to
obtain
(Tx) (S, and x=3)

What does this denote?
thai,

A moment’s reflection reveals

if S 13 true, then this expression
denotes just what

S does, and if S is false it denotes
a certain class

(roughly, the null class.)

Thus the following
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(Tx)(S, and x=S) =
(Tx)(x=S)

and the original S will
be true and false
together. Here
as before the equivalence
is determined through
our understanding Of the logical
ideas drawn upon, and
so. as before, we may conclude
that the pair are
co-denotative
Now we are in a position
to argue straightforwardly
fo. trege s conclusion
that if sentences denote
facts,
there are at most two facts.
We begin with two
sentences.
S and R, alike in truth-value.
Now, (a) and (b)
(a)
(b)

S

(Tx)(S, and x=S) = (Tx)(x=S),

we have just shoxm to share
their reference.
must (b) and (c)
(c)

(Tx)(R, and

x^-S)

Then so too

= (Tx)(x=t.s),

since by our assumption S and R
are alike in truth-value,
and so (c) arises from (b) through
substitution of ccdenotative left terms. The expressions
*(Tx)(S, and x=S)*
and *(Tx)(R, and x=S)» are
co-denotative since if both S
and R are true each description
picks out whatever it is
that the sentence S denotes, and if
both S and R are false
then each description will denote
(roughly) the null class
as no object will satisfy either of
the conditions *S,
and x=3* and *R, and x=S*. Finally (c)
and (d)
(d)

R

will share their reference for the same
reason that (a)
and (b) do. Since the argument works for any
pair of
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sentences alike in
truth-value, we have
reached Frege's
concluoion that all the
true sentences denote
one thing,
and all the false ones
another.?^ The common
denotation
xs called the True
in the one case, the
False in the
other.

Just before launching
the above argument we
reasoned
that two concept-words
will share denotation
Just in case
sentences that result fro.
the. through co.pletion
with
co-denotative singular terms
themselves are co-denotative
Having arrived at the view
that sentences denote truthvalues we can be more specific.
Two concept-words
are

co-denotative just in case whenever
a name completes each
to form a sentence the
resultant sentences are alike
in
truth-value. Since concepts are
functions, this is no
more than what we would expect.
But it is worth lingering
over this a moment, since there
has been a history
of

misinterpretation of Frege at this
point.

The source of

the trouble lies undoubtedly
in the fact that Frege does
not come out and say that concepts
that uniformly yield
the same Values for the same
arguments are one and the

50

argument (called by some Davidson's
sharpened
thing 11, ce tnis form by Church in his into somereview of
Cai. nap g jjltrQ'l^^ction to
Semant ics Philosouhical
£evi^/r t>^ U 9 ^ 3 )» p. 29S-3()Hy:^^t has
recent]^
cone in lor considerable discussionj
see, for
instance, John Wallace *s ’'Propositional
Attitudes
ana .Ldentitv" Jo urnal
PhiloGophy 66 (1969),
pp» 165 “ 132
and references therein.
(

(

)

,
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so^e stricter
identity-con.itiors for concepts.
However
this IS .istalcen. As
emphasised earlier, identity
is a
first-level function (relation)
. one which holds
only for
and. so cn.re can Vo
be no question of
identity
conditions for concepts,
still one may feel that
even
if we are precluded from
asking under what conditions
j.

•

are

••two"

concepts identical, a
somewhat analogous question
can still be raised. To
such the following can be
taken
as Frege’s reply:
• • «coincidine;
in ^Axension
extpnc?ir,n .is a
^
necessary
anH
and oufficient crixerion
for the holding
of the re,lation co^resDondobjects.
Identitv' doe^^
not
speaking, hold for
concettf!)5f
(

By 1955 Geach52 had directed
attention to the fact that
identity was inapplicable to
concepts and to the above
quoted passage; this should have
served to clear matters
up.
And with the publication of
Furth's fine introductory essay, excuse for error was
removed altogether. That
error over the "extensionality" of
Frege's concepts
has

51

The passage is from Frege's review
of Husserl's
Arithmetlk (.Leiozig, 18qi). extracts
from Which will
found in £hiiil4kical
4 have quoted from Furtn:r~^‘
Editor’s Introduction'*, p. xliv.

jihiic§.°.?h ie

52.

"Cl
t

Concept”, The Philosophical R eview , LXIV
Reprinted in —
hssa’vs on Fre^fe:

pp» j6l-570.

see p. 2o4.

——
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been so widespread. 53
particularly a.ong writers
with a
logical bent, is perhaps
somewhat accounted for
by the
fact that Carnap, a
Known student of Frege's,
went awry
The logical Syntax
Language, where
misinterpretation first occurs, to
my Knowledge. 5^^
Nevertheless it is
regrettable that, for
instance. Quine continues
in his
wayward way in his recent
Philosophy of Logic. 55
Recapitulating recent thoughts,
we have seen what
motivates treating
predications as complex names.
But
then If predications have
denotation it is natural
to
assume tnis is so for
sentences generally. Given
this,
we have constructed
an argument of some force
that issues
in the conclusion that the
range of denotations

«

^

of sentences contains just two
members, the True and the
False,
so called. But if sentences
denote truth-values it
is
appealing to treat truth-functional
correctives as a
special case of concept-words,
that is. as incomplete
expressions that denote functions
taKing objects
(in

53.

See Furth's "Editor's
Introduction", ^p. xxxvm.
xxxviii
for a partial catalogue.

and 259-f6o:

(first published in
^ iHIlSHnES
1937).
See pp. 136-137

place in Grundla^en (p* 80, n.
1) Frere
idea that -different conoLZ ^
mc-y have the same extension.
But of course thi- idevelopment of his seman'Iics on wMch"
concepts are functions.
55«

See pp, 66-6?.
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particular truth-values)
into truth-values
.
And given
that predicative
expressions denote functions
an account
Of universal and
existential quantification
see.s at
hand. The universal
t
vexiotential) closure
of a predica
tive expression denotes
the True Just in case
the completed
concept-word denotes a concept
that yields the True
for
all (so:ne) arguments.
Seen this way quantifiers
too seem
something like functional
expressions. Treating them
as
seoond-levei function-names
denoting functions
^

in their
own right then provides
an account of third-level
functionnames in terms of these
second-level functions similar
to that of second-level
function-names in terms of firstlevel functions. And so
forth.

Our aim has been to lay out.
compellingly if possible,
na.urd steps to Frege’s semantics,
what Frege might have
called the semantics of
unsaturation. This unsaturation,
the unspecifiable ontology,
is problematic, and one
way
or another we shall be
concerned with it for most of
the
remainder of this essay. However
there are problems with
Frege’s semantics which have
nothing directly to do with
the view that functions are
unsaturated, which it behooves
US to mention, if not mull over.
There is a problem with multiple
quantification.
understand, given the foregoing, the
conditions under
which seme thing of the form
(

X ) Fx

We

1?6

rue

-

just in case F denotes
a function which
yields
the True for all
argu,.ents.
But what are we to
say with
regard, for instance,
to something of the
form
(x)(y)(Rxy)?

Frege does not tell us
how to regard the
semantic contribution of an embedded
quantifier.
I'here is

an analogous difficulty
with connectives,
conditionality is explained
for all objects as
arguments.
but this dees not tell no
u.o thv, semantic
import of the
conditional J.n
-p
in oent.nces
sentonf'^o of, for
instance, the form
(x)(Px:r> Gx).
•

The conditional-sign, the
horseshoe or Frege's, has not
been explained for contexts
in which it is not completed
to a proper name by proper
names, but rather serves
itself
to complete a second-level
function-name to a proper name.
It IS through such a use
of connectives that we
enrich

the expressive powers of a
finite supply of predicates.
So we could just as well say
that the problem here mentioned is with the semantics of
complex predicates as
that it is with connectives in
quantlf icational contexts
(and higher-order contexts generally*)

Related to this

is a

problem with

us about predication itself.

-what

Frege tells

Something of the form

wixl be true just in case a falls
under the concept F.
But what are we to say of polyadic
predications ; of, for
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instance, something of the
form
Ra, b?

In "Function and Concept"
Frege writes

In
X > y
we have a function with
two arguments
indicated cy *x* and the other
by *y*

one

and

3 > 2
we have the value of this
function for the
arguments . 56

But of course we do not have
the value of the function
for the arguments, for there is
no unique value of the

function for the arguments.

Rather, what we have is the

value of the function for the
arguments taken in a certain order, in the order in which we
most naturally would
take them.
I quote Frege's words
here not just to catch
him up, but to highlight the fact that
his practice
in

this passage is his practice generally.

Always in dis-

cussing polyadic predications he relies on
the natural
convention of plugging mentioned arguments
into available
argument-places of the predicate so that the first
mentioned argument goes into the "alphabetically
earliest"
position, and so on.

But this means that Frege in fact

has no way ol keeping track of the argument
places in

many-place functions.

At least he has given no sense to

talk of a particular function having a first, second,

Philoso p hica l Wr Ltin/^s . p, 39 .

•

•
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kth argument place, anymore
than he has to a particular
function having a top and a bottom,
or a left and right
side •
This problem Tarski solved with
sequences.

And it,
in turn, led to solution of the
problems with complex

predicates and multiple quantifications,
which, after all,
are somewhat artificially parcelled
out as separate problems. Sequences are no solution
for Frege, however. For
sequences are “set-like", indeed, definable
set-thecreticaily.

Thus for the semantics to call upon
sequences

would be for it to undercut the very
philosophy of mathematics that was intended to be argued for
through
the

use of the logical notation.

It is not clear whether

there is any way of providing an adequate
semantics for

Frege

s

logic which at least s.ccord5 with the spirit of

his logicism.

To Frege's idea of reducing arithmetic to

logic we return in the next section, in particular we

shall look at his philosophical attitude towards set
theory,

lirst, let me repeat that the problems just con-

sidered are independent of those caused by Frege's deeming
functions insusceptible of singular reference; these

matters we return to in ($ 14 ).
$13.

Classes, Concepts, and Consistency

In developing Frege's semantics

v/e

worked on the

assumption that such simple subject-predicate sentences

(t) 0% q.x0u ST

(

)

pxno« a3e.,, .ua.a^a^s
XBuot.aTaa sx^,
jo
•iCjBW 04. q.x 0 u ST :i0q.0j
sous:).U0s

B^•:^

^©pTsuoo

•nq^ptOAP aapxaSoxXB aaa
uox^Baniasun uaaSsag
JO aaouanbaauoo paiuPMun
aoy,.at,« aaAo aq
xxt« uaaauoo
oxjToads .no a.aqM

OMJ^dn a,ax xiaqs

a,,

-sasoexo pua oqdaouoo uo
s.ugnov,
s.aSaaj to uoxasnosTp
.oMq.nj oq quxcd K.qua ua
sa aapx
ST'« osn TTX^qs a«
..oasmok 'o.aH .aouaquas
apq jo q.ad
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sqaa.q qaqq axsApaua
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.apxsuoo sn qaq
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JO EXsXxaua q.ad-OMq a jo
uoxqdumssa auq SuxqoaCa. iCq
saxqxqua paqa.nqasun jo
uoxqonpo.qux aqq pxoAa oq axqxssod
aq qx qp3xM

•qsxM pxnoM a« sa uiaqq qnoqa

j(xeq qouuao aAi
a.add^
XJ
.oxqeaiaxqojd aaa sqdaouoo
paqa.nqasun qons qng
•poqa.nqasun a.a sqdaouoo qaqq MaxA
s.aSpjj oq paap uao
‘aAxqaqouap a.c suoxssa.dxa
aqaxduiooux qaqq «sxa aqq qqxM
paxdnoo *uoxqdu;nasa sxqq «oq uaas SAaq
a« puv -.ssa.qoa
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Plete expressions which
flank it into a sentence,
that
each of these three
parts denotes something,
and

that the

doubly-incomplete expression has
a doubly-unsaturated
denotation. The suggested
alternative is to try to
make
something like this analysis
work for such as -Jane
is an
actress- through treating
-is- as a two-place
connecting
expression, but in such a way
that unsaturated
entities

sli*g

no"t for*c6d

upon us»

Let us assume that, if we
treat the copula as denotative, previous reasoning will
lead us to the conclusion
that Its denotation is unsaturated,
doubly-so. And it is
clear that Frege would have held
that if the copula is to
be construed as a genuine
relational expression, then it
must be thought of as denoting
something. That is, if
the alternate analysis is
otherwise acceptable, it requires
that we count the copula among the
denoting expressions
of,

for instance, 'Jane is an actress'.

That this would

be his view is borne out by these
remarks.

Somebody may think . . . that there
need ao all to take account of such is no
an unmanageable thing as what I call a concept;
that one might . , , regard an object's
falling under a concept as a relation, in
wnich xhe s.ame thing could occur now as
object now as concept. The words 'object'
and 'concept; would then serve only to
indicate the different positions in the relation.
This may be done; but anybody who
_
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very
We have suggested that
Frege had sufficient
reason
to hold that, on his
analysis, predicates denote,
since
he was to quantify at
the predicate place.
And that such
quantification was essential to
his logicist program,
efieo., Frege developed
a set tneory through
quantifying
over concepts, indeed he
maintained that this was the
onlv
way one could intelligibly
ascend into set theory. But
this reason for quantification,
and so for the assumption
that predicative expressions
such as •( ) is an actress'
have denotation, does not carry
over to support the view
that on a three part parsing
of subject-predicate sentences the putative relational
expression must denote.
For It seems that we gain no
additional logical power

m

through quantifying at the position
of the copula.
Either
set theory arises independently
of such quantification,
or not at all.
So perhaps the copula need not
denote,
and hence not denote something
unsaturated*
But if we are to make out an
alternative three-way
analysis, we shall have to explain, or
make clear, what
It IS thax is denoted by such general
terms as 'an actress'
and 'a Republican*. This, Frege would
claim, we cannot
do, except through also assuming concepts.

57*

Ibid., PPo 5^-55

To understand
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Frege

thought on this will both
clarify his thinking
on set theory and heip
us to understand his
cc.itnent
to concepts.
-s

On the imagined alternative
analysis, as applied to
•Jane is an actress',
'Jane' denotes Jane.
'ig. is
denotative; its semantic
function lies in other than
having denotation. This
aside, what of the remaining
piece of the new picture?
'An actress' denotes.
But

What?

(Of course this expression
does not look much like

a name, but then neither
does

'is an actress'.)

clearly
an actress' does not denote
an actress. Perhaps it denotes. collectively, all the
actresses. But then presumably,
in like fashion, 'a two-headed
actress',
as in 'Jane is

a two-headed actress', denotes
the two-headed actresses.
But since there are no such

creatures, apparently there

is nothing for 'a two-headed
actress'

to denote.

But

notice that if 'Jane' failed of
denotation
suppose we
learn that there were really twins,
only one of whom
appeared publicly at any time
we would probably say of
•Jane is an actress' that it failed
of truth-value,

—

—

and

so dropped off the stage of our
concern.

(This feeling

woula undoubtedly be enhanced if just
one of the twins
was an actress.) While the fact
that there are no twoheaded actresses does not incline us in
the least to

suppose that 'Jane is a two-headed actress'
lacks truthvalue*)
On the contrary, it is straightforwardly false.
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So» since *Jane is a +wr»
xs a Tiwo-headea
actress

a-

•

truth-value

an aotres.- aces, if
-an actresa- .as
denotation. then >a two-headed
actress- .ust as well.
The
problem is that there
does not see. to be
anything for
is

It to denote*

Nowadays an answer is
IS reTHiit-r^
readily forthcoming.
Let such
general terms as are here
ro-nvir-aA
quired to nav'e denotation
denote classes, and so.
in particular, -a
two-headed
actress- will denote a
class, the class that
has no
members. How adequate a
reply ia this? Well,
what is
a class?
-t-

Fr-ege found discussions
by his contemporaries
full

Of mistake and confusion.

There was psychologistic
con-

fusion found in the talk of
forming sets by abstraction,
or putting things together
in the mind by a process
of
attention, etc. There was
failure to distinguish
the

relation of an object falling
under a concept (class
membership) from that of one
concept falling within
another (class inclusion), and
either of these from the
part-whole relation of one object
to another.
And ihere
were mistakes arising from
failure to distinguish
ade-

quately concept from object.

Thus, for Instance, it was

not sufficiently recognized
that whereas there could be
no non-self-consistent objects,
there was nothing improper
about a self-contradictory concept.
Hclated to this was
the attempt, by Schroder for
instance, to by-pass concepts
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and consider t.e elements
of a class as
constituitive of
the class. This resulted
in the situation
that the idea
of the null class,
the class without members,
was unintelligible.^°
What of our contemporaries?
Of the clearest.

Let us listen to one

In his Set

and Its Logic Quine

says, in the first
paragraph of the introduction,
that

this will be
neip than hindrance unless
wp ifpo-r.
or colLctInf Lre Ts"t"co“
displacement of 't^e obJec^sTand

fur?ber-ha*

lecUon:'or'c^mblnaUon'‘on

awlon

Ox

objects just so long as
'agg^esa+e
-combination' is undfrStood strictly in the sense of
'class'. 59
It might seem that if Quine
is not canceling out
with the last sentence all
salient suggestions of the
first, the problem of the
denotation of 'a two-headed

actress’ re-emerges, for the notion
of an aggregate or
collection or combination of nothing
is unintelligible.
And this, again, was Frege's primary
objection to set

58.

59 o

Gruribf^esej^ $0. and "A Critical
of
Some Points in ii. Schroder's Algebra Elucidation
der Logik ” in
Ph ilosophical Writings .

IhSL^^ and Its ^,gic, p.

1,
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theory as hejcnew it.

Schroder*
against

Thus Frege directs
these words

*

we have so
far^used
far
used iw
the word, consists of
obiect-- ?+
“ collective unity,
of
tLm"
when these objects vfnis^

thereby burn down the
Thus the'*’
there can be no empty class.oS
oannot be an emoty class if we
+ei^e* a class
take
to be a collectiL or
LtalTL
ti'iat, as the author
savs
consists of individuals or
indiv?rtnei-®^
viduals
make up the class.
But it is doubtful that
in this we have an objection
to Quine, who did. we now
remind ourselves, preface
the
passage we have quoted with
the claim that rt]he
notion
of class is so fundamental
to thought that we
cannot
hope to define it in more
fundamental terms •.^2
continues in his second paragraph
to characterize this
nobion as Tollows*

articulate on the funcn- the notion of class.
tion Ox
Ima^.ine a
something. Put a blank or
var^nMo
variable where the thing is referred
to.
lou have no longer a sentence
about that
but an open sentence, so
called, that may hold true of each
of various
things and oe lalse of others. Nov/
the
is supposed to be, in addition to the various
tnings 01 which that sentence is true,
also

60.
61.
•

Philos ophical Writinf^s
Ibid,

,

p.

^Gt Cheery

102.
,

p.

1

.

p.

89.
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Though the null class does
not co.e in for explicit
T-ention in this passage,
it does implicitly,
-x is a twoheaded actress' liKe any
other open sentence
determines
a class.
We must. Of course, take
the talk of an open
sentence
determining a class in its
mathematical sense . Quine
does
not think that open
sentences, or general terms,
create
classes, since, among other
reasons, classes outrun our
resources for talking about
them.^^^ On this Frege
agrees.
Since Quine, no more than
Frege, construes classes
as the

denotations of predicative
expressions, perhaps it would
be best to say simply that
for (most) every general term
(or open sentence) there is
assumed an associated class,
though not conversely.
(The parenthetical
'most'

is a

hedge against Russell's paradox,
which will remain offstage for now.) We can then go
on, with Quine, and say
that if two general terms are true
of just the same things,
the class associated with the
one is just that associated
with the other.
Up to this point Quine’s classes
and Frege’s extensions

^3.

Ibi d.

64,

See Set Theory , p. 2.

.

p.

102.
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seem
3.re

to run quite parallel.

Co-extensive
exxensive oconcept-words

3-ssoci3.t0Q wiith
xh the —same
oourse-of-values

through the denoted
concept.

.

albeit

So it would seem
that, up
to this point. Prege
could have no complaint
with Quine's
Class talk. Could we
now treat Quine’s
classes as the
denotations of general
terms so as to serve
the needs of

our alternative analysis
without incurring Fregean
objections?

Frege might well object
that we still had not
made
clear this nol;icn of
class for
r fhc.
the follo'wing reason.
A
class A and a class B
are to be one and the
same when
each is associated with
a general term and
the associated
terms are true of just the
same things. But not
only
When, since classes
outrun general terms. So
how are we
to express the desired
extensionality condition generally?
In words, classes are
identical when they have just
the
same members. But here
iieze we speak
qroav of
o-f o..
sameness of class in
terms of sameness of members,
and now our concern refocuses
upon the latter notion, which
is as yet unexplained.
If
class A and class B are the
same when they share their
members, then if neither has
any members they share no
members i once again the null
class is unintelligible.
Frege might have argued.

Since Frege’s set theory is
developed within a
second-order logic, he can state the
desired extension‘^lity condition for classes
(extensions), and courses-
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of-values generally, with
his Basic Law v.
-(x^(x)=x'>T(x)) =

0

(~^0(a) =V(=1)).65

and

-V’ are variables
ranging over one-place,
first-level concepts (and
functions generally),
including
those
or rather that
under which no object
falls.
Whence the null class.

-

-

Now we .ight expect a
Quine to retort that one
could
only think that the
notion of a concept with
an empty
extension is clearer than the
notion of a class with no
members if he were clearer
about what is a concept
than
about what is a class. And
just what is a concept?
To

this Frege may reply that
concepts are just a special
case
of functions, and what
a function is is clear
enough.
Now Quine would agree that
functions, as they are called
upon in classical mathematics,
are unproblematic; they
are on a par with, and submit
to much the same treatment
as, ordered pairs.
What is problematic Quine might
insist
is Frege’s insistence that
functions, and so concepts,
are unsaturated. And if we
then turn to ask why Frege
maintains this view we are taken
back to our beginnings.
And led in something of a circle.
For what initiated the

discussion of this section was the
question of whether

65.

Here I use the modi fied Fregean
notation of our
exposition and have ignored the asstrxion-sign;
this may be compare d with the statement
of BLV
in note 25 .
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it would be possible
to provide a
relational analysis
Of such a sentence
as Vane is an
actress' in a way

would avoid commitment
to unsaturated
entities.
For us here the answer
to this question
turned on the
possibility Of construing
(e.g.) the denotation
of -an
actress', in the example
sentence, as a class,
and in
such a way as to overcome
the objection that
on such a
view 'a unicorn', or
'a two-headed actress'
would require
denotation, yet fail of
it lor
XU
for want nr
o
of an
appropriate
class •
</hat

IS at issue in our
imagined exchange between
Frege and Quine is whether,
as Quine

contends, the notion
of class, or class-membership,
is fundamental to
thought.

The reason Frege gives
for denying this, which
we have
developed, is that it would
render the notion of a null
class unintelligible. But
this may be symptomatic.
For
to hold that the notion
of class was fundamental
might
seem to commit us to viewing
BLV as a synthetic a
priori
truth (if a truth at all),
and hence to commit
us to the

sort of epistemological
Platonism which

I

have urged we
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err in attributing to
Frege,

Earlier ($4)

claimed that Frege
regarded BLV (or
its instances) as
containing alternative
analyses of a
given Thought. Let me
now offer some textual
evidence
for this interpretation.
In "Function and Concept"
Frege
writes of the "transformation"
involved in BLV this way.
Vi'e
have generallyi
x^-4x s= x(x-4)
whatever number we take for v
t
this as follows,
the function 'x.'xlh)
[.In

i

as the
the example^ we have not function x2-4^ *
ort
*

-r

the funrti--n y/'v
funoi^n^ X
y 2 -4x, •
funcvion
and h.ere

•

LHf-values
lae-of

"that of

of

the

v/e have ar eouaJ’tv
holding generally between
courses-of-vl.ues!^7

Frege puts this equality, or
identity, into his notation
this way,
(a)

x(x^-4x) = x(x*(x-4)).

If we set (a) to the left of
the identity sign while

66.

However Quine is someone who both
rnrards the
of class as fundamental
‘wax. ciuu
and i- no
no*o tin
in o p aS 1 6m o 1 o£T j c a 1
pi ii-f-rtn e.+
T
Smart's assessment.
"wfne^r^n*
i

Platonism.5 need detenu on
intuitions
of a special inteltualr realm.
Such a Platonistic epistemolop-y cansquared^with a biological view of man,
On?
Quine
s account we need no such
non-erriDirical in(
vUitions,
'’Quine’s Philosophy of Science",
'
19 (1968), p. 5.)
^

t.

,

Writings, p. 26,
(I have modified
the tianclation to standardize usage with
Furth,}
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putting on Its right side
the universal closure
of Frege’s
example,
(l>)

(x)((x^-4x) = x(x-4)),

to its right, we thereby
for. an instance of BLV.
Now how should we take
Frege’s remark to the
effect
that such a pair as (a)
and (b) say the same
thing? Frege
answers when he says, of
his previous example,
that
Cit] in the same sense
as
before
this expresses [aus_drbcken]
the
oat in a diff^FiTTt' way. iam^sen^e
presents
the sense as an equality
holding -^»nerallv^
newly introduced expression
[fa)^ 1
IS
is simply an equality,
and
r’lrh-h
eaually its left --riP ??? its rxght side and
something
complete in itselfto^’

U

Here we may assume that Frege
is using ’sense’ and ’expresses’ as he does in ’’Sense
and Reference", which had
been written, though not
published, at the time of this
address. Thus he is saying that
such pairs as (a) and
(b) express the same
Thought, though clearly they
differ
in logical structure and ontology.
In GrundgeseJ^ itself we do
not find such an explicit assertion that "instances"
of BLV have the same
sense. But we do get explicit
denial of this in the case
of a rather similar pair of
sentences. Suppose we have a
function F which yields different values
for different
arguments generally. Then if we apply
this function to

P- 27.
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a "pair- of oourses-of-values
we will get the
same object
as value just in case
the oourses-of-values
are one, not
two* that is. the
following sentences are
true and false
togetheri
(i)

(ii)

F(x(Gx)) = F(x(Hx))
x(Gx) = x(Hx).

Where -G. and
names.

are any one-place,
first-level functionThen, given BIV. (i) will
also share

truth-value

v/ith

(iii)

(x)(Gx = Hx),

for any G and H.

Having noted all this Frege
makes it a
point to add. in a note, that
-this is not to say that
the senses [of (i) and (iii)]
are the same. -69

u„der the

advocated interpretation Frege
held that (ii) and (iii)
were the same in sense. That
he does not deny it in this
context, provides some, indirect,
support for this.
On the understanding here advocated,
BLV was to provide Frege with the means of
apprehending the objects of
arithmetic For numbers are to be gained
set-theoretioallv.
and BLV gives us our sets. Sets
(or classes,
or extensions)

are not reducible to some other sort
of entity.
Nor can
discourse about sets be forgone in favor
of more basic
discourse. Still, for Frege, the notion
of class is not
an episxemologically fundamental one,
at least not as

^9*

Grundf’.esetze , p. ^6
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compared with that of
concept. For we are
to gain it
through redistributing
the content of an
expression which
maxes mention of concepts
but not classes. Here
we may
recall our discussion of
Frege's Grundl_agen example
of
judgments concerning parallel
lines and directions
($3,.

Directions are not reducible
to other geometric
entities,
nor talk of directions
eliminable in favor of more
basic

geometric discourse,

still the concept of direction
is
not. according to Frege,
epistemologically on a par with
such a concept as that of
one line being parallel
to
another. Parallel lines, we
might say, are geometrically
prior to their directions.
It is an analogous vein
that
I would "fca-ltG
s UGrraTk
remark +h'a-J^ *S
tha^
uhG concept is logically
prior to its extension.”'^® And
viiu o
sirril'>rlv
irfiixc.! ly , oUCh a
rGinarX
as this

FlTG£rG*

phrases of ordinary
terminology, the word 'function' mathematical
certainly
corresponds to what I have here called
the
^ function.
But
function,
n the ot-nse oi +
the word employed here, is
the logically prior [notionj.^^

how

I

Wish to return to another theme
of the earlier

discussion of Grundlap;en.

As we read Frege, such

"definitions’* as
(A)

?0.
*

NxFx

=:

NxGx iff the Fs equal the Gs,

Philips ouhical Writin.^s
1hi

. ,

p,

B6, note.

.

p.

106«
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were methodologically
unsatisfactory in that they
did not
provide sharp toundaries
for the introduced
concept. In
Vol. II. Fnege expresses
himself this way.
A defini-tion of a concept
.
,
.
must hp
complete! it must unambiguously
determinp
«ny object. I.the/ oTlll
IT
unden tlie concer't
4-'
us men, with our defective
question m.ay not always be knowled|p>, the
decidable^ We
rnetaphorically as follows,
the concept must have a
sharp boundary.
i_

j-.

W

He subsequently adds that
'"iddle is really
iust^-nc+hr”
just
another lorm of the requirement
that
the concept should have a
sharp boundary.
Any object
that you choose to take eith-^r
concept 0 cr does not fall
uodP^ it; xertium non
under
datur » ^3

Further, it is instructive to see
that this requirement
is equivalent to Frege's
"basic principle"

of Grund.reset 7.e

which we have already mentioned,
the "principle that
every correctly formed name is to
denote something. .
a principle which, says Frege,
"is essential for full
rigor.”
For, if some concept-word denoted
a concept
such that some object neither did
nor did not fall under
the concept, then there would be
sentences which fail
of

denotation, and so are neither true nor
false.

If, on

the oxner hand, we had, for instance,
a (one-place) concept-

.

I bid.

,

p. 159,

73.

Ihid.

,

p, 159.

72
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wor. an. a pnopen na.e,
eac. o. wnic. succeeds
in .enoUn.
but Which are such
that the completion
of the concept«ord by the proper name
does not denote, i.e.,
denotes
neither the True nor the
False, this would mean
that the
ubiect denoted by the
proper name neither did
nor did not
fall under the concept
denoted by the concept-word.
In Grimdcesette Frege
sought to guarantee that
all
concepts, of whatever level
or degree, which can
be de-

noted by primitive notation
of Begriffsschrif t
however
complexly put together, have
sharp boundaries through
insuring that the "basic
principle"
was in force.

His

approach was to insure that
each of his eight primitive
names, each of them function-names,
uniquely has denotation
and then to guarantee that
the rules by which new names
may be formed from old ones
pass this feature on. This
he set out to do in Seotions
28-31 of Grundgesetc-.o .

This
procedure was of considerable
importance. For it is
reasonably clear that Frege's axioms
would be true, if the
names of the Begriffsschrift
univocally had denotation,
and likewise that the rules of
inference would be truthpresorvtng. Thus, to show that the
"basic principle"
was in force would be to establish
that the system of
logic of nrundgeset7£ was consistent.
For no falsehood,
and hence no contradiction, could be
forthcoming.
It seems clear that Frege held
that a system of logic

mus

,,

bo constructed in such a way that we
can be certain
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fro. the outset that it
is free fro.
oontradiotioa.
in Grur>4Ia£en he had
written that

rw\rt'he

proorrl.iLf

For

a"

definitions
are iu=tirted A ?
^
afterthought,
by
our falli^ii 5
tion. By these''^e?hodrwe
shal?°"a*'‘bo?:

general logical foundations
of our scl’ence

Yet I know of no place where
he indicates that his "basic
principle” was intended for this
purpose,
(still I feel
that this was the case. I am
inclined to think that the
fact Russell -s fateful letter
evoked such a dramatic reaction from Frege was due. in part,
to F'rege’s believing
that he had proven that no such
contradiction could
arise.) Since Frege’s logic is
susceptible to Russell’s
paradox we know that Frege failed in
his attempt to show
that Begriflsschrift names univocally
denote. Not surprisingly, the problem centers upon the
notation for the

course-of-values of a function.

In Section 31 "Our

simple names denote something" Frege errs
in his attempt

?5,

^_undl_ago|> ,

p. ix.
Remember that with Grundgesetze.
take up the ro.le of introducing ontology
which .QrjLmdl^^^ definitions had been allowed to
perform.
axioni^j
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to snow that his
oourse-of-vaiues function-name
yields a
denotation of an object
whenever appropriately
completed.
But I shall not here
trouble to detail his
procedure or
his mistake,

Russell
logicism.

s

paradox dealt a severe blow
to Frege's

It showpfid ohaw the 4two
-

•

sides” of BLV did not

express the same Thought,
and so discredited a
central
idea of the Grun^agen
program, that which we
focused upon
before ($3)» Reportedly
I
rwrFre'^-e
xj.
+
ege later
came to regard set
theory as an intellectual
aberration.
+.

$14.

The Concept Horse and
Consequences of Unsaturation

Let us review and recast
our earlier discussion of
Frege's semantics of predication,
which we saw to be a
major stepping stone to his
general semantics.
We seek an account of the
fact that such a sentence
as

Native Dancer is a horse
has truth-value.
IS to be framed,

Wa assume that, in this case,
the answer

on tho linguistic side, just
in terms of

the two (proper) parts.

'Native Dancer' and

horse'.

•(

)

is a

Suppose then that we are led to regard
both positions in our example sentence as open
to quantification,
that each of the sentence parts denotes
something. We

?6,

See Dummetc, "Frege”, p. 22?,
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then encounter a conundru..

if

entire contribution
Of each Of the two
expressions to the fact
that the sentence has truth-value
lies in each having
denotation,
then the positions of
our predication would
be semantically indistinguishable
with the result that
replacing
•( ) ie a horsewith -Native Dancershould be a sentence, a bearer of
truth-value. But this is
not so.

Unsaturation is a solution.

I'rege ruled that
whereas

both singular terms and
predicative expressions have
denotation. the entities they
denote are significantly
different, different enough
that the denotation of
one
type of expression cannot
be denoted by expressions
of
the other type. The
denotations of predicates
are in-

susceptible of singular reference.

Correlatively, the
denotations of singular terms
are insusceptible of predicative reference. The difference
in denoted entities
justifies the assumption of
positions of two distinct
types in such simple predications
as -Native Dancer is a
horse
*

Thinking of predications as resulting
from names
completing predicative expressions,
which are otherwise
incomplete, the denotations of
predicates are spoken of
by Frege as analogously incomplete,
or unsaturated.
Once sentences are construed as
names of truthvalues, the denotations of predicates
then are treated
as functions which always yield a
truth-value as value.
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x.e., as concepts.

Then predicative
expressions, such
as •( ) is a horse',
are said to he
concept-words, that
IS. expressions which
denote concepts.??
similarly,
singular terms, such as
'Native Dancer', are
said to be
proper names, that is.
expressions which denote
objects.
Given this we may say
that 'Native Dancer is

a horse' is

truth-valued since 'Native
Dancer•I

)

IS a horse'

is a concept-word.

is a

proper name and

And so, the sentence

will actually be true if
Native Dancer falls under
the
concept jTojise, false, if
it does not fall under
this concept. However, this last
statement cannot be taken
literally by the true Pregean.
since it attempts, with the
phrase, 'the concept horse',
to refer by means of a
singular term to a particular
concept.

Discussions of Pregean unsaturation
have tended to

worth commenting upon here.
Purth
savrthet'‘.j;cc"^
‘denotes
concept'
"a?= ^ntenLr^"
intended to be related by that st'^i a
p
rt-ciot
<=°r.nects expilcandum
and® 2 xnUca‘or..°^I?|“'"^
Denotation-, p. 22 .
Rnt +ho;':^do not cover the same ground.
.m,
t'
In'
•The class each of whose members
is a primris a
prime , or x(x is a prime) is a
prime', the firs'occurrence of ( ) is a prime' is not
p^edVL.-tive;
the second is; yet at both places
.

•

the

exoressior
suia?ion

w?"h (e.g.)
wi^h
(e ^
That which is a father of
lather of Tom', or '(Tx)(x is a father Tom is a
of To^) is
Tom'.
In other words, predicates do
not always occur predicatively, at
least not in
t^hammar.
And there is no reason to suppose
that
thought otherwise.
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focus upon What has been
called the paradox of
the concept horse. In "On Concept
and Object" Frege responds
to remarks of Benno Kerry
this way.

following example.
•th^con^er't^iir®
easily
ed', snd"thirlF^ai^+f
'
^^inko ..hat the concept horrje attainart
is
fact, one of the obTects
th?t
fall under the concept
concent
.
j«uite so; and the three
wordr"* thJt^nciFt"^*
horse; do designate an object,
but or?ha*
^ery account they do not
designate
a oon-'”
cept, as I am using the word. To

Apparently it is Frege's view
that
The concept horse is a concept

(1)

is false.

False, since the object denoted
by the first
three words is mapped by the
denotation of ’(
is a

)

concept' into the False. ^9

^his is regarded as para-

doxical since the expression 'the
concept horse has been
deo^gne_ explicitly for the use
which, according to Frege,
it cannot perform.
'

Frege's reasons for denying that
(1) is true come,
it should be clear, straight from
the heart of his semantics.

76
79

•

It is perhaps less clear why Frege
must claim

gMlosophical Wr itings

i

,

p. 45.

We might go so far as to say that
(1) is logically
false on^ i,he grounds that any sentence which
results
irom filling out the context ‘the concept
is a
concept' will be false. This would lead us to
construe 'the co.ncept horse as a complex singular
term^ formed througn completing a one-place,^
secondlevel function-name by a one-place, first-level
concept word.

—

'
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that (1) IS false.

Both Dummett and Geaoh,
in rather
different ways, have suggested
that Frege need not say
this. Exploring these
suggestions will serve to
deepen
and round out our understanding
of Frege's semantics,

in

particular his semantics of
predication.
Here is what Dummett has to
say in his paper
on Functions: A Reply".

''Frege

unsuccessfully
and which threaten‘d
theory, could have been
by adopting (to use well-worn
formal instead of the
mode ofi speech. Most people would material
admit that
r-rege made clearer than
anyone had donrbefoJe
difference in
what he callea proper names, logicarro^f oP
concept-words,
second-level concept-words, and so on
.
.
.
bad confined himself to talking
abouo vnese various types of expr es
sion , instead of that for which they stood,
the appearance of paradox, the awkwardness
of phrasing# vhe resort to metaphor, which
pervade
i^’^^bing would all have been avoided. . .
in the material mode of speech Frege
was forced
into such at least superficially
contradictory
expressions as *the concept horse
not a
concept*, 'the function x2 is~not“ function*
but when we are talking about'express
ions^
then we have no motive for denying the obvious fact that ^be g^edicate is a horse®
is a predicate
tried to overcome

...

t

*

What is Dum.mett saying?

For one thing, he sees

Frege *s denial of (1) as a threat to "his whole
system
Not that he regards this denial as capricious.

If

I

read him correctly he sees the "paradox" forced upon

80.

Dummett, "Frege on Functions" in Kssavs on Fren-p.
p. 269.
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Frege for very much the
reason

I

have suggested,®!

If

predicates, like singular
terms, are denotative,
their
denotations must differ
Ollier significantly, if
predication

at

Its simplest is a two-party
affair.

Since Dummett sees
great value in the
distinctions of frege-s
grammar I take
it he accepts Frege’s
parsing of (e.g.) ’Native
Dancer is
a horse’.
And so Dummett would trace
Frege’s difficulty
to the claim that predicates
denote, which he regards
as
mistaken.

However the quoted passage
seems to carry another
sage. First, Dummett wants
to say

mes-

of. for instance,

(2)

The concept-word
concept-word,

’(

)

is a hors^’

xo
is a

that this is unproblematical
from Frege’s point of view.
In this regard he directs our
attention to a note in
Which Frege says that

happens when we say as
regaroo tne senoence **this rose
is r-ed':
The pammatical predicate ’is
red’ belongs
to the subject ’this rose’.
Here the words
^Ihe grammatical predicate "is red"*
are not
a grammatical predicate but
a subject..
Bv
the very act of explicitly calling
it a
„
predicate, we deprive it of this
property.
‘

81

ite
thx.ng complete, i.e., an object,
and thus cannot
stand I or anything incomplete like a
relation; this
IS so by the definition of ‘object*
and ‘relation*."
i'rege on functions", ^^s^ays cm
{
Frcre p. 281.
,

^2.

£]?ilc§^ixai Writing s,

p.

46,

note,

•
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But, claims Durnmett,
riege nad no
Free:e
no reason
to deny, for
instance, that

predicate *is a norse
horse* is
i*, a
^
grammatical predicate.

And no .ore does he have
reason to deny the truth
of (2).
Since (2;. lUte (3), 3^
unproblematic we nay have

recourse
to it in place of the
'
•superficially contradictory
(1).
And similar shifts win
avoid other problems, or
apparent
problems, arising with "the
material mode of speech".
This is Dummett’s idea.
It IS important for our
understanding of Frege to

realize how mistaken this is.
(^)

For

The concept“Word
concept horce!

‘

)

^

To this end. consider
o
“

ic;

^
^orse- denotes
the

F. ege,

this does not state that a
(first-level) relation holds between a concept-word
and a concept.
It is
not. in this respect, similar
to -John loves Mary' which
does state that a particular
relation holds between John
and Mary. It does not. since
if it did then
a concept

would be denoted by a proper name,
which is impossible,
given Frege's account of predication.
Now Dummett recognizes this, and. as well, sees that
Frege also recognized
this.
But it is additionally the case
that (k) does not
state the "intended" relation for the
reason that tnis
would require a concept-word to be denoted
by a singular
term, v,iz.

'the concept-word

*

(

)

is a

horse", and this

too cannot be the case, given Frege's account
of predi-
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cation.

This cannot be. since a
concept-word, it is
explained, is an expression
which denotes a concept.
Thus, (4) is equivalent
to

And this implies
(6)

The expression

•(

)

is a horse*

denotes a

But if (6) were true a
concept would be denoted by a
singular term, which we know is
not possible. Within the
confines of Frege’s theory we can
no more use a singular
term to refer to a concept-word
than we can use one to
refer to a concept. What is
insusceptible of singular
reference may be referred to only
by what itself is likewise beyond the reach of singular
terms.
We see then why if Frege was to
call (1) false we
would expect him to say the same of
(2).
But what of
(3)?

If the intended reference of ‘the
grammatical

predicate 'is a horse*’ is the concept-word
of ’Native
Dancer is a horse’ then since the expression
’the gram-

matical predicate ’is a horse” is a singular
term. (3}
would be false for the same reason that
(2) would bej
singular terms cannot denote concept-v/ords

83.

A similar situation holds for senses*
What denotes
oOmething unsaturated has as its sense something
unsaturated, which sense can only be expressed, or

denoted, by something itself insusceptible of
singular reference.

We must be careful
to keeu

mirr' tnat^
mind

m
•

speaking

of concept-v/ords
and of expressions
,
generally, we do not
na.G in mind various
"mounds of ink", that is,
certain
^

physical objects.

Words get spoken and
written down with
ink. Chalk, and so forth,
but particular words are
not to
be identified with
particular configurations of
sound
waves, chalk marks, or "^nk sootc:
spots. Any ink spot, however
configurated, can be pointed
at by scneone in its vicinity.
This Frege does not deny.
But wo might suppose that
we
could in pointing at an ink
spot point through it, by
What Quine calls deferred
ostension,®'' to the word (if
any) written down with that
ink. This Frege would deny
with respect to concept-words,
and function-names generally. Though this requires
qualification. To take an
example of Frege's, consider
^

•

(7)

Trieste is no Vienna.

Here

'Trieste* is a proper name.

i

'Vienna* is not:

either a concept-word, or part of one.

it is

Though there are

other contexts in which 'Vienna* is a
proper name,
for instance,
(8)

Vierjna is no Trieste.

Expressions, at least in natural language, play
particular semantical roles in particular contexts,
and can

84.

Quine, "Ontological xEelativity" in Ontological
Relativity, p. 40 .
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play one role in one
olaoe
in another.

^

an-^

,
another (or
none at all)

This snr+
^ -u*
sort of ambiguity
would be banished
a lingua eharaoteri ra .

Returning to Dummett, it
should be clear that he
has seriously
misappreciated the semantics
of Frege’s
notation, at least as Frege
understood it, he does not
sense how deeply ingrained
in Frege’s thinking
is the
phenomenon of unsaturation
and the importance
of this.

In this, however, he is
hardly unique. 86

However, the

situation with Dummett is
complicated by ihe fact that
he
his own axe to grind on
related matters. It is not
simply, as earlier suggested,
that Dummett would reject
Frege’s view that predicative
expressions have denotaticn.
Rather, it seems, Dummett would
have us. while recognizing
the merits of Frege’s grammar,
reject, not
in detail, but

in conception. Frege’s
truth-oriented semantics. With
this goes a rejection of the
classical conception of

discusses concerns the sentences
Venus’, and (ii) ’The morning ss-ir
oar lo no other than Venus*.
the evrrpc.
Sion IS* denotes the relation of In ( i)
idenui;i
in (Vi
It plays no independent semantical
role, Lin^ a"
non-deno native part of another expression
which
denotes the relation of jdertit”
-’oo IhUosojQ.h2^
pwStv!
J-aentiL^..
,^ee
•

p. 44.

86.

For instance William Kneale says that
''[ilf we
aistinauish carefully between expressions and
about functions without
-tailing into Frege's perplexities...'
•
opine nt
(
•

.0^

p, 622

.)

«
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"tr'U'bh*

t-viicM

remarks

essay these must
remain passing

Frege is committed, we
have said. 'to the view
that
concept-words, and function-names
generally, are. like
functions, unsaturated.
This suggests that
function-names
speciax case of functions.
And likewise that proper
names. ^including sentences,
are a special case of
objects.
Geach advances this
suggestion.
-The sign of
a function”, he says,
"is i^elf a function
and not an
actual quotable expression!
if so, it is futile to
try to
make our -function sign”
to be a more intelligible
term
than -function-. -89
,

Frege in Dummett's way out*

87.

See '•Truth.% especially
pp. 55 . 56 .

88 .

I'here

is,

funct?o

instate-

however, the following problem
t- ^ n
range of any first-leveT
Tnoon‘,‘for

Argument for * ( J is prime . but we
should also be able to take\L
moon its^iFas'^Lgufunction.
In the first case tS value
'Argument is the sentence
The m-on is prime . But what will
second case? And notice that whereasit be ir the +
in the' flrs
denotes
^^ere appears to be no analogous way
in
,h?
the value yielded in the second
Cc^se, Tn
i.n a manner
consonant with Frege’s semantics.
We cannot say, for instance, that
the value of •( )
IS prime^ for the moon as argument
is such and such
an ODjeCk# lor this would be to treat
a function,
here a linguistic function, as admittiiig
of singular
reference.
<,And similar puzzles will come up
^ with
senses.)
*

>

“

hree Ph ilosophers

*

,

p.

147,
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Nonetheless Ceach feels that
Frege could have avoided
claiming that (1) is false,
and so at least this
appearance Of paradox. He would
have Frege reject the
idea
that such expressions as
-the concept horse
in (i) have
denotation. He suggests that
^

’

just as

sentences with ’some man’ as
their
matical subjects are not
assertioL "about
a conopni

stands neither for
an object; where it is

The Idea is that, just as we,
with Frege, regard the
structure of ’Some man is wise’
as made more explicit with
•Something is a man and is wise’,
so (e.g.) ’The concept
is realized’ can be, and should
have been by Frege,
regarded as a sentence with the same
logical properties
as ’Something is a man’.
And as to the sentence ’The
concept hors.e is not a concept’, which
Frege was prepared
to count true, it and other "sentences
not exponibls in
some such innocent way . . . may be
regarded as nonsensical. "9^ In another place Geach puts
his thought this
^3.yt
The concept horse v/ould have to stand
for a con~
cept if it stood for anything; in fact it
does not, and
sentences in which it occurs are at best
circumlocutory

am

*

(•'falls under the concept horse " = "is
a horse")

and at

90.

’Trege's urundlaf;en" , in Essays cm t'rerCf p. 4??,

9-*

Ibid.

»

,

p, 4?7.
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worst philosophers*
nonsense . "92
It goes with this view
that such sentences as

Native Dancer is a horse
and

Native Dancer falls under
the concept
are just stylistic variants!
they do not differ in
any
way in their semantical
properties, which are more
perspicuously displayed in the
former. A similar attitude
would be taiten by someone
adopting Russell *3 theory
of
descriptions with respect to
such a pair as

ho^

The winged horse flies

winged horse and

it'’flieL°"^

Here the latter would be
preferable on the grounds of
avoiding an inappropriate appearance
of singular reference
to a particular object.

When the offending appearance
of

a singular term cannot be removed
by a paraphrase Qeach
would have Frege count the containing
sentence as non-

sense.
It must be granted,

I

believe, that Frege was com-

nuttcd to viewing certain occurrences
of such expressions
as ‘the concept hor^* as
non-denotative
These

are those

.

like the occurrence of *the concept
hors e
•the extension of the concept horse

92

»

Three P hilosophers

»

p.

156.

*

*

in the phrase

My reasons for
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oxaiming tnis

is that

such phrases are represented
in the
Begriffsschrift with course-of
-values notation by such
expressions as. J(x is a horse)
(See $9.)
.
And this
contains no proper part which
itself is a proper name.
Still Frege would, I think,
have been disinclined
to take

Geach-s advice.

For one thing, Geach is
assuming of such
sentence pairs as those lately
discussed that if they
express the same Thought, then
they are to be accorded
the same semantical accounting.
But this is not a view
Frege accepts, his logicism
requires its denial. 93 For
another, the appeal of Geach's
suggestion for paraphrasing
out offending expressions will
depend significantly
on

being able, in this or some other
way, to handle all the
problematic cases. But to deal with
(1), and others,
Geach appeals to a doctrine of
philosophers' nonsense.
It may be that Frege, even while
recognising that much
of his expos itional discourse went
irretrievably wide of
the mark, would have balked at the
idea that it
was

"philosophers

93

94

*

*

nonsense".^^

^ee also Philosophica l Writings

.

pp, 47-/49

Pl}.i^t.')sophers Geach offers Frege another
solution; this is to use such sentences as 'Horses
are a
kind_ of thing* in place of the likes of
But it
(1).
IS difficult to see how Geach will put this
in terms
of Frege's grammar in a way compatible -with
the truth
of, for instance, 'Unicorns are a kind of thing*.
We
might try *(x)(x is a horse ri x is a horse)', but I
doubt wliet her Geach has this in mind, for, intuitively
speaJeing, there seems little sameness -in meaning
between it and (1).
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Suppose Frege were not to
adopt Geach’s advice
and
continued to maintain that
(1) „as false.
The question
then arises as to what
object 'the concept horsedenotes.
Frege, so far as I know,
never discussed this
question in
his published writings.
This is particularly
strange
since there is a natural
candidate for the
job.

I

sug-

gested earlier (in note 78
of this chapter) that
if such
an expression as
the concept horse
is to be a proper name its
logical structure is that of

a second-level function-name
completed by a first-level

concept-word.

And this is just the situation
with

Begrifi sschrift expressions of
the form

x(x IS a horse)
So the natural thought is to
treat the former, problematic
proper name as denoting extensions
of concepts; on this
suggestion the above two names would
agree semantically
part for part.

Why did Frege not endorse, or even
discuss, this

212

suggestxon?95

^here have been those who
thought that
Frege -s concepts were,
like the attributes of
more recent
literature, in greater supply
than the classes associated
*.-ith them.
If this were the case
then expressions like
•the concept
could not (at least generally)
denote
class6s« Two decade? a'^o
Rninrwxcti/.,
a^o KU-kon Hells was moved
by this
c ons 1 dora t i on to
„
coin the term
V.O com
’concept-correlate* to

h^.

•

95.

But perhaps in the juxtaposition
passages we do find what amounts of
to an sndiL'ement.

aiscussions one quite
needs to assert something about often
a concept,
and to express this in the
form usual fo>"

asserted of the concept into the
contend
lyp one wou^d expect that
tne
the grammatical subject would reference of
be the con-'
cept; but the concept as such
cannot olav
this part in view of its predicative
na-''
tuie; It must first be converted
into an
object, or speaking more precisely,
sented by an object. We designate reprethis
object by prefixing the v/ords *the
concept*; e.g.:^ 'The concept man is
not
empty.
( Philosophical
Writiv^p-s.
pp. 46-47.1

It has been suggested . , . that in
further developments, instead of secondlevel functions, we may employ firstlevel functions • * • this is made possible through ihe functions tha.t appear
as arguments of second-level functions
being represented by their cou.rses-oivalues
though of course not in such
a way that they simply give their places
to them, for that is impossible.

—

(

Grund^^esetze

.

p.

92,)
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speak Of the denotations
of the problem
phrases. 9^
thfs ter. has enjoyed
so.e ourrenoy.
particularly with
Gustav Bergroann and his
students. 9? However the
ter. was
introduced under false
pretences. As we have
said earlier,
CO extensive predicates
are co-denotative; thus
no class
have .ore t,han one
concept associated with
it.

If our suggestion were
adopted, tagging along
would
be certain bizarre
consequences such as that the
concept
ILOT-? Q is the class of horspci
noroes.
But It aoubt whether here
we find a reason for
reticence on .-oge-e part.
His account
of definite description
has consequences such as
that the
Winged horse is the class
of horses. Though undoubtedly
aware of this, he advocated
the view nonetheless.
As far as I can see the
suggested
-

identification is
perfectly coherent with Frege’s
other views.
But let us
not forget that all he gains
in clai.ing that (e.g.)
'the concept horse’ denotes
an object is an avoidance of

96.
97.

R.S. Wells, "Frege’s Ontology"
in Essays on Frege
Gustav .Dergmann, "Frege's Hidden
Nominalism" in
Essays
The idea, however, is more widespread
ohe usage of this term.
Thus Newton
Carver ;
says thaw even Frege wished to
talk about
hence he had to suppose that each
concept hdo a special object associated
with it which
serves only as an object to talk about
when we mean
("Subject and. Fredicate" in
^dwards'^F^^;^^ Vol, 8 , pp. 36 - 37 .} And
‘^e.Uars speaks of "the peculiar objects
which,
"thri?
talks aoout when one attempts
aiiout concepts,"
(S_cl g n_c_e, PerceDtion. and
^
Reality, p, 228, n. 1 .)

^

meaninglessness for the likes
of (l).
cluded by what he speaks of
as "a

kind of necessity of

language -98

literally what we all can
feel

he wished to state.
wlii,l0

i

Por Frege is pre-

ionlsss

So our proposed identification,
is

usGlesc;
ubexess,

Frege’s attitude this way.

Por'ho—
Perhaps
we may reflect

Given that, for all his

philosophy, the concept h^rje
could be a class it did not
matter what it was.
A couple of observations will
serve the purposes of
summary.
In all but his earliest writings
Frege rigorously distinguished between the use
and mention of expressions,
to use Quine’s terminology. He
was, perhaps, the first
philosopher both to see the need for
this and to minister
to It.

It is

thus somewhat ironical that,
excepting pro-

per names, all expressions which play
a semantical role
for Frege are, in isolation, unmentionable
.
These include,
hesides predicative expressions, connectives,
quantifiers,
indeed, all the primitive sjonbols of his
Begriffsschrift 99
This is the first observation.
1

he second builds on the first.

A legacy of Frege's

work is xhe notion of a formal system, with
its method-

ological distinction between constructed system,
object

9 S»

Phi losophical Writln.^s

99 .

The asserxion-s ign (and kiiidred expressions) may
be an exception to this.

.

p. 54.
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langu<ige Go-cailed, and
me ta- language

In the latter proceeds discourse about the
system, including, of course,
directions for the construction
of the system.
One commentator has gone so far as
to call -the distinction
contained in his work between
formal language and meta-language by means of which is
accomplished the construction
of a given formal language,"
"the greatest merit of
Frege". 10° But from the
point of view of Frege's
semantics,
since the primitive symbols
are unmentionable, formation
rules are unstatable. Thus in
place of the distinction of
language and meta-language we are
left with one between
literal language and metaphor.
"I must confine myself to
hinting at what I have in mind by
means of a metaphorical
expression ... I rely on my readers
agreeing to meet me
ha If -wav.
.

In Chapter II a conception of logic
was set out under
which logic is to provide the grammar
of a ( potent ialiy)

universal language.

Attributing this conception to Frege

leads us to consider his Begriffsschrift
as providing, in
intention, such a universal grammar, or at
least a start
of one.
But logic involves more than grammar.
In Frege’s

mature thought laws of logic are called laws
of truth.

Also in II, discussion of this idea led us to
attribute

iOO,

B-V. Birjukov, Tv/o Soviet Stud.i es on Freg e,

101

Philosophic al Writin-^s

.

,

p.

11

,

p.

44,
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to Frege a oorception
of logic on.er which
logic provihes,
schematically, an answer to
the question. How
is truth
possible? It does this
through our providing
a referential. truth-oriented
semantics for the grammar
of logic.
Frege's semantics, in
particular that of predication,
has
been our concern in this
chapter. ,Vhat has emerged
is
that the semantics Frege
provides for his logic seems
to
place a limit upon the
universality of his lingua.
For
the semantics of the lingua
cannot be stated

within the
Though we should not put the
point in a way which
suggests that the semantics can
be stated, just not in
the
preferred notation of Begriffssohrift.
For a "necessity
of language" blocks the
expression of Frege's semantics;
we are confronted with an
essential inadequacy
lin£!ia.

of lan-

guage.

We might sum up Frege's view
hers this way. It
IS not possible to say how
what we can say can be true.
The fact that Frege's semantics
cannot be (literally)

stated consistent with its own
import, what has been
called its self-referential inoonsistency.l<52

10

"Frege's Theory of Incomolete
of _Sc ience , 32 (1965)*,
pp. 329-341; he terns this "fatai" to Frepe's
vi
imilarly Sellars claims "it is reasonable .ew,
j
to
to
demand ox a philosophy that it be self-ref
erentialiv
consistent; i.e-, that its claims be consistent
with
Its own meaningfulness let alone truth."
(Science,
and
p. 208.)
Here SeHars"is“
speaking oi the Trac a tus , but would undoubtedly
^PPly such remarks to Frege's philosophy as well.
ii.ntities

_

,

^ilosophv

p
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widely taken to establish
that something is wrong,
that
at least some portion of
Frege -s views must be
given up
or excised.
Thus Dummett, having
discussed (e.g.) Frege's
Ca.ttxm .-hat ( 1
is false, concludes
)
that
(at first sight trivial)
difficultv
shows conclusively that the
two pjrts of
rrege-s theory
the method of
'
expressions into "proper names," ?lassifvir^
first-'
and second-level conceot-words
etc
,
ani
the doctrine that each' of
the"; kln^; of
expression stands for something
v/ill not
bang^J^ge^her; some modification is
called^
or,

-

"

—

Max Black speaks of "the
disastrous consequences
•
»
of
the view that it is logically
impossible to refer to a
function*'^^^ and adds.
if Frege's view implies that
the very
formulation of the view is nonsensical
f
no further refutation is neededo'b'^

William Kneale, having all so
diplomatically mused that
pb.ilosopher is in a very awkwerd pohe finds himself driven to say
that his thought cannot be expressed

adequately,

goes on to claim that Frege's situation
"is due to a

defect in his theory of language •

^

103»

Dummett, "Frege on Functions", pp, 282-283.

104.

Black, "Frege on Functions", p, 242.

^^5*

Ibid.

106.

Development of Logic

^^7*

Ibid

,

,

p.

p.

242.

501

.

.

pp. 50 O- 5 OI,
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So much for sampling of negative
reaction. Subsequently I shall want to argue that
the fact that Frege’s
semantics is subject to "self-referential
inconsistency"
is not sufficient reason for
rejecting his views, in whole
or in part.
For. I shall argue, this situation
is un-

avoidable
In the meantime there is a somewhat
more internaly

and specific, objection that can be made
against Frege's
semantics. The unmentionability and
inexpressibility

problems trace to the presence of unsaturation
in the
Fregean scheme of things. Unsaturation in turn,
is

in-

duced through the assumption that predicative
expressions
relate to items of what there is in a fashion
analogous
to thau of singular terms.

But, we may object, the effect

produced by unsaturation strains to the point of breakage
the analogy which leads to its appearance.

The denotation

relation between a proper name and its denotation is a
two-place, first - level (semantical) relation taking as

arguments a pair of objects, typically a linguistic object and a non-linguistic object.

Whereas the denotation

relation of a (one-place) concept-v/ord and its denotation
is a two-place,

second - level (semantical) relation taking

as arguments a pair of (one-place) first-level functions,

typically a linguistic furiction and a non-linguistic
function

For want of common terms of comparison the

analogy between these modes of
reference breaks 108 vVe
might conclude that Frege’s
account of predicat on cannot
withstand the breakdown of this
analogy.

108.

Much this point was made to me by
Kugly.
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.
.
.on thorough investigation it will
be found that
the obstacle is essential,
and
f ounded on the
oi our language;
nature

FREGE

CHAPTER
UNSATURATION
$15.

IV

AN ASSESSMENT

t

Names, Sentences, Horizontals*
and Assertions

We shall begin here by
reviewing once more the reasoning which leads, with some
plausibility, to the con-

clusions that arithmetic functions
are unsaturated and in
parallel manner to the conclusion
that concepts are
un-

saturated.

Taking the example

’

2 +3

and assuming that, seman-

*

tically speaking, its (proper) parts
are

—

*

2

’

and

’(

this involves the previous simplifying
assumption

we begin by stating that *2+3

viz., the number five.

'2*

*

)+3*

—

is a name of an object,

also names an object, and we

assume that it is through this that it makes
its contribution to the fact that 2 + 3 has denotation.
What of
*

(

)

*^3

?

*

If it denotes an object, then that object
has,

or can be provided with, a proper name, so that,
if the

contribution of
tafcioii lj.6;s

*(

)+3* to the fact that *2+3* has deno-

in this fact, i.e., that

object, then replacing

’(

)+3',

'(

)*>*3'

denotes an

in *2+3', with

a

proper

name of the denoted object would not affect the semantic
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Character of the larger
expression, i.e., the result
of
replacement would, lihe .2+3..
be a

(complex) name, indeed it would, in this case,
denote the number five. But
this is not so; replacing
•( )43. with a
proper name does
not leave a (complex) proper
name. Therefore, we conclude that •( )+3* does not
denote an object.
(At least
that that is not the (sole)
source of its contribution
to
the fact that *2+3* has
denotation.)

In much the same way, taking
the sentence ‘Jane is
an actress* and assuming that
its (proper) semantical
parts are *Jane* and •(
is an actress*, we say that
)
•Jane* is a name.
In this, we assume, lies its
contribution to the fact that *Jane is an
actress' has truthvalue. What then of •( ) is an
actress*? If it, like
•Jane*, denotes an object, then that
object has, or can
be provided with, a proper name, so
that, if the contribution of *( ) is an actress* to the fact
that *Jane is

an actress* has truth-value lies in this
fact, i.e., that
’( ) is an actress* denotes
an object, then replacing
(

)

is an actress',

in *Jane is an actress*, v;ith a pro-

per name of the denotation of

*

(

)

is an actress* would

not affect the semantic character of the containing
expressi.on,

i.e., the result of replacement would, like

Jane is an actress*, be a sentence, indeed one v/hich,
like 'Jane is an actress', would be true.

no u so; replacing

*(

)

But this is

is an actress* with a proper name

1
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does not leave a sentence.
(

is an actress*

)

Therefore, we conclude that

does not denote an object, or at

least that that is not the (sole) source
of its contribution to the fact that *Jane is an actress*
has truthvalue.
In these reasonings we employ the ideas
of object

and name of object, i.e., proper name, and
it might be
objected that we have nowhere explained them.
But this
is not quite correct.
What we did, previously

($11), was

to begin with certain words and things, and speak
of such

words naming, or denoting, such things.

We subsequently

—

or imagined such

roamed over portions of our language

roamings — — collecting together other words which struck
us as suitably similar to those begun with.

And then

thought of these on the model of the first as denoting
objects.

Thus we increased the extension of the denota-

tion relation at both ends;
more names of such.

v/e

gained more objects and

By such linguistic bootstrapping we

moved tcv/ards the general idea of an expression denoting
an object, which, once in hand,

v/e

then used to explain

proper names as just such expressions.
point,

e xplaj.n

To concede a

the idea of (e.g.) proper name, for in-

stance, we perhaps have not donee

But if not, then

explanation is not possible here.

This situation should

be likened to that of our inability to provide an expla-

nation of negation, for instance, on account of the problem
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of circularity.^

Returning to our examples,
what shall we say is
the
semantic function of ( )+3..
on the
one hand, and

is an actress* on the
other?

•(

)

We may regard the
earlier

reasoning as establishing this
much.
are to have denotations accorded

If such expressions

them, their denotations

must differ essentially from
objects, the (possible)
denotations of proper names.
This was Frege’s position.
For reasons stemming from his
logicism Frege counted
predicative expressions as denotative,
and drew

our con-

clusion that concepts, the denotations
of predicates, are
unsaturatea, this being their essential
difference from
objects. Similarly, for functional
expressions and functions, A result of this is that
sentences get classed as
a species of complex proper name.
This conclusion seems to present a
problem, one we
have thus far passed by. If (e.g.)
•Jane is an actress*
itself denotes an object, then should it
not be the case
that it and (e.g.) *Jane* are intersubstitutable?
And
if they are not, then should we not conclude,
by parity
of reasoning, that sentences do not denote
objects?

Yet

sentences must denote objects if predicates denote
functions.

Frege

1*

There is,
s

I

believe, a wide-spread suspicion that

semantics harbors a contradiction in this area.

See Quine, Ph ilosophy

p_f

Lo/yjc

,

p, 40.

.
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The principles which (in the
context of certain assumptions) lead to the conclusion
that the denotations of
predicates are insusceptible of
singular reference also
(in the context of similar assumptions)
lead
so runs
the suspicion
to the conclusion that the denotations
of
sentences are likewise beyond the reach
of singular terms.
Yet Frege maintained that sentences
are proper names, a
thesis which cannot be given up without

—

—

ur,raveling the

whole semantics.
Black has voiced this thought this way.
The following argument seems to me tc be
a sufficient refutation of Frege’s view that
sentences are designations of truth-values.
We may assume that if A and B are designations of the same thing the substitution of
for the other in any declarative sentence
^isver result in nonsense.
This assumption would not have been questioned by Frege.
Let A be the sentence “Three is prime” and B
the expression ’’the True". Now “if three is
pr.lme then three has no factors” is a sensible declarative sentence; substitute B for
A and we get the nonsense “If the True then
three has no factors” . . . Hence, according
to our assumption A and B are not designations of the same^thing
which is v/hat we
set out to prove.

—

Black here argues that if ’Three is prime* is true it
would, on Frege’s view, be co-denotative with ’the True*.
But since two expressions which have the same denotation

are intorsubstitutable, such expressions as ’If the True

then three has no factors’ should make sense.

2.

Black, “Frege on P'unctions”, pp. 229-230.

Since they
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do not. Frege is wrong
in his view that
sentences denote.
Black assumes that x-xege
Free-e would
wonin not question
the

principle that co-denotative
expressions are intersubstitutahle without going from
sense to nonsense. 1
agree,
but wish to so further
and attribute a somewhat
broader
principle to Frege. The
intuitive idea is that
expressions
which make the same semantic
contribution to containing
expressions are so intersubstitutable,
classes of such
expressions comprise, we may
say. semantic categories.

can provide no general
characterization of the idea of
same semantic contribution,
or semantic category.
However proper names should comprise
one such category, on
Frege's semantics. Thus the
broader principle requirss
that any name of an object can
replace any other name
1

of

an object, so occurring, preserving
nonsenselessness, these
exchanges not being limited to the
oo-denotative. So
also

first-level function-names of like
polyadicity should
comprise semantic categories. Similarly
with secondlevel function-names j and so forth.
We may state this
general semantical principle (G3P) this
way.

If
and/- are expressions of the same
semantical category, then the result
with
in any e.xpression
'^ill he of the same semantical
0
category
-

•

-

as

•

The idea this principle aims to capture is an
old one,
one which guides Plato in the Sophi st

I

should say.

More

to the point of this essay's interests, adherence
to this
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principle is required by
the philosophy of logic
we have
attributed to Frege ($8).
if „e see ourselves as
attempting to say how truth is
possible through spelling out
how
words relate to the world,
then we must suppose that
ex-

pressions which bear the same
semantical relations to the
same (ontological) sorts of
worldly items are making the
same type of semantical
contribution to wholes which
have
them as (semantical) parts and
so can replace one another
preserving the semantical character
of the wholes •
That
Frege came to hold that functions
are unsaturated I take
to confirm that he was guided
by our GSP. But what then
of Black's charge that Frege
was wrong on his own principles to maintain that sentences
denote objects? I want
to show that Frege has a reply
to the reasoning Black
employs, one which leans heavily on
the peculiar functionname, the horizontal. Still in all,
Frege's semantics
does violate our GSP, indeed violate
it wholesale, and
the source of the problems does lie
with the view that
sentences are denotative. But when we get
a better
over-

all view of the lay of the land

I

think we shall not be

inclined to see in such violations a rejection
by Frege
of the general semantical principle.

Nor shall we find

reason to retract our attribution to him of the
philosophy
of logic of ($8),

First let us see

hov/

Frege can reply to Black's

objection? here we shall use the example
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(1)

Theaetetus sits only if Plato
flies.
In this we cannot, we
might suppose, replace
-Theaetetus
sits- with -Theaetetuswhile saving the semantical
(2)
character of the containing
expression. Certainly the
result
Theaetetus only if Plato flies
is not grammatical.
However I shall argue that,
in this
case, the failure of grammaticality
is rather incidental,
at least for thoroughgoing
Fregeans.
Let us

remind

ourselves that (1) would go into

Begriffsschrift notation this way.
Flies

(3)

’(Plato)

^^^S(Theaetetus)
The vertical is Frege’s condition-stroke

to which the

horizontal is attached at three places.

And let us remark

again on certain differences between the
Fregean (3) and.
for instance,
SitS(^heaetetus)
as standardly understood.
Z)

*

Plato)

First, whereas both »|’ and

express truth-function conditionality, Frege’s
sign

is a two-place, first-level f unction-name
denoting a func-

tion which takes any object as an argument, not
just truthvalues. The horseshoe is most typically considered
as

non— denotative , and, whether sentences are treated as

names or not, only sentences are allowed to complete
it
to a sentence.
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More importantly, Frege's

( 3)
differs from the above
in that the horisontal is
counted as a piece of notation
on a par with the condition-stroke.
It too is a functionname; it denotes a function
which yields the True when
its argument is the True, and
yields the False when any
complete denotation other than the
True is its argument.
Thus
A will denote a truth-value provided
only that
c< denotes an object» any
object*

Holding onto these reminders, we may
formulate our
understanding of (3) by saying that it is
the True) Just in case if

true (denotes

—

.

aenotes

the True, which it will Just if ’Sits.
the True, then

'

it will just ix

^^^®®(piato)

*

'

aenotls th^
also.

ru:!

senotes

which

Or somev/hat

more simply, (3) is true under just these
conditionsj

Either *Flies^-,^

denotes the True, or *SitSy«.
(Theaetetus
does not (i.e*, denotes something other than the
True.)
v

•

For Frege such remarks render our understanding of
(3),
lor,
by our stipulations it is determined under what
conditions the name denotes the True.
of this name

—

the Tho ught

conditions are fulfilled.

—

[And t]he sense

is the thought that these

To understand under what

conditions a sentence would be true, its truth-conditions,
is to grasp its sense, the Thought which it expresses.

3

*

Grundgesetze , p. 90.
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Now suppose we replace,
in (3), ’Sits,^^
heaetetus)
•Theaetetus' to get

.

(-O

-J—
*

Theaetetus.

Do we undetstand the
truth-conditions of this? Yes.
(4) is true just in case if
—Theaetetus- denotes the
True then
•
does also. Alternatively
put,
is true just when either
•
denotes the
True or ’Theaetetus* does not.
And so we know that (4)
is true, since we know
’Theaetetus* to denote other than
the Irue,
But this is by the way. Of
importance
is the

fact that, as Fregeans, since we
understand the truthconditions of (4) we grasp the Thought
which it expresses,
-or thciu IS the txiought that these
conditions are fulfilled.
Now we wish to use these observations
to answer

Black’s objection.

I

take our task to be to show how to

render the likes of (4) into recognizable
English.
knoy^ (2)

We

will not do, since it is ungrammatical
and hence

not fit to

e-wxpress

the Thought of (4).

But a suggestion

Dummett’s, made in the course of brushing aside
the
argument of Black’s under consideration, is relevant
Oj.

here.

If sentences stand for truth-values, but
there are also expressions standing for
truth-values whicl'i are not sentences, then
the objection to allowing expressions of
the latter Kind to stand -vherever sentences
can stand a.nd V2.ee versa is grammatical,
not logical. V.'& often use the word ’thing*
to provide a noun where gramma.r demand.^
one and we have only an adjective, e.g..
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•That was a disgraceful
thing tc do'! and
we could introduce a verb,
sav
+
purely grammatical function **
Of^co^^
of converting a noun standing
value into a sentence standing for a truth^ for the
same truth-value.^

Applying Dummett-s suggestion to
an example of his. we
would turn the ungrammatical
construction 'If oysters are
inedible, then the False* into
something we can. with good
Crammatical conscience, count among our
English grammatical constructions, namely, 'if
oysters are inedible, then
the False trues*.
On first reflection it might seem
that Dunmetfs
suggestion would not be applicable to our
problem with (2)
since with *Theaetetus only if Plato
flies* we have no
noun standing for a truth-value" which v/e
could convert
"into a sentence standing for the same
truth- value . " We
do have ’Theaetetus , but this, we assume,
denotes
*

Theaetetus, and not some truth-value.

And it would de-

feat our purpose to think that this expression
had somehow shifted its denotation. For the point of
this exercise
is, as we may put it, to see how to deferid the
claim that

when (e.g.)

Iheaetetus

* ,

with its sense and reference,

replaces a sentence the result expresses a Thought,

Upon second reflection, however, it should occur to
us that there is no reason not to extend (if that is what

Dummett, "Truth", pp. 49-50.
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we do) Dunn^etf s suggestion
to apply to the general
case.
Our situation is that of having
a Thought, that
expressed
by
to render in a recognizably
English sentence.
Why not employ Dunnetfs device
to tailor the nongrammatical (2) to our needs thusi
Theaetetus trues only if Plato
flies. It mist be admitted
that this is somewhat altered
English. But then we might expect
some grammatical

W.

adjustments to follow in the wake
of looking upon sentences
as denoting expressions. The
suggested adjustment
is to

allow (or require) that a singular
term "grow a verb"
when replacing a sentence. Such
an adjustment is merely
grammatical. We must keep in mind that
the expression
which occupies the sentential position,
the singular term
with Its attendant ’’verb’*, has the same
sense and denotation as that we have (or may have)
substituted,
(e.g.)

•Theaetetus’; ‘^growing a verb'* in no way
affects the sense
or denotation of the substituted singular
term. Such,
then, IS the defense

I

would have Frege offer against the

criticism of Black.
We have just seen how such a problematic case
as

that of (2) can be made sense of*

But remarks made thus

far may not make apparent why Frege’s horizontal is
essencial to the line of reply
charge of inconsistency.

I

am offering to the

This since it is possible to

treat tne condition-stroke in such a way as to avoid the
need for its pair ol trailing horizoritalf}

.

Qn Frege’s
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understanding'

—
j

L«,

/•7

;

^

Cienotes the „
True just in case either

does not denote the True or

/?

does. and if we interpret

the condition-stroke just
this way we need not
attach
any notational significance to
either of the trailing
horizontal strokes) they become
.just pieces of punotua
tion.
(And similar observations can
'oe made of the
negation-stroke ,

But there will remain the
"limiting case" where, to
move back into English, a singular
term is substituted
for a sentence which is not itself
a truth-functional
component of a larger sentence. What
do we say of the
result of substituting for (l) , in
entirety, *Theaetetus
Adopting Dumpiett*s grammatical convention
the result will
read*
Theaetetus trues. But what 'Thought is
thereby
expressed? If we think of such substitutions
as proceeding within a suppressed initial horizontal,
then we
*

may say, generally, that

trues* will be true when

denotes the True, false when

u

True.

denotes other than the

The Thought expressed is thus that this condition

is fulfilled where

is

’Theaetetus*, that, in other words.

•Theaetetus* denotes the True.

And recalling a remark of

($9)» a Fregean can make explicit the presumed implicit

English horizontal'* with the phrase
thus we may render (4) as*

*i't

is the case that*;

It is the case that Theaetetus

trues
We have considered interpreting the results of a
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sentence being replaced by a
proper name. For completeness we need to consider what
we shall say of the
results
Of a reverse substitution,
for instance,
(5)

Theaetetus sits sits,

in whicn the sentence 'Theaetetus
sits* replaces
’Theaetetus* in 'Theaetetus sits’?
What sense can we
make of this? As Frege understands
the construction of
predication, a most simple predication
is true just when
the function denoted by the predicate
yields the True as
value for the denotation of the proper
name as argument.
When we think of 'Theaetetus sits' as
itself an expression
which denotes an object then the Thought
in question is
that the function denoted by
sits' takes the denote.-*
(
)
•

tion of 'Theaetetus sits' into the True.

This is the

Thought which (5) would express were it
grammatical,
so eligible to express a Thought.

and.

Is it grammatical?

If

the foregoing has had its intended effect this
question

will not strike us as terribly important from
the point
of view of present concerns.

If (5) is not grammatical,

let us ’’punctuate" it, perhaps with a sprinkling of

hyphens or parentheses, so as to render it graTninatically

acceptable to us.

Once again our position, if we are

Iregeans in our semantics, is one of grasping a certain

Thought which is (perhaps) not readily expressible in the
confines of received English.

(This would not be the

only place v&icre Frege’s theory had an impact on Fnglish
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constructions; think of the
phraseology we accept in
rendering quantifications, or
negations, for that matter,
back into our mother tongue.)
But again, such alterations as attend the expression
of these thoughts
are

•’meaning neutral",

vve

might compare them in this
respect

with the grammatical adjustment
of the ungrammatical
•Some cow are bro-wn- to the
grammatically acceptable
•Some cows are brown*.

Summing up. the point of the last
several pages is
that Frege's semantics is not shown
to be incompatible
with the general semantical principle
by the
line of

reasoning Black sets out.
zontal to this purpose.

We mobilized Frege’s hori-

Let us look further at this piece

of notation.

The presence of the horizontal in the
notation as
laid out in
is puzzling.
V/hat
v/ork does

do?

Why does Prege include it?

it

Is this simply a case of

a piece of machinery held over from Begrif
fs s-chrift which,
hav.lng 'oeen stripped of its earlier function,

supplied with some explanation?

had to be

Our response to Black

perhaps provides something of an ansv/er.

For there is a

natuial iiicli.nation to treat sentences as comprising
a
semantic category.-^

5»

Indeed this v/ould seem to be required

And in effect we have earlier.
below.

On this see note 13,
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by Frege's Dictum.

This category disappears
once sen-

tences are construed semantically
as a case of complex
prop_r nam.es. The inclusion,
or retention, of the horizontal, w.ith its Grundgesetze
explanation, provides at
least the semblance of a class
of sentences.
For we may
think of all ordinary sentences
as simply having 'it is
the case that’ as a suppressed
prefix so that the results
of substituting ordinary names
for ordinary sentences get
accommodated .into an expanded class
of "sentences" along
the lines sketched out in reply to
Black. ^ Thus we may
see Begriffsschrift formulas and
their natural language
translations as forming a kind of
surrogate-sentence class,
the class of horizontals .

However our maneuver does not serve to
square Frege’s
semantics with our general semantical principle,
for the

class of horizontals does not itself comprise
a semantic

6*

If we do not think of English sentences as
having
a suppressed initial horizontal, then we shall
encounter the following situation. There will be
expressions which we shall not be able to determine
whether or not they are ?iarnes of truth- values , even
knowing of their (proper) parts whether these are
truth-value names. Consider *(Tx)(x=:3 or x~R)’.
If *S* and *R* are co-denotative , then the whole
expression denotes either the True or the i’alse.
But if 'S* and *R* are not co-denctative , then
(on Freege’s convention) the whole denotes the
class whose members are the True and the False.
So we cannot determine v^hether the whole denotes
a truth-value, or as we might also say, whether
it expresses a Thought, except by determining if
*S* and *R* are alike in truth- value.
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category, since for every
member of this class there
are
other, co-denotative.
expressions themselves not
horizontals. Thus, let S be any
surrogate-sentence, then
•(Tx)(x=S)- denotes what S does
but. lacking
as it does

an initial horizontal, it is not
itself a surrogatesentence. The sane is true of
•(Tx)((x=S) and S)’t and
so forth. Any such expression
may be replaced by a
horizontal, saving semantical
character, but not converoely. And generally, a horizontal
may replace a proper
name, saving semantical character,
but not conversely.
The horizontal-stroke performs the
suggested role of
fc-niing a Gurrogate-sentence olars
through giving sense to

the results of replacing sentences,
naturally taken, by
names, naturally taken, the semantics
of the horizontal
provides Thoughts for such replacements to
express. But
it can do this only at the cost of its
own immovability

from the position of initial prefix to
Begriffsschrift
formulas.''

So it is that the class of horizontals does

not comprise a semantic category.

So it is also that the class of proper naraes^ which
incluaea truth~value names# is not a semantic category.

7

It could# with justice# be pointed out that in Frege*
grammar the signs for both negation and conditionality suffer a similar syntactic immovability.
The difference is that there is no external requirement fox'" thi.s in their case as there is with the
horizontal.
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And for similar reasons
one-place, first-level function-names do not form a semantic
category. The horizontal IS such a function-name, and
while it may replace
any similar funotion-r.ame, saving
semantical character,
the converse does not hold*
Indeed, for similar reaso/is, it follows
that Frege's
semantics of Begriffsschrift flouts the
general semantical
principle at every turn} his semantics
admits of no semantic categories*
By picking an appropriate Begriffsschrift

formula and making an appropriate deletion
of some name
or names, we can display a f unction-name
of any particular
level and degree; this name may then replace
others
of

like level and degree, but not conversely.

As an example,

take the Begriffsschrift translation of 'Everything
sits*.

Sits (a)’

and delete the one-place, first-level f unction-name
*Sits^

®

^

This leaves the one-place. second-level func-

tion-name.

where

,

as before, is a place-holder*

This may replace

any other similar function-name, but other ouch functionnames may not, in general, replace it in the above.

For

instance it cannot be replaced, saving semantical char-

acter (or in conformity with Frege's syntax), by the
similar course- of -values notation,
Frege's semantics is in complete violation of our

^

^

euided by

incxple xn bis semantics.

situation this way.

.so„,e

such

For we can look at
this

Deeming sentences
denotative seemingy induces failures of
substitution. The
horizontal
serves to localize these
violations so that failure
of
substitution occurs
urs onlv
+v>donly at the
horizontal. Unfortunately
such failure is infectiosic;
xmcctious, and +V
the horizontal touches
expressions oi all would-be
semantic categories. So
the
Whole system suffers the
disease, looked at this
way the
wholesale violation of the
GSP may be seen as
resulting
from an attempt to handle
the more blatant violations
of
this principle brought on
by counting sentences
as names.
Still we should emphasize
that since in the end
frege-s semantics is devoid
of semantic categories,
there
is in particular no such
category whose rsembers are distinctively concerned with truth.
Frege then has not given
us a lingua with respect
to which we might entertain
the
Idea of answering our question
'How is truth possible?*
in the ostensive fashion
previously considered. For such
an answer
“These ways"
would seem to presuppose
that forms therewith indicated,
or all lexical fleshings
out of them, possess a distinctive
semantical character,
the character possessed by those
linguistic items at
which we may sensibly direct the queryi
Is it true?
Again we observe that this situation results
from holding
that sentences are proper names. I would
have us see
•

i.

-

-
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how

"this*

in

"tho

iw.
,

;
PnH
end,
IS incompatible
paoiDxe wi+v»
o «
With a
conception

p.« «=„„ibi. ,„
the first place.

Here we may j-xna
find a ^e^son
»'e''-o7>
0^

that move to be mistaken.

f
.for

+•

•

thinking

There is another, somewhat
subtle, difficulty
which
results from the inclusion
of the horizontal
in the
system of C-rundges^.
Tahe, for instance, the
truism
that the disjunction of
a truth with itself
is a truth.
We would expect a system
of logic such as Frege's
to
encompass this, perhaps
through showir^ by some
means or
other that a self-disjunction
Si

is true just in case

itself is true.

However there is

a clear sense in which
Begriffsschrift is incompetent
to
this task.
And the inadequacy in no way
turns upon the

lack of a (primitive) symbol
for disjunction, which we
may suppose is present. The
problem is that a selfdis junction, like all
disjunctions, has a symbol for
disjunction as its main (truth-functional)
connective,
and^no Begriffsschrift formula can
be so structured. Since
all Begriff.sschrift formulas
lead off with the horizontal, it will always be the main
connective.
V/e

may put the same point in terms of

inference.

a

mode of

To move to a conclusion by modus
ponens we

require two premisses; one is a conditional
which has as
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„„„„ „

It.

,,,
noequent that of the
conclusion. But since
no
Begriffsschrxft formula will
be a conditional,
that is, a
formula whose main
connective xw
is a oign
-irm for
Prt
conditionality* no Be£:ri^f<^«?f'hr"5 -f+
sn.^oocnriit nioves can bo
made in accordance
with modus ponens, a.
at xeaot
least as
Pd this is
intuitively understood. Similar problems
affect
ixtruo vi^ist-order)
(f'’i'«?-+^ nr»-i-»yt.\
quantificational rulec, and so
forth, since, as
suggested, the
presence of the horizontal
i„ £rund^_^e^ reflects
the
dccxsion to count sentences
as names, in the
inadequacy
Of Begriffsschrift to
intuitive logic we may find
a
second reason for rejecting
that decision.
Curiously, thxs problem of
capturing intuitive logic
turns up in CBjndgeset^
„ot just once, but twice
over.
Recall that the Basic Laws
(axioms), and so too the
theorems, of Grun^esetze are
not themselves names of
anything. They are expressions
wherein the assertionsign prefixes a proper name.
Equivalently described, they
are expressions wherein the
judgment-stroke prefixes a
horizontal. Such expressions we
might naturally call
assi^ions.® (But remember we speak of
strings of symbols
of Frege's system, not speech
acts or the like.) Since
the assertion-sign can only
occur in a left-most position.

^

•

8.

In ($9)
sitions

vt-e

followed Furth in calling them propo
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we cannot, for
instance, truth-f
unctionally compound
assertions. Hence the
problems just noticed
with horizontals attend assertions
also.

Assertions are problematic
in other ways.
Since an
assertion of Begriffsschrift
is a law of logic
it must be
trues laws of logic are
laws of truth. But
now consider
the fact that cf some
linguistic items it is
appropriate
to say that the truth-value
of the whole is a
function of
the truth- values of the
parts. This requires
that

we be
able to speak in one breath
of wholes and their
parts as
being true or false. But
this is not so with
assertions.
The sense in which an
assertion is true cannot be
that in
Which any of its parts may be.
For an assertion cannot
contain an assertion as a
(proper) part. And. whereas
truth-valued parts of assertions
are names of truth- values,
an assertion is not a name.^
It seeias that Frege has, or
owes us, two theories
Of truth, both at the level of
linguistic artifact. One
in terms of semantical relations
between words and things,
this IS well arxiculated. And
another which discusses how

truth-value accrues to such non-names
as assertions, this
we do not get. Further we would
like to know, for instance.

And w nave similar problems with
derivations. Rules
of inference are officially stated for
assertions, taut,
xoi .instance, when Frege derives
Russell's paraaox
pp* 130-132) he civoids using formulas
with a prefixed assertion-sign.

1.

.m

1.

....P„pp.

...

.„ „..

....

...

the True.

Further, we may wish to
ask of some theorem
of
Begriffsschrifti *3
I3 Xt
»
.
tmev And
it true.'
do so even knowin?
that it is a theorem.
But it seems that
Frege precludes
this, for to do so we
would have to be able
to consider
an assertion non-assertively.
I do not wish to
pursue further the topic
of Frege

on assertion except
pi to reim-riremark +h--sthat it 13 not imiplausible
that the assertion-sign,
like the horizontal,
found
•

its

into the Gjiundgesetze
system in part at least
under
the felt pressure to recoup
what gets lost when we
lose
v.-ay

senteiices as a semantical
category. I*’

Here we may find
further reason to judge
mistaken the treating of
sentences
as names.
We Shall now return to
Frege’s philosophy of logic
as earlier discussed and
inquire as to whether, consistent

with this and so with the
enunciated semantical principle
required by it, it is possible to
frame a semantics for
predications which avoids the unwanted
consequences of
Fregean unsaturation.

10 .

argued that if you could assert the
True
vhen you could assert the number
two
which 'S
impossible; hence truth-value names are not
assertiDie, eno a new type of expression
is needed.

—
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$16.

Alternative Semantics
of Predication
(1)

On Frege's view
predicative expressions
have denotation, they denote
functions. These

denotations, he
says, are unsaturated,
they lie beyond the
reach of
singular terir.s. As a
consequence Frege's
semantics of
predication carmot be stated
consistent with its own
import

for the Fregean there
is something, indeed
much.
Which cannot be said. For
instance, that '( ) is
an actress' denotes a particular
concept in its occurrence
in
•Jane is an actress'. Here
we can. in a certain
fashion,
show that the expression
is. or is taken to be.
denotative, we do this by
existentially generalising upon
the
predicate position. And in
this way generally we may
show that a certain expression
is denotative, while working within the system, for
Frege any denotative expression
(excepting a lead horizontal) may
yield up to an existential generalization. Sometimes
what can be so shown can
also be stated. Thus we may.
in good conscience, state
that 'Jane' denotes Jane. But
this is the exception.
Oniy objects admit of such
specification of denotation.
The non-believer finds Frege guilty
of saying what
he says cannot be said, he accuses
Frege of "self-referential inoonsistency". This "inconsistency"
and the above
ir.elfaoility are two descriptions, or
accounts, of a
I'hus
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co..on phenomenon, we may
oall it the Frege
phenomenon.
The question which shall
now

exercise us is whether,
and if so how. this
phenomenon can be avoided
or done
away with. More exactly,
given the Pregean conception
of
logic keyed to the question
“How is truth possible?-,
can
we provide a semantics of
predication which avoids the
ineffability, or inconsistency,
attendant to Frege's
account? As to what could count
as a "semantics of
predication", I shall rely on the
content this idea has
acquired thus far in the course
of the essay, though
this
will be extended and modified
in various ways in ensuing
investigations. But a cautionary
note is in
order.

Whereas wo shall be focusing our
attention upon predication
we will do well to keep in
mind that this construction
interlocks with others, notably
quantification, in notations such as Begriffsschrift
We shall survey a numher of
alternatives to Frege's
account of predication, investigating
something more than
a random selection, but perhaps
something less than all

possible alternatives, even within our
task-set boundaries.
The hope is that techniques displayed
in discussing
these

examples will be applicable to variations which
may be

unmentioned so that generality is achieved.
tion

y^e

In this sec-

shall look at a number of alternatives which we

may see as agreeing with Frege in counting predicative
expressions as denotative.

In the subsequent, and final.
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section alternatives which
arise through denying
this
feature of Frege's semantics
will come in for consideration.

Each of the various
alternatives will resemble
the
views of certain well-known
figures, some of whom, at
least, will be indicated.
However in critical discussion
I snail stick with the
basic idea of each alternative
and

not specifically take up the
positions of others, who. in
any case, may not intend, or wish,
their views to be taken
as attempts to deal with our
question. An exception to
this policy will be the position
of Quine, a closer look
at which
close the essay.
Before explicitly taking up such
alternatives we
shall spend a little time developing
a critical

tool, one

which derives from, and works well
in conjunction with,
the general semantical principle which
we have seen Frege's
conception of logic requires. Consider once
more Mane
IS an actressM
On Frege's view this is composed of
two
semantic parts, the proper name Mans* and
the functionname *( ) is an actress'. These expressions
are of dif-

ferent semantical type, since, so gees the view,
whereas
each denotes something and therewith makes its
semantic

contribution to the fact that the whole expression has
truth-value, the denotations involved are essentially

different and thus so too are the expressions.

But now

suppose, for example, we wish a view on which it is

possible to refer to the donotationL=! of predicative
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expressions with sing,,,,
additional

conplications.

-Jane- and

•{

the same semantic catee-orv
category,

is an actress' will
be of

)

oo, with regard to
'Jane is

an actress', our general
semantic principle will
require
that some semantical function
gets performed other
than
those accomplished by 'Jane'
and '( ) ie an actress'
each
denoting something. For we
must be able, for instance,
to replace either one of
these names with
the other with-

out disturbing the semantical
character of the containing
expression. But. failing additional
interpretation. -Jane
Jane', for instance, lacks
truth-value. Kenoe the need
for more in the way of a
semantical accounting

of 'Jane
IS an actress' so that such
substitutions already licensed

may proceed in accordance with
our guiding principle.
Given that neither 'Jane' nor •(
is an actress'
)

be re-

quired to perform additional semantical
chores, it is most
natural to locate the additional semantical
feature in the

juxtaposition of 'Jane' and

•(

)

is an actress'.

account will in this respect differ from
Frege’s.

The new

On

Frege's view each semantical function
performed in (e.g.)
'Jane is an actress’ receives expressional
representation.

On the type of alternative to be considered
a semantical
function is performed by a non-orthographio feature
of

the sentence, the juxtaposition of subject and
predicate.

Now it would seem that wo could represent the additlonci.1

somaiitic roature in explicit notrition*

Since ’Jane'

2^7

and

.(

)

is an actress- are
to be counted of a

co^on

semantic category we may,
without worrying the
syntactic
details, portray the claim
of -lane is an actressmore
explicitly with a sentence
of the form -( )R(.)..
•R' will stand for the
additional notational
element,
it is to perform as does
juxtaposition
in -Jane is an

actress

'

Since any sentence, or at
least any humanly understandable sentence, must be
party to just a finite number
of semantic features, it
might well seem possible to
re-

flect in explicit notation the
semantic features of any
sentence. And i-r thic:
ic -r.
orus IS
oo, xt

mght

seem that we could

orthographically represent the semantic
features of any
sentence with another sentence
semantically indistiaguishable from the first.

(Unless the first already wore

its semantic features in its
orthography.)

To this it

could be objCs^ted that being able
to render any semantical
feature orthographically does not
imply being able to
aceoinplish this with a semantically
indistinguishable

sentence.

Perhaps rendering explicit previously
implicit
features induces additional features newly
implicit.
We need to look carefully at this idea.

Suppose

there is a sentence with a non-explicit semantic
feature,
such as the juxtaposition of 'Jane* and *(
is an actress*
)
in *Jane is an actress' is on a semantics where
the two

pieces are co-categorematic

.

What would it mean to say.
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^or instance, t.at tHe
semantic Sanction so
pe.ro^e.
cannot to onthognapMcaU,
repnesente. .it, a
sentence
semnttcally indistinguishable
from -Jane is an actress*? Just thic?
thrs. +>>«+
that the semantic
function cannot,
literally, be cut into
words cit
at CU.X,
all. Th;This may not be
readily apparent, but
reasoning -n
in ^-srma
.t,rmo of our
example
should make it rso,
I^et

'cx

R/?

•

be a sentence in
j-ii

tne semantic
features of Vane is an
actress, are rendered
explicit
through
functioning
as does

*(

)

-Jane',

ag ^oes
is an aotress-, and <R.
as does the .luxtaposition
of

these two elements.

Now suppose it is said
that

•>:

•

is semantically distinguishable
from -Jane is an actress’

through containing an additional
semantic feature, (Perhaps one shown by the grouping
of ’iX* and ’/? • about
•R’.)
This would contradict the
original supposition, at
least if taken in a way intended
as supporting the alternat.lve viaw being considered.
If %x*,
% and *R*
each performs just the semantical
roles of *Jane*, •( } is
an actress*, and juxtaposition,
respectively, then it will
be possible to deploy these
elements in such a fashion
that a truth-valued expression
results. This might require some incidental grammatical
adjustments, but cannot
require any additional semantical elements.
This is so
since *Jane is an actress* itself is
a truth- valued expression, and one which gains its semantical
character

2^9

under our assumption
through just the three
features in
question. Any new semantic
feature must be superfluous.
Thus 1 .
oiRp* contains an
essentially additional
feature
the original supposition
is ^aioe.
false* For
Pot- ease
o
of exposition
let us assui5i9 that
vnax if .. R/r a?
is essentially
richer than
the original sentence,
then -R- is our culprit,
that -Rdoes not function just as
does juxtaposition
•

i.-.

in *Jane is

an actress' contrary to the
original supposition.
Then
we have failed to pat into
words the semantic function
of
juxtaposition in our example.
Perhaps this failure can
he rectified, but only at
the cost of rendering
implicit
something previously explicit.
This is the force
of the

derived contradiction.

such complications.

To maintain focus, let us
ignore
So we shall conclude that if '^R/S.

e^senuialiy richer than "Jane is
an actress* it will
not be possible to use an expression,
any

expression, to
do what is done in 'Jane is an
actress* by juxtaposition.
Ii this IS the case, then a
version of the Frege phenomenon has been forced back upon us*

To facilitate understanding let us
approach this
through some examples. We may state the
semantic function
Of ’Jane* (in our example) this way,
•Jane* denotes Jane,

Here we use ‘Jane* (on the right) in the
role we are
speaking oi , Again, to take a somewhat different
case,

suppose we were to think of the predicate

*(

)

is tall*
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in, say,

-on,

is tali',. not itself
as a denoting
exoresbut rather as one
which perior.s its
semantical
'Tora

function through being
true of some, none,
or all of
various objects. Then
we cou3d
UJ.U 3-cac..
*•
stat- its semantic
function this way,
•(

)

IS tali'

Is

true of what is tall.

And here we use the
predicate (on the right)
in the role
we attribute to it.
Now. if

are to be able to state
the semantic function of
juxtaoo^i
ti nr, (as in
jujcx^i-posxtion
our exampla)
it seems we shall want
to say something like
this.
Juxtaposition performs thusly.
•

Here, having indicated
the appropriate semantic
relation
(e.g., denotation, or
satisfaction, or what have you)
we
would use some expression in
the role performed by
juxtaposition in (e.g.) 'Jane is an
actress'. But since we
are unable to provide an
expression to perform that role,
we cannot state what we would
wish to say,

Frege was precluded by his
semantics from (literally)
stating the semantioal function of
(e.g.) ’( } is an
actress'. What we have just
seen is that to hold
that

some sentence contains a semantic
feature which cannot
be orthographically represented
in another sentence
semantically indistinguishable from the
first is to be
committee to something of a piece with
Fregs'fi forced
silence. In the example pursued, what we
learn, subject
to some simplifying assumptions, is
that we would be
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precluded by our sen,antioe
fron (literally) stating
the
semantical function of the
juxtaposition of -eane- with
•( ) is an actress'.
Thus if we are to avoid
the ineffability, or inconsistency,
attendant to the Frege
Phenomenon we shall need to
require that our
semantics,

whatever its details, bo in
accord with the following
representation principle
a

sentence possessing a serrantic
feature wnicn is not renrssentad
in
possible to Jonstruct anoxher, semantically
able from the first, in which indistineuishreceives orthographic re presentation

Since our intention is to attempt
a semantics of predication which avoids xhe consequences
of Fregean unsaturation W8 shall want to adopt this
pr.inciple.^^

But

let us keep in mind that to shew
that a particular seman^
tical interpretation breeds inaffacility
through violating the representation principle is
not, by itself, to

provide sufficient grounds for concluding
that it is mis
taken* For we have not shown that such
ineff ability is

altogether avoidable.
This principle, in tandem with our general
semantic

11.

Actually this principle is not as strong as v/e probably v/culd v/ant. It requires the representation of
any feature, but not the (simultaneous) representation of ail features. This, since it allows the
possibility that rendering an implicit feature explicit diminishes one xnat was explicit so that it
IS now implicit#
However the principj.e as stated
will adequately sez'va present purpose-s.
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principle, injects a certain
rigor into our semantical
investigations. When the CSP
turns up inexplicit
semantical features the
representation principle
authorizes
rephrasal into more explicit
forms. Whereupon GSP
may
again be trained upon our
quarry. And so forth.
This
said, let us get on with the
inquiry.
In this section we shall take
up four alternatives
to
Frege's account of predication,
each of which agrees with
Frege in construing predicates
as denoting expressions.
The first three will be versions
of the idea that in (e.g.)
•Jane is an actress', juxtaposition
of the subject and
predicate is semantically significant.
On one view this
has the significance of functional
application!
on a

second, that of a relation! and on
the third, that of a
non-relational tie. The fourth position
to be considered
here attempts to avoid the attribution
of an additional
semantical feature through what we shall
call the "metalanguage move*'.
It is convenient to shift to *2 is
prime* as our work-

ing example of a most simple- predication.
that the predicative part

*

(

)

is prime*

Then, given
has complete

denotation as does *2* so that these expressions
are

semantically co-categorematic and thus interchangeable,
we must find additional semantical work done
in the sentence,

Suppose then that we see in the juxtaposition of

subject and predicate notation for the application of a
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function
represent

"to

3.n tirdJTicGr'"fc.^^
argjTiccnt.

*2

This IS more intuitive
if we

is prime* as

Prime
(

2 )*

Here we have two positions,
these we
(•)
(

eiay

show with

)•

The juxtaposition of these
positions is to be treated as
indicating functional application.
This additional semantic role may then be made express
ionally explicit this
v^'ay,

A [(•),(
or,

)],

in the particular example, with,
A [(Prime)

,

(2)],

which IS intended to be semantically
indistinguishable
from *2 IS prime'. We may read the last
set-off expression as *The application of the prime function
to the

number two*.

And this will be true Just in case the func-

tion in question yields the True for its argunient,
which
it does, since 2 is prime.

However, on the suggested

semantics and given our general semantic principle,
any
naifie

of any object may sit in either of the two available

slots.

12.

And what, we may

v.'onder,

will we say, for instance.

This view is similar to those suggested by A.lonzo
Church in his review of Black’s "Frege on" Functions",
£l Symbolic Logic , 21_ (193b), pp. 201-202,
ilrpdiUcziGn
to Mathematica l Logic, Chapter 0.,
Xl
and by M*U* Resnick, "Frege's Theory of Incomplete
Entities •
'*
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When seething other than
a function is denoted by
a name
in the left position. We
need to provide an interpretation for the notation of
functional application which
will
handle such "waste cases".
But note, the need for
this
does not arise with the
introduction of explicit notation.
It stems from an even-handedness
towards the semantically
akin. Perhaps it will do to
simply take the
idea of

"functional application" broadly so
that we may say that
in all cases where the application
of one argument to
another does not yield the True, that
it yields the Palse.
It is with another aspect of this
approach that I wish to
be critical.

Taking juxtaposixion as having the
semantical significance of functional application requires
agreement
with Prege s view that sentences have
denotation#
We

have already indicated problems with such
a viewj here
we may expand upon these.
If sentences have complete denotation, then
our gen-

eral semantic principle licenses substituting fer
the sentence

'2

In this

is prime*
y/0

such an expression as, simply, *2*.

might suppose we have a violation of our urin—

cipls, since this substitution takes us from a sentence
to a non-sentence.
*2

is prime’

If so, we would have to conclude that

is not semantically explicit.

And if it is

not, for this reason, then neither would *A [(Prime)
be semantically explicit.

Indeed, the condition of

,

(2)]'
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oxpl.c..ne.s „ould p.ove
unattainable. But the
situation
a not as clear as
it „ight be.
We violate our
guiding
principle .hen replacing
one expression by
another of its
semantic type alters the
semantical character of
the containing expression. (Where
the relevant notion
of containment is stretched to
the limit to accomodate
such
substitutions as recently
contemplated.) In replacing
•2 IS prime- with
'S' we shift from a
truth-valued
ex-

pression to a non-truth-valucd
one.
of semantical character?
Ccnstant
lac. .hat
Sion.

enough?

But is this a change

through such substi-

always nave a denoting expres-

Is this perhaps not saving
semantical character

This response is.

I

believe, sufficient to show

that our semantic principle by
itself is not able to rule
cut counting sentences as names
Let us review the situation with
Begriffsschrift
Frege's sjratax. breaches the general
semantical principle
through disallowing general replacemeiit
of horizontals
py proper names.
He thereby gains a class of
truth-*valued

expressions.

And so can, in effect, provide a
semantic.s
for his notation through stating
truth-conditions for
expressions of this class, the horizontals.
And it seems
clear that any notation which is intended to
be inter-

13»

This, and what follows it, is what is referred
to
in note
•
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pretea thro.g. t.e
p.ovtain. of truth-conditions
.iii have
to Uhevise »a:te
syntactically inper^issihle
certain semantically authorised
substitutions if aentencea
are names.
And so perhaps we should
say that whereas
replacing -2 is
prime- with -2- may not
violate the general
semantic
principle, it does undercut
itw
For noiGing
i^ur
holdinfr «
sentences to
be names, thus licensintc
noung such
nssn"?*
o»oh a replacement,
is incompatible with the conception
of logic that motivates
the
semantic principle, since,
if free replacement is
allowed
we shall have no means of
focusing in upon just those
pi

expressions which are truth-valued*

'

To sum this up, if treating
sentences as names does
not lead, with Frege, to a
flouting of the GSP through
judicious sjTitaotical restrictions,
it will result in the
indiscernibility of bearers of truth-value
and so void
the possibility of a
truth-conditional semantics, hither
r^y Frege-s conception of logic suffers. So, I
oonclada,
that the laws of logic are laws
of truth, as previously discussed, sentences are not
themselves names.
Since treating juxtaposition as
functional application
requires sentences to be names, this
approach must be
discarded*
Let us turn to some alternatives which
are not
faulted in this way* Suppose we treat
juxtaposition as

having the semantical
import of a relational
expression.^'^
If predicates, including
relational terms, do not
denote
functions, this move need not
force sentences to be
names.

On this interpretation.

-2 is

prime- could be rendered

semantically more explicit with
something of the form
cX' does the
where
work of -2-, •/.?. that
of
is prime- and -R- indicates
some relation. The particular relation can vary with
variants of the basic
•

idea,

hut it could, for instance,
be that of class membership.
Then the idea would be that -2
is prime- would be
seman-

tically indistinguishable from
the more explicit -2 is
a
member of the class of primes -.^5
However, without fussing over details, a simple argument
seems to show the inadequacy of -this approach*
If -2 is a member of the class
of primes- is a relational statement, then. -(
is a member of the class of
)
prices* v/culd be a predicative expression*
v.»hich, if

and students
instance, it is found, attributed to
S
iit-ge, %
It is often comsentences have denotation*
out this IS not necessary*
1^*

iiarlier
we discussed one cbjection Fresco had
to in^/roducing classes in this way*
In passing we
may mention another ncssible objection* If classofs
are iiriported with the semantics of predication at
the ground level of logic* then there will be hardly
araything left to the Idea that logic is throughout
ev.\dent (J|>5)j this thanks to Russell *s paradox and
the adjustments it requires*
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predicates denote objects,
would itself have
complete denotation. Then, bringing
our general semantical
principle
to bear, we realize that *2
ia a member of

the class of
primes' is not semantically
explicit. For '2' and •(
)
is a member of the cIrc^c; n-p
primes must be substitutable
one for another in. for
example. <2
a member of the
class of primes', saving
semantical character. Nor
could
•2 is a member of
the class of primes' be
rendered explicit by interpreting the
juxtaposing of '2' and (
is
)
a member of the class of
primes' as relational notation.
This would bs to step off on a
vicious regress.
•

'

So. if

the proposed semantics were
adequato,

'(

)

is a member of

the class Of primes' could not
be a predicative expression.
But then neitner could •(
is a msi.iber of (’)' be a twoj
plaoe predicative expression denoting
a relation. Since
this was to have the same function
as j’.ixtaposition in
2 is prime', if the proposed
semantics were adequate,

juxtaposition could not have the force of
a relational
expression. But just that was the idea,
which must thus
be rejected*
oince niithing in this reasoning depends upon
the

relation in question being that of set-meinbership,
we
conclude generally that juxtaposition is not to be
accorded
the semantic role of a relational expression,
not, anyway,
if predicates are construed as denoting objects.

Suppose we say that the juxtaposition of

*2*

and
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xs prime'

)

(

is not to be considered
as an implicit

relational expression, but
rather what we may call,
iollowing Strawson, a non-relational tie.l^
^e as concrete
as possible, let us as before
take classes to be the
de-

notations of predicates, though
nothing shall turn upon
tne specific nature of these
denotations. Then we may
offer *3 is tied to the class of
primes’ as a semantically
explicit version of *2 is prime'.
Now we may ask whether

*

(

)

is tied to the class of

primes’ itself is a predicative
expression.

then

*2

If it were,

is tied to the class of primes’
would not be

sewcxntically explicit, as we could shov;
through use of
the GSP as before. So we conclude
that the expression
(

io tied to the class of prime.s"

)

Likewise, we infer that

self

£.

•

(

is not a predicate.,

is tied xo {'}»

}

is not,

two"-place predicate denoting a relation.

it-^

The

reasoning here parallels that gone through with
the last
pioposal. But in this case the conclusions that
since

(

)

is tied to (*)*

is not a relational expression

neither is it the case that juxtaposition is implicitly
a relational expression,

posal;

is

it is the proposal.

not a rediictio of the proIt is, anyway, verbally, bat

the expression ‘non-relational tie* remains to be ex-

plained.

l6.

See Strawson, Individ uals , p. 169 ff.

260

The semantical funotinr^
of

derad expUcix by

•(

)

^

j

.

.

ux oapos ition may be ren-

i, xied to (•)•. or
so..e such ex-

pression.

(Recall that to deny this,
which would be xo
violate the representation
principle, is to introduce
the
Frege phenomenon we seek to
avoid.)
But what is this
semantic function? i.ure
f^'iore oartinn
paroicularxy, are we to assume
that *( ) is tied to (')*
4
j
\
maKv-s It.-,
i
distinctive
semantic
contribution to (e.g.) *2 i.s tied
to the class of primes*
through itself having denotation?
Let us suppose that
this is so. And that •(
is tied to {•)* denotes,
)
not
a relation, but what we shall call
a tie.^^ Now
x

--,

.-ti

•

if

io tied to

(Geg.)
th.is

•(

{

)

)

*

(

)

has denotation, so too. presumably,
does

is tied to the class of primes*.

Then, if

expression were co-categorematic with (e.g.)

*

2 *,

these would be .interchangeable, and so we
would learn that
(e.g.) the sentence *2 is tied to the
class of primes’
would not be semantically explicit. Since
on the pro-

posal this is explicit, we must conclude that
’{

)

)

and

is tied to the class of primes' are not
of xhe same

semantic category.
(

*2*

This is to conclude that, although

is tied to the cl.ass of primes’

is to be accorded

denotation, its denotation canjict be denoted by a singular
term.

1?.

And so here, once again,

encounter the Frege

For such a view see Bergmann, “
Logic and Realitv»
p, 229.

phenoinenon*

we can encaDsulate
uj.axe thUi
.
this reasoning as
follows.

If relations are
denotabla by
singular ro..
y sin^^uloT'
terms, it must be
that ties are not.^®

At this point we might
reject the idea that the
semantical function of
V
is t’eri to v')*
(
)
I
i .
,
lies
in its
denoting something and explore
the possibility of a
semantics for predications in
other semantical terms.
But if we are going to
approach the semantics of
predication this way, we might be
better off to simply treat
predicates themselves as non-denotative
and inquire directly^ into the possibility
of a semantics for
predication on
which some semantical idea other
than denotation plays
the central role. In any case,
this is the tact -.ve shall
take, we shall pursue this latrer
idea in the subsequent
section. Problems there to be
encounxered can be applied
bt-c.k to vhe other idea
of rephrasing predications in
terms
of
is tied to (•)» and then taking
(
)
this as non-denotative. With this, we set aside
approaching predication
•

'

.

•

through the idea of attributiiig to
juxtaposition the
significance of a non-relational tie.

a

Treating predicates as denotative and then
finding
further semantic feature in juxtaposition has
not yielded

18 .

Unless we wish to introduce kinds of objects in the
fashion, of Russell's tiieory of types; but this
will
not enable us to avoid the' F rege phenomenon, vi?hich
now v/ill turn up over such s laternents as there are
objects of various types*
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a semantics of
predication «nich avoids
the unwanted
consequences of Prege-s own
account. So let us
looK at
how we night attempt to
circumvent the apparent
need for

such additional semantical
accounting through recourse
to
"metalinguistic discourse-’. We
have been considering
Prege-s Begriffsschrift.
enriched to whatever extent
with
carious proper names and
function-names. And we have
been attempting to provide
it, or substantially
it, with
(at least the beginnings of)
an interpretation, a semantics,
otner tnan Prege*s own. Cur
remarks in this vein
are not

framed with sentences of the
notation of which we speak.
This talk we may think of a
progressing in a metalanguage
whose object language is
Begriffsschrift. or kindred notations. This distinction of object
language and metalanguage is useful, even necessary
for the attainment of
full methodological rigor. Against
this background, to
make the metalanguage move is (l)
to claim that predicates
have complete denotation
and we may, as before, assume
that classes are such denotations,
so that (e.g.) •(

—

)

prime* denotes the class of primes.

(2)

ia

deny that, in a

given language, say that of Begriffsschrift,
the denota->
tions of predicates may also be denoted by
singular terms.
(3)

deny also that

s?ich

denotations are altogether

insusceptible of singular reference through allowing
the possibility

th.at

the (or a) metalanguapje may employ
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singular tents to just
this purpose. ^9
But to no avail. This
r.ove

at best postpones
prcb-

leas.

For. if our general
set,antioal principle
is in
effect, then singular ter«s
occurring (actually and
potcntially) in the metalanguage
limit the predicates
which
may occur, or be introduced
into, the metalanguage.
Specif.oala.y, the metalanguage
may contain no predicate
unsion IS that 0. a class
nameable in the metalanguage, Such a metalanguage
would pretty clearly seem
to be too impoverished to even
serve the purpose of laying
out the syntax and semantics
of its object language.
Wa
orxng this point home by observing
that if the metalangvae^e xorms class-no.mes by
applying an "abstraction
operator'’ to predicates, then
the specif icaticn of the

denotation of

*

(

)

is prime’ will itself draw
upon an

inacuiissible predicate*
It might be rejoindered that this
objection prcsiip-^

poses that we v/ill, indeed must, apply
the semantics we
attribute to the object language in like
fashion to the
wetalajiguage, but that this need not be
the case*

we to

fo.^!r:uiixe

Were

that metalanguage itself we would bs free

to offer a different sort of semantical
account of its

19.

Furth reports that both Richard Montague and David
Kaplan made much this suggestion in his discussions
With them of Frege* ("Two Types of Denotation",
P*

21, n* 2?*)

®®

now in a n^.eta.otalanguage,
o 1
than that accorded
expressions of the (original)
oboect language.
j>

Es

•> 4-

»»

This type of response
underscores a fundamental
incompatibility between Frege’s
picture of logic and one
vhich. When thought in terms
of it, encourages such
••i.etalinguistic“ scramblings.
For to move this way is
to reject the jdea of a
logical notation, such as
Begriffsschrift, as (potentially) a
universal language.
To

this we shall return later.

But for now we have found

no way, consonant with Frege's
conception of logic, to
hold predicates denotative and
avoid the Frege phenomenon.
$ 17 .

Alternative Semantics of Predication
(2)

In this concluding section we shall
explore the possibility of diverging more sharply from
Frege's semantics
of preaication through not according
predicates denotations €it axl. For Frege, *2 is prime'
has two (proper)

semantical parts, *2' and

»(

)

is prime*.

This can be

maintained compatibly with both cur general semantical
pij.riciple and the

view

th?».t

each denotes by ruling the

denotations of predicates unsaturated.

If however pred-

icate denotations are objects, then our principle
requires

20.

Recall the earlier remarks on Kalish's idea that
trwth-in-e-model is a more general idea than that of
truth. See also Gvidel's remark in note IB, Chapter
III.
We shall return to this in discussing Quine.

265

a third semantical role
to be played.

But not. we have

argued, with the effect that
the consequences of
unsaturation are avoided. If now
predicates are to be thought
Of as non-denotative such
an additional semantic
feature
will be uncalled for. But if
they make their semantic
o'thoi'wi.s 6

*

so?

liow

let us first consider a

tjqje

of view which agrees

with Frege's (and other views thus
far examined) in this.
A predicate stands in some
semantical relation to some
entity. The divergence is over the
relation! it
shall

not be that of denotation*
We fine, such an idea in William
Kneale's discussion
**

of Fr^e^e*

Ke suggests that we say thatj
in terms of

our example,

*

(

)

is prime*

expresses the attribute of

being prime, while maintaining that
ber two*
genera.lly.,

-The

denotes the num-

attribute so expressed, and attributes

can be referred to with singular terms*

*The

atti'ibute of being prirae* will do, or, equraiy
well we

may use simply *primeness**

And we can, on this view,

state that, for instance, the number two stands
in a
ceix«,in relation to this attribute*
2

exemplifies priraeness*

vieiv

21

»

For we may say*

Further, it seems to be Xneale's

that this sentence shares its content with, expresses

Kneale and Kneale, The Pevclc pTnen t of Philosophv,
p*

566.
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the same thought as.
-E is y
pri„e-

rr
•If

»u
SO, then
this pair
would be regarded by Kneale
i.. a .
y aneale in
way similar to the way
in
e.e thinks Of
2 IS prime- and -2
falls under the
concept prime-. ^ However,
of importance to
matters at
hand is the fact that on
the considered
alternative, the
-2 is primeand -2 exemplifies
primeness- are not
semantically indistinguishable,
this is indicated by the
fact that the latter is
Feruine^v
» relational
y.^aTc-i.i
genuine.
> a
statement,
whereas the former is not®
Each statk-ment is
luscn
m
regarded as
bemantioally explicit. Thus the
reasoning,
..

used before.

which loads towards a vicious
regress does not have a
foothold from which to get started.
There are. however, other problems
with this type of
approach. Consider again the
previous statement relating
2 and the attribute of being
prims,
2 exemplifies primeness

Soth -2- and -primeness- are names
and so from this we may
extract a one^place predicative expression,
(

)

exemplifies

of seif «-exe:r<plificat ion.
”[(

)

(

),

The negation of this would bo,

exemplifies

(

)],

a predicats of non-self-cxempllf ication.

But now if

prci-»

dicates express attributes and this is a
predicate, it
must express an attribute. But it cannot. For
there is

22

.

ibid

p.

26 ?

no attribute of non-self~exemplif
^-ation
c.xj.on far
lor it ^
to express,
since if there were it would
exemplify iteelf just in
case it did not do just that,
which is a contradiction .23
But if there is no attribute
for •-[( ) exemplifios

—

)]•

(

to express, then, if •-[(

)

expresses

(

)]•

is indeed a

predicate, it is not the case
that predicates, generally,
express attributes, and so a
semantics of predication
cannot bo provided in these terms

On the other hand, if '-[{

not a predicate, then neither
i'hus,

for want of a predicate,

)

is
v-e

exemplifies
•(

)

(

)]•

exemplifies

is

(

shall not be able to

state such relations as hold between
objects and attributes
as that we seemingly put in words
this wayi
2 exemplifies
primeness. Generally, if there are
attributes which
things exemplify, we shall not be able to
say that this
xS so, at least not if we are
conceiving our semantics

of predication as turning upon this
relationship*

So

v/e

see that, once again, ineffability is the
cost of gaining

an account of predication.

23 .'

Here we encounter a form of Russell
paradox, and
we draw' Russell’s conciuoion, the only one compatible
with Iroge's philosophy of logic, that something we
thought we had described does not exist.

2h,

deny this v/ould be to deny that every predicate
has a negatio?3, and so to reject standard logic.
the negation of a sentence has a sense,
the sentence itself is without sense." Frege,
J^iiiCb^ ophical W ritings , p. 104.)
o?o
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A similar problem
occurs over such statements
as
IS prime' expresses
(
)
primeness,

Which purports to state a
relation between a oredicate
and an attribute. From
this vve may extract a
one-place
predicative expression#
(

)

expresses

(

}

of self-expression, which
in turn, by negation,
gives «s
one of non~self-expression#
“[(

)

expresses

(

)]„

But. much as before, there is
no attribute for this predicate to express, since if there
were it would be one
which has a particular trait
oust in case it does not
have that trait. ^5
predicates, then
it cannot be, generally, that
predicates express attri-

butes.

In which cass we cannot provide
an account of

predication in these terms.

Thus to gain an account cf

predication along these lines we shall have
to deny that
-C( ) expresses < )]• and •( ) exprssses
}
are
(

icates.

that

•(

But then
)

v/e

'

pred-

shall not be able to state (e*g,)

IS prime* expresses p.rimeness# at
least not if

we are limited in our attempted semantical
accounting to

25*

attributes do we suppose v/e are speaking of? I
can say this# but no more. Any expression which
expresses an attribute wh.ich it itself exemplifies,
expresses the attribute of self-expression. And
analogously lor the attribute ol' nori’'Seif--oxpres 3 ion*
Vthat
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drawing upon expressions
of bewantical
sewartic;,! categories
employed
in the account aso reouirpri
lequired by Frege's
conception of logic.
Thus, inuch ss before, we
shall conclude that if
there are
attributes which predicates
er.press we cannot say that
this is the case, or at least
not in such a way
•

as to

thereby provide an account of
predication.
have an account of predication
it

Again, if we

is one. as was Frcge-s.

Which requires its

ow'n

ineffability.

It rernains to emphasise that
these difficulties with
the approach just consldorp'*
are quite general; they attend
any approach to predication which
proceeds in terms of
treating each predicate as relating
semantically to some
ejitity.

This .may encourage us to try a somewhat
different
approach, ona which does not rely on
thinking of
each

predicate as pertorming its semantic function
through
relating to some particular non-linguistic
entity. Suppose
we assume that, for instance, '2 is
prime* has
just two

(proper) semantical parts,

-Z-

and

’(

)

is prime*.

that *2', as all along, denotes the number

tv/o.

And

But now,

instead of bringing in new entities in terms of which
to

speak of the semantical contribuxion of predicates, let
us attempt; to provide a semantics of predication
in terms

of just the sort of things whicn our singular terms are
cJcnoiving.

such as

’(

And so we shall say that a one-place predicate,
)

is prime*,

is tru e of such objects,

some.
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none, or all o-^
O. thpm
ao -n,
them as
the case may be. or
that various
objects satisfy various
predicates
^
x'-cxi.cs.
In the
tho case of *2
in
is
prime*, we shall sav xnat
sc,
y that
2.3 prime*
(
)
is true of (or
satisfied by) all obipotc
^
are prime, and so *2
is
pi ime
wi ll be true iu^^t if
4
11
denotes
one of those
primes
•

^

.

.

*

Since on this approach we
do not proceed in terms
of
some relation holding of
predicates and classes or attribui-us,

or the like, it will be
immune to the first of the

pair of diffiouities with the
last considered idea, that
is. our account of predication
will „ot uncover a version
of Russell's paradox.
However, the second of those
difficulties is still
with us; we shall, in this semantics,
turn up a version
of Grelling-s paradox. From,
for instance,
TvvO

we

ma^r

extract
(

of

satisfies

)

3,

satisfies

)

)

(

is prime',

one—place predicate,

self "Satisfaction*
*•[(

'

(

),

Its negation will be,

satisfies

(

}],

conveying non-self-satisfaction? this will be
satisfied
hy just those things which do not satisfy
themselves.
But now what of this predicate itself?

It will satisfy

itself just in case it is a non-self-satisfier, that is,
juot if ib does not satisfy itself.

contradiction.

We come again >ipon a

Since we cannot live with this, something
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will have to be denied or
given up.
In the analogous situation
with the previous alternative we denied the existence
of a particular attribute,
the (supposed) attribute
expressed by the predicate of
non-self-c-xpression. But since we
are no longer viewing
predicates as functioning senanticaily
through relating
to particular entities our situation
is one in which, to
put the point in a paradoxical
manner, we have no entity
around to. deny, or none whose denial
would be to

the point.

In the earlier situation, denying
the attribute led
to denying that •( ) expresses
) •
was a predicate.
(
There we argued that if this were a
predicate and predicates express attributes, then it. and
so its negation,
would have to express an attribute; but
in the latter case
at least that there is such an attribute
is denied.
And
here is a parallel with the present situation,
for in this
case we are constrained to deny that •(
)•
satisfies
)

is a predicate.

cate,

.so

Here we argue that if this were a predi-

too wou3d be its negation-

through wi

all as the case may be
)

But then in carrying

the idea that piedicates function senantica.ily

through being satisfied by objects

*-[(

satisfies

(

)]•

—

•

—

some, none, or

we encounter the fact that if

is a predicate, then it satisfies

Itself just in case it does not satisfy itself.
are not to deny the existence of the expression
i-Sfi.es

(

(

)*, which would be absurd.

Here we
*(

)

sat-

What we deny is the
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possibility Of this expression,
or any other, performing
a particular predicative
function;
deny that •( ) aatisfies ( )• is a predicate.
So. once again, we find
our-

selves in a situation where,
if we have an account
of
predication, it is one which we
cannot state, or cannot
state compatibly with that
account itself. Once again
the Frege phenomenon is encountered.
This completes my survey of
alternative semantics
lor predication; I am ready to
conclude that the unwanted
consequences of unsaturation are unavoidable.
However,
since the last considered alternative
is essentially that
of Quine {following Tarski), it will
prove instructive to
consider what Quine's position is on the
Frege phenomenon.
This will serve to put the course of our
inquiry
into

perspective.

And it may also help to dispel the feeling*

which some may have, that the problems we have
been re«
peatedly encountering stem from the sort of failure
to

keep sti-aight use and mention Tarski wrote of this
way*
People have not always been aware that the
language bout which we speak need by no
means coincide with the language in which
we speak# They have carried out "the*~ernan“
tics ol a language in t?iat language itself
end, generally speaking, they have pi*oceeded
as though tpere was only one language in
^
the world.
?»

Our general conclusion does not,

26 .

I

should say, depend

Tarski, **The Hstablishment of a Scientific Semantics M
in Lo gic , Semantics , aj^ci Me t amat he ,i\a 1 1 c s , p. ^i02.

2?3

upon inattention to such matters

shall briefly review some of
Quins's remarks in
Chapter 2 "Grammar" and Chapter
3 "Truth" of his recent
Philos^hj Of Logic. In this I will
assume rather much
as to the reader's familiarity
with Quine's use of
I

Tarski's work on defining truth for
formalised languages,
and also with Tarski's work itself,
though more with his
“results’, how the thing goes, than
with the technical
details*

For his canonical notation Quine employs
a ’'standard
logical grat.imar" of an "austere" sort,
one which draws
upon just (nearly enough) four constructions
£r<^C 3 ti.^
.
consists in the adjoining of predicates (of
various
de-

gree) to (appropriately

.n.any)

variables.

Open sentences,

with free variables, result? these are considered
sentences

fur

pcij.

poses oi exposition*

(The grammar vises no names

and a single style of variables, in Quine’s familiar
fashion.)

ion consists in prefixing a sign for nega-

tion to a sentence.

Con J u_nc_tion consists in joining two

sentences with a sign for conjunction*
2-

8.T)

And existentia l

construction whereby through prefixing

cxi£'tential Quantifier to an open sentence whicn has

an alpluibeticaiiy similar free variable a closed sentence
may result.

(And will result if the open sentence

con-"

taincd just one free variable.)

Subsequently Quine tuzns to provide a semantics for
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this notation, and so for
any language with just its
gramisar.
He offers a semantics of
predication in terms
of a notion of satisfaction
which is a generalised version
of the idea we have considered.
The generalization occurs
in speaking of open sentences
as satisfied by sequences
of objects) this allows its
application to such expressions
as polyadic predications, which
we have conveniently i-r_
riorea«

Indeed, xhe sacisf action concept
of Tarski's which

Quins employs is adequate to provide
a seinantics for the
entire canonical notation; no other
semantical idea need
be called upon. This semantics
has its penultimate cui»
mination in a recursive, or inductive,
definition of satisfaction lor a language ouilt upon the grammar
of the

notation} the definition will have one step
for each of
the predicates of the particular languafie,
and then one

step

1.01

each of the constructions of negation, conjunc-

and existential quantificatioru

Given this, a

definition oi truth for a language falls
is true if always sstisfied*

a sentence

i.e., satisfied by any

sequence whatsoever; false, otherwise.

simply pass by the details.

oiit;

Here we shall

Quine then shows us how to

go about transforming such an inductive definition into

an explicit, or direct, definition» d.rawing upon ideas
due to Frege*

?<!ore

of this in a moment.

Suppose that the logical grammar has been stocked

with some predicates.

Tht^n we have not

merely a grammar.
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or ianguage.frar.e, but a
language in which we are
able
to say things. Call this the
object language. And call

then our ordinary, unf0nr.ali7.ed
mother tongue its metalanguage. What can be said in the
object language will
depend to some extent upon what
predicates we have introduced into it. Thus if it lacks the
predicate ( } is a
cows then we shall not be able to speak
*

in it of cows,

unless in other terms.

And there

v/ill be

no point in

our taking cows among the values of
the variables of the
object language. Ail this, I repeat,
from the vantage
point of our unreconstructed mother tongue.
Similarly,
for instance, with the predicate *(
is a class' or the
)

relation cf set-membership.

If the object language lacks

the Cleans for speaking of sets, then

v/e

have no reason to

count sets amcivg the values of its variables.

And this

e\en though in pro\-iding a semantics for the object

language

v/s

do, at least in effect, speak of sets through

our talk of sequences satisfying expressions.

Let us get back to the matter of turning a recursive

definition into a direct one.
our metalanguage.

Set theory is available in

Though it is somewhat indefinite as to

Just v;hat this set theory is, as to v/hat are its existence

assumptions, or requirements .

The point at hand is that

given sufficient set-theoretic resources in our metalanguage we can turn our recursive definition of satis-

faction for the object language into a direct definition
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thereby elirrdnating the talk of
truth and satisfaction as
directed upon object language
sentences in favcr of
(just)
the language of logic and set
theory.

The trick here is

to take the steps, or clauses,
of the recursive definition
of satisfaction
there will be 3-^n, where n =
the number
of predicates
and replace 'satisfies* by a
variable.
We can then state that the satisfaction
relaticn. which
will be a certain set of ordered pairs,
is that relation
which answers tc the open sentence
constructed as just
described. This sentence we may abbreviate^
with Quine,
to
•
Again we do not linger over the details,
and
shall simply assume that wa have such a
definition of

—

-

satisfaction for some sample object language.

And gener-

ally, that we know that no matter how well
supplied our

object language may be v/ith predicates, we may
always

directly define satisfaction for it in the metala?iguage
(If satisfaction gets defined directly, truth will
also,
taggi?ig along as before.)

Having sketched this in, Quine proceeds to develop
a version of Grelling's paradox.

Ke reasons that if our

object language were itself to have the resources of set

theory and devices sufficient to enable us to speak

v;ith

it of expressions of the object language, then it would

seem that we could reconstruct in the object language the
direct definition of its own satisfaction predicate.
Thus we Y/ould, in effect. have in the object language a

predicate

satisfies (•) a»d so also the
predicate
-[< ) satisfies ( )]•, from which
we move directly to
contradiction as before.
•{

)

The stage is set.

What does Quine say now?

does he react to this looming
contradiction?

where our interest lies.

Th:.s

How
is

Here is the response.

The induc-cive definition , .
was all right,
ana can be translated wholly into
the
language except of course for the new cbiect
that is being inductively defined -- term
the verb
satisiies*. Accordingly
which we
get from fthe steps of our recursive
tion Ox satisfies*] by dropping that definiverb
and supplying 2 *, is fully translatable
into
the object language, moreover 'SR^*
does
indeed require of 2 that its member pairs
be
pairs <x,yg such that x satisiet> y.
i)0
tar go good. But is there a
set 2 meeting this requirement 'F',"T''7~'che
ansv/er is , . . negative, by redurt-'o F*d
such seTrrr"oF\vF“wouid
be Daclc in Grolling’s contradiction,^?
,

*

*

If

’(

)

satisfies (*)* were a predicate of the object lan-

guage and object language predicates are satisfied by
se-

quences oi objects, then there would have to be a set of
sequences ansv;ering to this predicate.

And though from

the perspective of the metalanguage it seems
of vhe

v/e

can speak

satisfaction set” of the object language, it can-

not be that this set is among the values of the variables
of the object language.

It cannot, since otnerv/ise con-

tradiction would ensue.

And this is so despite the fact

2? 8

Quine, Phi l osophy of Lo gic , pp.

A4-'4'5.
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that the imagined object
language

Riay

employ a relation

of class«Tnembership,

Thus Quine takes GrelUng's
paradox as it turns up
in the context of a Tarskian
senantics in much the spirit
of Russell -s paradox, each
brings home to us that something doss not exist* Two paragraphs
dowTi he continues
on this theme*
•
•
we have been forced by Grelline-'s
•
Paradox to repudiate a siipoosed set
z.
But it
Should be noted that this repudiakon
a
in this respect:
the
that
repudiaxes was not a set xha**"
was purportedly determined by any
open seny:y?ssible in the object language. It
purported inaeed to be the set of ail
pairs
NXiy,> such that x Satisfies
y? sra so Dur—
ported indeed to be dexermined by the
open
sente?^xe 'x satisfies y* *
But this is not a
sentence of the object language* As
Greiling’s
paradox has taught^us, it is untranslatable
foreign language

L

k.

Quine *s conclusion is an interesting one*

Let us

hold it in abeyance for a moment while we
recall some remarks he has made elsewhere on the theme of the
universal

adequacy of standard logical notation*

Taking the canonical notation • « «
austerely^ • * « we have just these basic
constructions? predication* universal
quantil icat ion • • ** and the truth functions (reducible to one) * * * Wihat thus
confronts us as a scheme for systems of the
world is that structure so well understood
by present-day logicians* the logic of
quantification or calculus of predicates*
Not that the idioms thus renounced are

26.

Ibid*

*

p« 45
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supposed to be u^eeded in
the market
laboratory . . . The doctrineplace
onli
^ such a
only that
canonical idiom can ho o>>
adhered to in the atete-"
Bent of one s scientiiio theory.
B»nt°of'*-^"?
The
doctrine is that all traits of
reality
worthy of the name car. be set
do-m in an
idioai of this austere form
if in any idiom.
Quine'S cancnicsl idiom is much
the same

as that in which

Frege couched fundamental logic
in

hi.s

Begriffsschrif t-

And Quine's doctrine, as here
stated, partakes of much
the same spirit as the view
attributed to Frege in our
discussion of the idea of logic as
lingua

cj^acto^^

($ 6 ),

Now returnii-ig to Quine's conclusion

j'ioted

before, let

us observe that, with regard to
our reflections upon the

Frsge phenomenon, the upshot of Quine's
viev73 is much the
same as that we have arrived at, with
Proge, For when,
with Quine, we set out to set dovm traits
of reality, we
shall sally forth in the knowledge that we
shall be pre-

cluded from stating, in a general way, how it
is that such
truths as wc manage to inscribe do succeed in
reflecting
reality®

For to say this we would need, what we cannot

have, an expression of the idiom with the meaning of
(

)

satisfies

(

)
'

'

The semantics of the idiom resists

its own statement in the idiom.

This we know.

Thus

v/e

also know that our attempts at its statement are, strictly

29 ®

Quine, Word

a.nd

Object, p. 228 ®
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speaking, “untranslatable
foreign language", that
is.
meaningless to speaker.® of the
idiom.
Let us cover this ground once
more, We begin by
carving out a bit of language
upon which to reflecti
the
grammar of logic together with
such predicates as we
choose
to include. This done v/e spsak
of it as the object
lan-

guage about which wa reason in
the remaindei- of our
language, the metalanguage so-called.
But then if. with
Quine, we think of this -object
language- as a canonical
notaticn, as a lang;uage in which,
given suitable predicates, we can set down any -trait
of reality worthy of
the name , then these metalinguistic
ruminations take on
a somewhat different cast.

They come to taka place in a

kind Of limbo.

For if the import of such remarks
should
escape expression in the -object languagewe
shall,

ultimately and upon taking up the perspective
of the
-object language” look back upon this discourse
as

non-

sense*

Quine
idiom*

&

And such, in a curious way, is the situation
with
attempt to provide a scraantics for the ‘’austereFrom the point of view of this idiom

v<fe

are able

to grasp the point of the direct definition of
satisfac-

tion v'hich was offered in the -metalanguage", for we

appreciate the point of the recursive steps which lead
up to it.

This despite the fact that since we cannot

pull this talk down into canonical idiom

v/e

must, so long

as W8 retain this perspective, regard the earlier discourse
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&s lacking literal ineaning.

Ultimately then the meta-

language is at best metaphoric.

Or, to alter and invert

the image, our metalinguistic exercises
provide us with a
scaffolding with which to construct the
object language,
and in this they have a pragmatic or
instrumental
use;

still this significance is only instrumental,
forf as we
have seen, they are like Wittgenstein’s

ladder, to be dis-

carded once used,'^^

My conclusion is that the Frege phenomenon
is real.
Pz*ege*s conception of logic is truth-oriented.

It encour-

ages us to provide for our preferred notation a
clear understanding of how it is that sentences of this notation
are

true, if true, through supplementing its syntax with
a

truth-conditional semantics.

This, together with a claim

to universal adequacy for the notation, focuses attention

upon the question*
swer

Yfas

How is truth possible?

tmstateable in its

om

terms.

Frege’s an-

He held, in effect,

that a necessity of language precludes the answering of
our question.

I

think he

v/as

right.

It remains to assess

the importance of this.

30.

Quine uses Wittgenstein’s image to a related purpose
in discussing the nature of the ccmpieteness proof
for quantification theory.
{'Reply to Strawson'S
S>q> these , I9 (1968), p, 29?.)
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